World happiness report: Año 2018 by Sustainable Development Solutions Network
2018
John F. Helliwell, Richard Layard and Jeffrey D. Sachs

The World Happiness Report was written by a group of independent experts acting 
in their personal capacities. Any views expressed in this report do not necessarily 
reflect the views of any organization, agency or programme of the United Nations.
Table of Contents
World Happiness Report 
2018
Editors: John F. Helliwell, Richard Layard, and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
Associate Editors: Jan-Emmanuel De Neve, Haifang Huang 
and Shun Wang
1 Happiness and Migration: An Overview  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 3 
 John F. Helliwell, Richard Layard and Jeffrey D. Sachs
2 International Migration and World Happiness  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .13 
 John F. Helliwell, Haifang Huang, Shun Wang and Hugh Shiplett
3  Do International Migrants Increase Their Happiness  
and That of Their Families by Migrating?  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 45 
Martijn Hendriks, Martijn J. Burger, Julie Ray and Neli Esipova
4 Rural-Urban Migration and Happiness in China  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 67 
 John Knight and Ramani Gunatilaka
5  Happiness and International Migration in  
Latin America  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 89 
Carol Graham and Milena Nikolova
6 Happiness in Latin America Has Social Foundations  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 115 
 Mariano Rojas
7 America’s Health Crisis and the Easterlin Paradox  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 146 
 Jeffrey D. Sachs
  Annex: Migrant Acceptance Index: Do Migrants Have Better 
Lives in Countries That Accept Them?   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 160 




Happiness and Migration: 
An Overview
John F. Helliwell, Vancouver School of Economics at  
the University of British Columbia, and Canadian Institute 
for Advanced Research
Richard Layard, Wellbeing Programme, Centre for  
Economic Performance, at the London School of  
Economics and Political Science
Jeffrey D. Sachs, Director, SDSN, and Director, Center  
for Sustainable Development, Columbia University
The authors are grateful to the Ernesto Illy Foundation and the Canadian  
Institute for Advanced Research for research support, and to Gallup for data  
access and assistance. The authors are also grateful for helpful advice and  
comments from Claire Bulger, Jan-Emmanuel De Neve, Neli Esipova,  
Carol Graham, Jon Hall, Martijn Hendriks, Haifang Huang, Marie McAuliffe,  
Julie Ray, Martin Ruhs, and Shun Wang.
World Happiness Report 2018
Increasingly, with globalisation, the people of 
the world are on the move; and most of these 
migrants are seeking a happier life. But do they 
achieve it? That is the central issue considered  
in this 2018 World Happiness Report.
But what if they do? The migrants are not the 
only people affected by their decision to move. 
Two other major groups of people are affected 
by migration:
• those left behind in the area of origin, and
• those already living in the area of destination.
This chapter assesses the happiness consequences 
of migration for all three groups. We shall do this 
separately, first for rural-urban migration within 
countries, and then for international migration. 
Rural-Urban Migration
Rural-urban migration within countries has been 
far larger than international migration, and 
remains so, especially in the developing world. 
There has been, since the Neolithic agricultural 
revolution, a net movement of people from the 
countryside to the towns. In bad times this trend 
gets partially reversed. But in modern times it 
has hugely accelerated. The timing has differed 
in the various parts of the world, with the biggest 
movements linked to boosts in agricultural 
productivity combined with opportunities for 
employment elsewhere, most frequently in an 
urban setting. It has been a major engine of 
economic growth, transferring people from lower 
productivity agriculture to higher productivity 
activities in towns.
In some industrial countries this process has 
gone on for two hundred years, and in recent 
times rural-urban migration within countries has 
been slowing down. But elsewhere, in poorer 
countries like China, the recent transformation 
from rural to urban living has been dramatic 
enough to be called “the greatest mass migra-
tion in human history”. Over the years 1990-2015 
the Chinese urban population has grown by 463 
million, of whom roughly half are migrants from 
villages to towns and cities.1 By contrast, over the 
same period the increase in the number of 
international migrants in the entire world has 
been 90 million, less than half as many as rural  
to urban migrants in China alone. Thus internal 
migration is an order of magnitude larger than 
international migration. But it has received less 
attention from students of wellbeing – even 
though both types of migration raise similar 
issues for the migrants, for those left behind,  
and for the populations receiving the migrants.
The shift to the towns is most easily seen by 
looking at the growth of urban population in 
developing countries (see Table 1.1). Between 
1990 and 2015 the fraction of people in these 
countries who live in towns rose from 30% to 
nearly 50%, and the numbers living in towns 
increased by over 1,500 million people. A part of 
this came from natural population growth within 
towns or from villages becoming towns. But at 
least half of it came from net migration into the 
towns. In the more developed parts of the world 
there was also some rural-urban migration, but 
most of that had already happened before 1990.
Table 1.1: Change in the Urban 
Population in Developing  
Countries 1990–2015




in %  
urbanised
China + 463m + 30%
Other East Asian 
and Pacific
+ 211m +11%
South Asia + 293m + 8%
Middle East and 
North Africa
+ 135m + 9%
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
+ 242m + 4%
Latin America 
and Caribbean
+ 191m + 10%





If rural-urban migration within countries is an 
age-old phenomenon, large-scale international 
migration has increased greatly in recent years 
due to globalisation (see Table 1.2). In 1990 there 
were in the world 153 million people living 
outside the country where they were born.2 By 
2015 this number had risen to 244 million, of 
whom about 10% were refugees.3 So over the last 
quarter century international migrants increased 
by 90 million. This is a large number, even if 
dwarfed by the scale of rural-urban migration. In 
addition, on one estimate there are another 700 
million people who would like to move between 
countries but haven’t yet done so.4
Of the increased number of recent migrants, over 
a half comes from migration between continents 
(see Table 1.3). There were big migrations into 
North America and Europe, fuelled by emigration 
from South/Central America, Asia and Africa. 
There were also important flows of international 
migrants within continent (see Table 1.4). In Asia 
for example there were big flows from the Indian 
sub-continent to the Gulf States; and in Europe 
there was the strong Westward flow that has 
followed the end of Communism.
From the point of view of the existing residents 
an important issue is how many immigrants there 
are, as a share of the total population. This 
requires us to look at immigrants as a fraction  
of the total population. At the world level this 
has risen by a half in recent years (see Table 1.2). 
But in most of the poorer and highly populous 
countries of the world, the proportion of migrants 
remains quite low. It is in some richer countries 
that the proportion of immigrants is very high. In 
Western Europe, most countries have immigrants 
at between 10 and 15 per cent of the population.5 
The same is true of the USA; while Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand have between 20 and 
30%. The most extreme cases are the UAE and 
Kuwait, both over 70%. Figure 1.1 shows the 
situation worldwide.
Table 1.2: Number of International 
Migrants
 Number of 
migrants





Source: World Migration Report 2018
Table 1.3: Numbers of International Migrants from a Different Continent (Millions)
 By destination continent By continent of origin
1990 2015 1990 2015
Europe 20 35 20 20
North America 24 50 2 3
South/Central America 3 3 12 30
Asia 10 12 22 40
Africa 1 2 8 17
Oceania 4 7 - 1
Total 62 109 64 111
Source: World Migration Report 2018.
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Table 1.4: Numbers of International 
Migrants from a Different Country 
Within the Same Continent (Millions)
 1990 2015
Europe 28 40
North America 1 2





Source: World Migration Report 2018
Figure 1.1: Percentage of Population Born Outside the Country
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The Happiness of International  
Migrants
As already noted, migration within and between 
countries has in general shifted people from less 
to more productive work, and from lower to 
higher incomes. In many cases the differences 
have been quite extreme. International migration 
has also saved many people from extremes of 
oppression and physical danger – some 10%  
of all international migrants are refugees, or  
25 million people in total.
But what can be said about the happiness of 
international migrants after they have reached 
their destination? Chapter 2 of this report begins 
with its usual ranking and analysis of the levels 
and changes in the happiness of all residents, 
whether locally born or immigrants, based on 
samples of 1,000 per year, averaged for 2015-2017, 
for 156 countries surveyed by the Gallup World 
Poll. The focus is then switched to international 
migration, separating out immigrants to permit 
ranking of the average life evaluations of  
immigrants for the 117 countries having more 
than 100 foreign-born respondents between 
2005 and 2017. (These foreign-born residents 
may include short-term guest workers, longer 
term immigrants, and serial migrants who shift 
their residency more often, at different stages  
of their upbringing, careers, and later lives). 
So what determines the happiness of immigrants 
living in different countries and coming from 
different, other countries? Three striking facts 
emerge.
1.  In the typical country, immigrants are  
about as happy as people born locally.  
(The difference is under 0.1 point out of 10). 
This is shown in Figure 1.2. However the figure 
also shows that in the happiest countries 
immigrants are significantly less happy than 
locals, while the reverse is true in the least 
happy countries. This is because of the 
second finding.
2.  The happiness of each migrant depends  
not only on the happiness of locals (with a 
weight of roughly 0.75) but also on the level 
of happiness in the migrant’s country of 
origin (with a weight of roughly 0.25). Thus 
if a migrant goes (like many migrants) from 
a less happy to a more happy country, the 
migrant ends up somewhat less happy than 
the locals. But the reverse is true if a migrant 
goes from a more to a less happy country. 
This explains the pattern shown in Figure 1.2 
– and is a general (approximate) truth about 
all bilateral flows. Another way of describing 
this result is to say that on average, a migrant 
gains in happiness about three-quarters of 
the difference in average happiness between 
the country of origin and the destination 
country.
3.  The happiness of immigrants also depends 
importantly on how accepting the locals are 
towards immigrants. (To measure acceptance 
local residents were asked whether the 
following were “good things” or “bad things”: 
having immigrants in the country, having an 
immigrant as a neighbour, and having an 
immigrant marry your close relative). In a 
country that was more accepting (by one 
standard deviation) immigrants were happier 
by 0.1 points (on a 0 to 10 scale).
Thus the analysis in Chapter 2 argues that 
migrants gain on average if they move from  
a less happy to a more happy country (which  
is the main direction of migration). But that 
argument was based on a simple comparison  
Figure 1.2: Average Life Evaluation 
of Foreign-Born and Locally-Born 
Adults: by Country
Source: Chapter 2
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of the happiness of migrants with people in the 
countries they have left. What if the migrants 
were different types of people from those left 
behind? Does this change the conclusion? As 
Chapter 3 shows, the answer is, No. In Chapter 3 
the happiness of migrants is compared with 
individuals in their country of origin who are as 
closely matched to the migrants as possible and 
are thinking of moving. This again uses the data 
from the Gallup World Poll. The results from 
comparing the migrants with their look-a-likes 
who stayed at home suggests that the average 
international migrant gained 0.47 points (out of 
10) in happiness by migration (as measured by 
the Cantril ladder). This is a substantial gain. 
But there is an important caveat: the majority 
gain, but many lose. For example, in the only 
controlled experiment that we know of, Tongans 
applying to migrate to New Zealand were selected 
on randomised basis.6 After moving, those who 
had been selected to move were on average less 
happy than those who (forcibly) stayed behind. 
Migration clearly has its risks. These include 
separation from loved ones, discrimination in the 
new location, and a feeling of relative deprivation, 
because you now compare yourself with others 
who are richer than your previous reference 
group back home.
One obvious question is: Do migrants become 
happier or less happy the longer they have been 
in a country? The answer is on average, neither 
– their happiness remains flat. And in some 
countries (where this has been studied) there is 
evidence that second-generation migrants are no 
happier than their immigrant parents.7 One way 
of explaining these findings (which is developed 
further in Chapter 4) is in terms of reference 
groups: When people first move to a happier 
country, their reference group is still largely their 
country of origin. They experience an immediate 
gain in happiness. As time passes, their objective 
situation improves (which makes them still 
happier) but their reference group becomes 
increasingly the destination country (which 
makes them less happy). These two effects 
roughly offset each other. This process continues 
in the second generation.
The Gallup World Poll excludes many current 
refugees, since refugee camps are not surveyed. 
Only in Germany is there sufficient evidence on 
refugees, and in Germany refugees are 0.4 points 
less happy than other migrants. But before they 
moved, the refugees were also much less happy 
than the other migrants were before they moved. 
So refugees too are likely to have benefitted 
from migration.
Thus average international migration benefits the 
majority of migrants, but not all. Does the same 
finding hold for the vast of the army of people 
who have moved from the country to the towns 
within less developed countries?
The Happiness of Rural-Urban Migrants
The fullest evidence on this comes from China and 
is presented in Chapter 4. That chapter compares 
the happiness of three groups of people:
• rural dwellers, who remain in the country,
• rural-urban migrants, now living in towns, and
• urban dwellers, who always lived in towns.
Migrants have roughly doubled their work 
income by moving from the countryside, but 
they are less happy than the people still living  
in rural areas. Chapter 4 therefore goes on to 
consider possible reasons for this. Could it be 
that many of the migrants suffer because of the 
remittances they send home? The evidence says, 
No. Could it be that the people who migrate were 
intrinsically less happy? The evidence says, No. 
Could it be that urban life is more insecure than 
life in the countryside – and involves fewer 
friends and more discrimination? Perhaps. 
The biggest factor affecting the happiness  
of migrants is a change of reference group: the 
happiness equation for migrants is similar to that 
of urban dwellers, and different from that of rural 
dwellers. This could explain why migrants say 
they are happier as a result of moving – they 
would no longer appreciate the simple pleasures 
of rural life. 
Human psychology is complicated, and be-
havioural economics has now documented 
hundreds of ways in which people mispredict the 
impact of decisions upon their happiness. It does 
not follow that we should over-regulate their 
lives, which would also cause unhappiness. It 
does follow that we should protect people after 
they make their decisions, by ensuring that  
they can make positive social connections in 
their new communities (hence avoiding or 
reducing discrimination), and that they are 
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helped to fulfil the dreams that led them to  
move in the first place.
It is unfortunate that there are not more studies 
of rural-urban migration in other countries. In 
Thailand one study finds an increase in happiness 
among migrants8, while in South Africa one study 
finds a decrease9. 
The Happiness of Families Left Behind
 In any case the migrants are not the only people 
who matter. What about the happiness of the 
families left behind? They frequently receive 
remittances (altogether some $500 billion into 
2015).10 But they lose the company and direct 
support of the migrant. For international migrants, 
we are able to examine this question in Chapter 3.
This is done by studying people in the country 
of origin and examining the effect of having a 
relative who is living abroad. On average this 
experience increases both life-satisfaction and 
positive affect. But there is also a rise in negative 
affect (sadness, worry, anger), especially if  
the migrant is abroad on temporary work. 
Unfortunately, there is no comparable analysis of 
families left behind by rural-urban migrants who 
move to towns and cities in the same country.
The Happiness of the Original  
Residents in the Host Country
The final issue is how the arrival of migrants 
affects the existing residents in the host country 
or city. This is one of the most difficult issues in 
all social science. 
One approach is simply to explain happiness in 
different countries by a whole host of variables 
including the ratio of immigrants to the locally- 
born population (the “immigrant share”). This is 
done in Chapter 2 and shows no effect of the 
immigrant share on the average happiness of  
the locally born.11 It does however show that the 
locally born population (like immigrants) are 
happier, other things equal, if the country is  
more accepting of immigrants.12
Nevertheless, we know that immigration can 
create tensions, as shown by its high political 
salience in many immigrant-receiving countries, 
especially those on migration trails from unhappy 
source countries to hoped-for havens in the north.
Several factors contribute to explaining whether 
migration is welcomed by the local populations.13 
First, scale is important. Moderate levels of 
immigration cause fewer problems than rapid 
surges.14 Second, the impact of unskilled  
immigration falls mainly on unskilled people in 
the host country, though the impact on public 
services is often exaggerated and the positive 
contribution of immigrants is often underestimated. 
Third, the degree of social distress caused to the 
existing residents depends importantly on their 
own frame of mind – a more open-minded 
attitude is better both for immigrants and for  
the original residents. Fourth, the attitude of 
immigrants is also important – if they are to find 
and accept opportunities to connect with the 
local populations, this is better for everyone. 
Even if such integration may initially seem 
difficult, in the long run it has better results –  
familiarity eventually breeds acceptance,15 and 
inter-marriage more than anything blurs the 
differences. The importance of attitudes is 
documented in the Gallup Annex on migrant 
acceptance, and in Chapter 2, where the migrant 
acceptance index is shown to increase the 
happiness of both sectors of the population –  
immigrants and the locally born.
Chapter 5 completes the set of migration chapters. 
It seeks to explain why so many people emigrate 
from Latin American countries, and also to 
assess the happiness consequences for those 
who do migrate. In Latin America, as elsewhere, 
those who plan to emigrate are on average less 
happy than others similar to themselves in 
income, gender and age. They are also on average 
wealthier – in other words they are “frustrated 
achievers”. But those who do emigrate from Latin 
American countries also gain less in happiness 
than emigrants from some other continents. This 
is because, as shown in chapters 2 and 6, they 
come from pretty happy countries. Their choice 
of destination countries is also a less happy mix. 
This combination lessens their average gains, 
because of the convergence of immigrant  
happiness to the general happiness levels in the 
countries to which they move, as documented in 
Chapter 2. If immigrants from Latin America are 
compared to other migrants to the same countries, 
they do very well in relation both to other  
immigrants and to the local population. This is 
shown in Chapter 2 for immigration to Canada 
and the United Kingdom – countries with large 
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enough happiness surveys to permit comparison 
of the happiness levels of immigrants from up to 
100 different source countries. 
Chapter 6 completes the Latin American special 
package by seeking to explain the happiness 
bulge in Latin America. Life satisfaction in Latin 
America is substantially higher than would be 
predicted based on income, corruption, and 
other standard variables, including having 
someone to count on. Even more remarkable are 
the levels of positive affect, with eight of the 
world’s top ten countries being found in Latin 
America. To explain these differences, Chapter 6 
convincingly demonstrates the strength of family 
relationships in Latin America. In a nutshell, the 
source of the extra Latin American happiness lies 
in the remarkable warmth and strength of family 
bonds, coupled with the greater importance that 
Latin Americans attach to social life in general, 
and especially to the family. They are more 
satisfied with their family life and, more than 
elsewhere, say that one of their main goals is 
making their parents proud.
Conclusion
In conclusion, there are large gaps in happiness 
between countries, and these will continue to 
create major pressures to migrate. Some of those 
who migrate between countries will benefit and 
others will lose. In general, those who move to 
happier countries than their own will gain in 
happiness, while those who move to unhappier 
countries will tend to lose. Those left behind will 
not on average lose, although once again there 
will be gainers and losers. Immigration will 
continue to pose both opportunities and costs 
for those who move, for those who remain 
behind, and for natives of the immigrant- 
receiving countries. 
Where immigrants are welcome and where they 
integrate well, immigration works best. A more 
tolerant attitude in the host country will prove 
best for migrants and for the original residents. 
But there are clearly limits to the annual flows 
which can be accommodated without damage to 
the social fabric that provides the very basis of 
the country’s attraction to immigrants. One 
obvious solution, which has no upper limit, is to 
raise the happiness of people in the sending 
countries – perhaps by the traditional means of 
foreign aid and better access to rich-country 
markets, but more importantly by helping them 
to grow their own levels of trust, and institutions 




To re-cap, the structure of the chapters that 
follow is:
Chapter 2 analyses the happiness of the total 
population in each country, the happiness of the 
immigrants there, and also the happiness of 
those born locally.
Chapter 3 estimates how international migrants 
have improved (or reduced) their happiness by 
moving, and how their move has affected the 
families left behind.
Chapter 4 analyses how rural-urban migration 
within a country (here China) affects the happiness 
of the migrants. 
Chapter 5 looks at Latin America and analyses 
the causes and consequences of emigration.
Chapter 6 explains why people in Latin American 
countries are on average, other things equal, 
unusually happy.
In addition,
Chapter 7 uses US data set in a global context to 
describe some growing health risks created by 
human behaviour, especially obesity, substance 
abuse, and depression.
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Endnotes
1  As Chapter 4 documents, in 2015 the number of rural hukou 
residents in towns was 225 million.
2  This is based on the definitions given in the sources to 
UN-DESA (2015) most of which are “foreign born”.
3 See IOM (2017).
4  See Esipova, N., Ray, J. and Pugliese, A. (2017).
5 See World Migration Report 2018, Chapter 3.
6 See Chapter 3.
7  See Safi, M. (2009).
8 De Jong et al. (2002)
9 Mulcahy & Kollamparambil (2016)
10 Ratha et al. (2016)
11  In this analysis, the equation includes all the standard 
explanatory variables as well, making it possible to identify 
the causal effect of the immigrant share. (This share also of 
course depends on the happiness level of the country but 
in a much different equation). A similar approach, using 
individual data, is used by Akay et al (2014) comparing 
across German regions, and by Betz and Simpson (2013) 
across the countries covered by the European Social 
Survey. Both found effects that were positive (for only 
some regions in Akay et al (2014) but quantitatively tiny.  
Our results do not rule out the possibility of small effects  
of either sign.
12  One standard deviation raises their happiness on average 
by 0.15 points. This estimate comes from an equation 
including, also on the right-hand side, all the standard 
variables explaining country-happiness used in Chapter 2. 
This provides identification of an effect running from 
acceptance to happiness rather than vice versa.
13  See Putnam, R. D. (2007).
14  Another important factor is the availability of sparsely- 
populated space. Earlier migrations into North America  
and Oceania benefitted from more of this.
15 See for example Rao (2018). 
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Introduction
This is the sixth World Happiness Report. Its 
central purpose remains just what it was in the 
first Report in April 2012, to survey the science  
of measuring and understanding subjective 
well-being. In addition to presenting updated 
rankings and analysis of life evaluations through-
out the world, each World Happiness Report has 
had a variety of topic chapters, often dealing 
with an underlying theme for the report as a 
whole. For the World Happiness Report 2018 our 
special focus is on migration. Chapter 1 sets 
global migration in broad context, while in this 
chapter we shall concentrate on life evaluations 
of the foreign-born populations of each country 
where the available samples are large enough to 
provide reasonable estimates. We will compare 
these levels with those of respondents who were  
born in the country where they were surveyed. 
Chapter 3 will then examine the evidence on 
specific migration flows, assessing the likely 
happiness consequences (as represented both 
by life evaluations and measures of positive  
and negative affect) for international migrants 
and those left behind in their birth countries. 
Chapter 4 considers internal migration in more 
detail, concentrating on the Chinese experience, 
by far the largest example of migration from the 
countryside to the city. Chapter 5 completes our 
migration package with special attention to Latin 
American migration.
Before presenting our evidence and rankings of 
immigrant happiness, we first present, as usual, 
the global and regional population-weighted 
distributions of life evaluations using the average 
for surveys conducted in the three years 2015-2017. 
This is followed by our rankings of national 
average life evaluations, again based on data 
from 2015-2017, and then an analysis of changes 
in life evaluations, once again for the entire 
resident populations of each country, from 
2008-2010 to 2015-2017. 
Our rankings of national average life evaluations 
will be accompanied by our latest attempts to 
show how six key variables contribute to explaining 
the full sample of national annual average scores 
over the whole period 2005-2017. These variables 
are GDP per capita, social support, healthy life 
expectancy, social freedom, generosity, and 
absence of corruption. Note that we do not 
construct our happiness measure in each country 
using these six factors – the scores are instead 
based on individuals’ own assessments of their 
subjective well-being. Rather, we use the variables 
to explain the variation of happiness across 
countries. We shall also show how measures of 
experienced well-being, especially positive 
emotions, supplement life circumstances in 
explaining higher life evaluations.
Then we turn to the main focus, which is migration 
and happiness. The principal results in this 
chapter are for the life evaluations of the foreign- 
born and domestically born populations of every 
country where there is a sufficiently large  
sample of the foreign-born to provide reasonable 
estimates. So that we may consider a sufficiently 
large number of countries, we do not use just the 
2015-2017 data used for the main happiness 
rankings, but instead use all survey available 
since the start of the Gallup World Poll in 2005. 
Life Evaluations Around the World
We first consider the population-weighted global 
and regional distributions of individual life 
evaluations, based on how respondents rate their 
lives. In the rest of this chapter, the Cantril ladder 
is the primary measure of life evaluations used, 
and “happiness” and “subjective well-being” are 
used interchangeably. All the global analysis on 
the levels or changes of subjective well-being 
refers only to life evaluations, specifically, the 
Cantril ladder. But in several of the subsequent 
chapters, parallel analysis will be done for  
measures of positive and negative affect, thus 
broadening the range of data used to assess  
the consequences of migration.
The various panels of Figure 2.1 contain bar 
charts showing for the world as a whole, and for 
each of 10 global regions,1 the distribution of the 
2015-2017 answers to the Cantril ladder question 
asking respondents to value their lives today on 
a 0 to 10 scale, with the worst possible life as a 0 
and the best possible life as a 10. It is important 
to consider not just average happiness in a 
community or country, but also how it is  
distributed. Most studies of inequality have 
focused on inequality in the distribution of 
income and wealth,2 while in Chapter 2 of World 
Happiness Report 2016 Update we argued that 
just as income is too limited an indicator for the 
overall quality of life, income inequality is too 
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limited a measure of overall inequality.3 For 
example, inequalities in the distribution of  
health care4 and education5 have effects on life 
satisfaction above and beyond those flowing 
through their effects on income. We showed 
there, and have verified in fresh estimates for this 
report,6 that the effects of happiness equality are 
often larger and more systematic than those of 
income inequality. Figure 2.1 shows that well- 
being inequality is least in Western Europe, 
Northern America and Oceania, and South Asia; 
and greatest in Latin America, sub-Saharan 
Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa.
In Table 2.1 we present our latest modeling of 
national average life evaluations and measures of 
positive and negative affect (emotion) by country 
and year.7 For ease of comparison, the table has 
the same basic structure as Table 2.1 in World 
Happiness Report 2017. The major difference 
comes from the inclusion of data for 2017, 
thereby increasing by about 150 (or 12%) the 
number of country-year observations. The resulting 
changes to the estimated equation are very 
slight.8 There are four equations in Table 2.1. The 
first equation provides the basis for constructing 
the sub-bars shown in Figure 2.2. 
The results in the first column of Table 2.1 explain 
national average life evaluations in terms of six key 
variables: GDP per capita, social support, healthy 
life expectancy, freedom to make life choices, 
generosity, and freedom from corruption.9 Taken 
together, these six variables explain almost 
three-quarters of the variation in national annual 
average ladder scores among countries, using 
data from the years 2005 to 2017. The model’s 
predictive power is little changed if the year 
fixed effects in the model are removed, falling 
from 74.2% to 73.5% in terms of the adjusted 
R-squared. 
The second and third columns of Table 2.1 use 
the same six variables to estimate equations  
for national averages of positive and negative 
affect, where both are based on answers about 
yesterday’s emotional experiences (see Technical 
Box 1 for how the affect measures are constructed). 
In general, the emotional measures, and especially 
negative emotions, are differently, and much less 
fully, explained by the six variables than are life 
evaluations. Per-capita income and healthy life 
expectancy have significant effects on life 
evaluations, but not, in these national average 
data, on either positive or negative affect. The 
situation changes when we consider social 
variables. Bearing in mind that positive and 
negative affect are measured on a 0 to 1 scale, 
while life evaluations are on a 0 to 10 scale, social 
support can be seen to have similar proportionate 
effects on positive and negative emotions as on 
life evaluations. Freedom and generosity have 
even larger influences on positive affect than on 
the ladder. Negative affect is significantly reduced 
by social support, freedom, and absence of 
corruption. 
In the fourth column we re-estimate the life 
evaluation equation from column 1, adding both 
positive and negative affect to partially implement 
the Aristotelian presumption that sustained 
positive emotions are important supports for a 
good life.10 The most striking feature is the extent to 
which the results buttress a finding in psychology 
that the existence of positive emotions matters 
much more than the absence of negative ones.11 
Positive affect has a large and highly significant 
impact in the final equation of Table 2.1, while 
negative affect has none. 
As for the coefficients on the other variables in 
the final equation, the changes are material only 
on those variables – especially freedom and 
generosity – that have the largest impacts on 
positive affect. Thus we infer that positive 
emotions play a strong role in support of life 
evaluations, and that most of the impact of 
freedom and generosity on life evaluations is 
mediated by their influence on positive emotions. 
That is, freedom and generosity have large 
impacts on positive affect, which in turn has a 
major impact on life evaluations. The Gallup 
World Poll does not have a widely available 
measure of life purpose to test whether it too 
would play a strong role in support of high life 
evaluations. However, newly available data from 
the large samples of UK data does suggest that 
life purpose plays a strongly supportive role, 
independent of the roles of life circumstances 
and positive emotions.
World Happiness Report 2018






















































































































Middle East & North Africa
 
0      1      2      3      4     5      6      7      8      9      10
0      1      2      3      4     5      6      7      8      9      10
0      1      2      3      4     5      6      7      8      9      100          1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9          10
0      1      2      3      4     5      6      7      8      9      10
0      1      2      3      4     5      6      7      8      9      10
0      1      2      3      4     5      6      7      8      9      10
0      1      2      3      4     5      6      7      8      9      10
0      1      2      3      4     5      6      7      8      9      10
0      1      2      3      4     5      6      7      8      9      10
0      1      2      3      4     5      6      7      8      9      10
16
17
Table 2.1: Regressions to Explain Average Happiness Across Countries (Pooled OLS)
Dependent Variable
Independent Variable Cantril Ladder Positive Affect Negative Affect Cantril Ladder
Log GDP per capita 0.311 -.003 0.011 0.316 
 (0.064)*** (0.009) (0.009) (0.063)*** 
Social support 2.447 0.26 -.289 1.933 
 (0.39)*** (0.049)*** (0.051)*** (0.395)*** 
Healthy life expectancy at birth 0.032 0.0002 0.001 0.031 
 (0.009)*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.009)*** 
Freedom to make life choices 1.189 0.343 -.071 0.451 
 (0.302)*** (0.038)*** (0.042)* (0.29) 
Generosity 0.644 0.145 0.001 0.323 
 (0.274)** (0.03)*** (0.028) (0.272) 
Perceptions of corruption -.542 0.03 0.098 -.626 
 (0.284)* (0.027) (0.025)*** (0.271)** 
Positive affect 2.211 
 (0.396)*** 
Negative affect 0.204 
 (0.442) 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included
Number of countries 157 157 157 157 
Number of obs. 1394 1391 1393 1390 
Adjusted R-squared 0.742 0.48 0.251 0.764 
Notes: This is a pooled OLS regression for a tattered panel explaining annual national average Cantril ladder responses 
from all available surveys from 2005 to 2017. See Technical Box 1 for detailed information about each of the predictors. 
Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
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Technical Box 1: Detailed Information About Each of the Predictors in Table 2.1
1. GDP per capita is in terms of Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) adjusted to constant 
2011 international dollars, taken from  
the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) released by the World Bank in 
September 2017. See Appendix 1 for 
more details. GDP data for 2017 are not 
yet available, so we extend the GDP 
time series from 2016 to 2017 using 
country-specific forecasts of real GDP 
growth from the OECD Economic 
Outlook No. 102 (Edition November 
2017) and the World Bank’s Global 
Economic Prospects (Last Updated: 
06/04/2017), after adjustment for 
population growth. The equation uses 
the natural log of GDP per capita, as 
this form fits the data significantly 
better than GDP per capita.
2. The time series of healthy life expectancy 
at birth are constructed based on data 
from the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and WDI. WHO publishes the 
data on healthy life expectancy for  
the year 2012. The time series of life 
expectancies, with no adjustment for 
health, are available in WDI. We adopt 
the following strategy to construct the 
time series of healthy life expectancy  
at birth: first we generate the ratios  
of healthy life expectancy to life  
expectancy in 2012 for countries  
with both data. We then apply the 
country-specific ratios to other years  
to generate the healthy life expectancy 
data. See Appendix 1 for more details. 
3. Social support is the national average  
of the binary responses (either 0 or 1)  
to the Gallup World Poll (GWP)  
question “If you were in trouble, do  
you have relatives or friends you can 
count on to help you whenever you 
need them, or not?” 
4. Freedom to make life choices is the 
national average of binary responses to 
the GWP question “Are you satisfied or 
dissatisfied with your freedom to 
choose what you do with your life?” 
5. Generosity is the residual of regressing 
the national average of GWP responses 
to the question “Have you donated 
money to a charity in the past month?” 
on GDP per capita. 
6. Perceptions of corruption are the average 
of binary answers to two GWP questions: 
“Is corruption widespread throughout the 
government or not?” and “Is corruption 
widespread within businesses or not?” 
Where data for government corruption 
are missing, the perception of business 
corruption is used as the overall  
corruption-perception measure. 
7. Positive affect is defined as the average 
of previous-day affect measures for 
happiness, laughter, and enjoyment for 
GWP waves 3-7 (years 2008 to 2012, 
and some in 2013). It is defined as the 
average of laughter and enjoyment for 
other waves where the happiness 
question was not asked. 
8. Negative affect is defined as the average 
of previous-day affect measures for worry, 
sadness, and anger for all waves. See 
Statistical Appendix 1 for more details.  
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Ranking of Happiness by Country
Figure 2.2 (below) shows the average ladder 
score (the average answer to the Cantril ladder 
question, asking people to evaluate the quality of 
their current lives on a scale of 0 to 10) for each 
country, averaged over the years 2015-2017. Not 
every country has surveys in every year; the total 
sample sizes are reported in the statistical 
appendix, and are reflected in Figure 2.2 by the 
horizontal lines showing the 95% confidence 
regions. The confidence regions are tighter for 
countries with larger samples. To increase the 
number of countries ranked, we also include four 
that had no 2015-2017 surveys, but did have one 
in 2014. This brings the number of countries 
shown in Figure 2.2 to 156.
The overall length of each country bar represents 
the average ladder score, which is also shown in 
numerals. The rankings in Figure 2.2 depend only 
on the average Cantril ladder scores reported by 
the respondents.
Each of these bars is divided into seven  
segments, showing our research efforts to find 
possible sources for the ladder levels. The first 
six sub-bars show how much each of the six  
key variables is calculated to contribute to that 
country’s ladder score, relative to that in a 
hypothetical country called Dystopia, so named 
because it has values equal to the world’s lowest 
national averages for 2015-2017 for each of the six 
key variables used in Table 2.1. We use Dystopia as 
a benchmark against which to compare each 
other country’s performance in terms of each of 
the six factors. This choice of benchmark permits 
every real country to have a non-negative  
contribution from each of the six factors. We 
calculate, based on the estimates in the first 
column of Table 2.1, that Dystopia had a 2015-
2017 ladder score equal to 1.92 on the 0 to 10 
scale. The final sub-bar is the sum of two  
components: the calculated average 2015-2017 
life evaluation in Dystopia (=1.92) and each 
country’s own prediction error, which measures 
the extent to which life evaluations are higher or 
lower than predicted by our equation in the first 
column of Table 2.1. These residuals are as likely 
to be negative as positive.12
It might help to show in more detail how we 
calculate each factor’s contribution to average 
life evaluations. Taking the example of healthy life 
expectancy, the sub-bar in the case of Tanzania 
is equal to the number of years by which healthy 
life expectancy in Tanzania exceeds the world’s 
lowest value, multiplied by the Table 2.1 coefficient 
for the influence of healthy life expectancy on 
life evaluations. The width of these different 
sub-bars then shows, country-by-country, how 
much each of the six variables is estimated to 
contribute to explaining the international ladder 
differences. These calculations are illustrative 
rather than conclusive, for several reasons. First, 
the selection of candidate variables is restricted 
by what is available for all these countries. 
Traditional variables like GDP per capita and 
healthy life expectancy are widely available. But 
measures of the quality of the social context, 
which have been shown in experiments and 
national surveys to have strong links to life 
evaluations and emotions, have not been  
sufficiently surveyed in the Gallup or other 
 global polls, or otherwise measured in statistics 
available for all countries. Even with this limited 
choice, we find that four variables covering 
different aspects of the social and institutional 
context – having someone to count on, generosity, 
freedom to make life choices and absence of 
corruption – are together responsible for more 
than half of the average difference between each 
country’s predicted ladder score and that in 
Dystopia in the 2015-2017 period. As shown in 
Table 19 of Statistical Appendix 1, the average 
country has a 2015-2017 ladder score that is 3.45 
points above the Dystopia ladder score of 1.92. 
Of the 3.45 points, the largest single part (35%) 
comes from social support, followed by GDP per 
capita (26%) and healthy life expectancy (17%), 
and then freedom (13%), generosity (5%), and 
corruption (3%).13
Our limited choice means that the variables we 
use may be taking credit properly due to other 
better variables, or to other unmeasured factors. 
There are also likely to be vicious or virtuous 
circles, with two-way linkages among the variables. 
For example, there is much evidence that those 
who have happier lives are likely to live longer,  
be more trusting, be more cooperative, and be 
generally better able to meet life’s demands.14 
This will feed back to improve health, GDP, 
generosity, corruption, and sense of freedom. 
Finally, some of the variables are derived from 
the same respondents as the life evaluations and 
hence possibly determined by common factors. 
This risk is less using national averages, because 
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individual differences in personality and many 
life circumstances tend to average out at the 
national level.
To provide more assurance that our results are 
not seriously biased because we are using the 
same respondents to report life evaluations, 
social support, freedom, generosity, and  
corruption, we tested the robustness of our 
procedure (see Statistical Appendix 1 for more 
detail) by splitting each country’s respondents 
randomly into two groups, and using the average 
values for one group for social support, freedom, 
generosity, and absence of corruption in the 
equations to explain average life evaluations in 
the other half of the sample. The coefficients on 
each of the four variables fall, just as we would 
expect. But the changes are reassuringly small 
(ranging from 1% to 5%) and are far from being 
statistically significant.15
The seventh and final segment is the sum of  
two components. The first component is a fixed 
number representing our calculation of the 
2015-2017 ladder score for Dystopia (=1.92). The 
second component is the 2015-2017 residual for 
each country. The sum of these two components 
comprises the right-hand sub-bar for each 
country; it varies from one country to the next 
because some countries have life evaluations 
above their predicted values, and others lower. 
The residual simply represents that part of  
the national average ladder score that is not 
explained by our model; with the residual  
included, the sum of all the sub-bars adds up  
to the actual average life evaluations on which 
the rankings are based.
What do the latest data show for the 2015-2017 
country rankings? Two features carry over from 
previous editions of the World Happiness Report. 
First, there is a lot of year-to-year consistency in 
the way people rate their lives in different countries. 
Thus there remains a four-point gap between the 
10 top-ranked and the 10 bottom-ranked countries. 
The top 10 countries in Figure 2.2 are the same 
countries that were top-ranked in World Happiness 
Report 2017, although there has been some 
swapping of places, as is to be expected among 
countries so closely grouped in average scores. 
The top five countries are the same ones that 
held the top five positions in World Happiness 
Report 2017, but Finland has vaulted from  
5th place to the top of the rankings this year. 
Although four places may seem a big jump, all 
the top five countries last year were within the 
same statistical confidence band, as they are 
again this year. Norway is now in 2nd place, 
followed by Denmark, Iceland and Switzerland in 
3rd, 4th and 5th places. The Netherlands, Canada 
and New Zealand are 6th, 7th and 8th, just as 
they were last year, while Australia and Sweden 
have swapped positions since last year, with 
Sweden now in 9th and Australia in 10th position. 
In Figure 2.2, the average ladder score differs 
only by 0.15 between the 1st and 5th position, 
and another 0.21 between 5th and 10th positions.
Compared to the top 10 countries in the current 
ranking, there is a much bigger range of scores 
covered by the bottom 10 countries. Within this 
group, average scores differ by as much as 0.7 
points, more than one-fifth of the average 
national score in the group. Tanzania, Rwanda 
and Botswana have anomalous scores, in the 
sense that their predicted values based on their 
performance on the six key variables, would 
suggest they would rank much higher than 
shown by the survey answers.
Despite the general consistency among the top 
countries scores, there have been many significant 
changes in the rest of the countries. Looking at 
changes over the longer term, many countries 
have exhibited substantial changes in average 
scores, and hence in country rankings, between 
2008-2010 and 2015-2017, as shown later in  
more detail.
When looking at average ladder scores, it is also 
important to note the horizontal whisker lines at 
the right-hand end of the main bar for each 
country. These lines denote the 95% confidence 
regions for the estimates, so that countries with 
overlapping error bars have scores that do not 
significantly differ from each other. Thus, as already 
noted, the five top-ranked countries (Finland, 
Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Switzerland) have 
overlapping confidence regions, and all have 
national average ladder scores either above or 
just below 7.5.
Average life evaluations in the top 10 countries 
are thus more than twice as high as in the bottom 
10. If we use the first equation of Table 2.1 to look 
for possible reasons for these very different life 
evaluations, it suggests that of the 4.10 point 
difference, 3.22 points can be traced to differences 
in the six key factors: 1.06 points from the GDP 
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Figure 2.2: Ranking of Happiness 2015–2017 (Part 3)
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per capita gap, 0.90 due to differences in  
social support, 0.61 to differences in healthy  
life expectancy, 0.37 to differences in freedom, 
0.21 to differences in corruption perceptions,  
and 0.07 to differences in generosity. Income  
differences are the single largest contributing 
factor, at one-third of the total, because, of the 
six factors, income is by far the most unequally 
distributed among countries. GDP per capita  
is 30 times higher in the top 10 than in the 
bottom 10 countries.16
Overall, the model explains quite well the life 
evaluation differences within as well as between 
regions and for the world as a whole.17 On average, 
however, the countries of Latin America still have 
mean life evaluations that are higher (by about 
0.3 on the 0 to 10 scale) than predicted by the 
model. This difference has been found in earlier 
work and been attributed to a variety of factors, 
including especially some unique features of 
family and social life in Latin American countries. 
To help explain what is special about social life in 
Latin America, and how this affects emotions 
and life evaluations, Chapter 6 by Mariano Rojas 
presents a range of new evidence showing how 
the social structure supports Latin American 
happiness beyond what is captured by the vari-
ables available in the Gallup World Poll. In partial 
contrast, the countries of East Asia have average 
life evaluations below those predicted by the 
model, a finding that has been thought to reflect, 
at least in part, cultural differences in response 
style.18 It is reassuring that our findings about the 
relative importance of the six factors are generally 
unaffected by whether or not we make explicit 
allowance for these regional differences.19
Changes in the Levels of Happiness
In this section we consider how life evaluations 
have changed. In previous reports we considered 
changes from the beginning of the Gallup World 
Poll until the three most recent years. In the 
report, we use 2008-2010 as a base period, and 
changes are measured from then to 2015-2017. 
The new base period excludes all observations 
prior to the 2007 economic crisis, whose effects 
were a key part of the change analysis in earlier 
World Happiness Reports. In Figure 2.3 we show 
the changes in happiness levels for all 141 countries 
that have sufficient numbers of observations for 
both 2008-2010 and 2015-2017. 
Of the 141 countries with data for 2008-2010 and 
2015-2017, 114 had significant changes. 58 were 
significant increases, ranging from 0.14 to 1.19 
points on the 0 to 10 scale. There were also 59 
significant decreases, ranging from -0.12 to -2.17 
points, while the remaining 24 countries revealed 
no significant trend from 2008-2010 to 2015-2017. 
As shown in Table 35 in Statistical Appendix 1, 
the significant gains and losses are very unevenly 
distributed across the world, and sometimes also 
within continents. For example, in Western 
Europe there were 12 significant losses but only 
three significant gains. In Central and Eastern 
Europe, by contrast, these results were reversed, 
with 13 significant gains against two losses. The 
Commonwealth of Independent States was also 
a significant net gainer, with seven gains against 
two losses. The Middle East and North Africa  
was net negative, with 11 losses against five 
gains. In all other world regions, the numbers  
of significant gains and losses were much more 
equally divided. 
Among the 20 top gainers, all of which showed 
average ladder scores increasing by more than 
0.5 points, 10 are in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States or Central and Eastern 
Europe, three are in sub-Saharan Africa, and 
three in Asia. The other four were Malta, Iceland, 
Nicaragua, and Morocco. Among the 20 largest 
losers, all of which showed ladder reductions 
exceeding about 0.5 points, seven were in 
sub-Saharan Africa, three were in the Middle East 
and North Africa, three in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, three in the CIS and Central and 
Eastern Europe, and two each in Western Europe 
and South Asia. 
These gains and losses are very large, especially 
for the 10 most affected gainers and losers. For 
each of the 10 top gainers, the average life 
evaluation gains were more than twice as large 
as those that would be expected from a doubling 
of per capita incomes. For each of the 10 countries 
with the biggest drops in average life evaluations, 
the losses were more than twice as large as would 
be expected from a halving of GDP per capita. 
On the gaining side of the ledger, the inclusion  
of six transition countries among the top 10 
gainers reflects the rising average life evaluations 
for the transition countries taken as a group. The 
appearance of sub-Saharan African countries 
among the biggest gainers and the biggest 
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22. Taiwan Province of China (0.554)
23. Mali (0.496)
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25. Benin (0.474)
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Figure 2.3: Changes in Happiness from 2008–2010 to 2015–2017 (Part 3)
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losers reflects the variety and volatility of  
experiences among the sub-Saharan countries 
for which changes are shown in Figure 2.3, and 
whose experiences were analyzed in more detail 
in Chapter 4 of World Happiness Report 2017. 
Togo, the largest gainer since 2008-2010, by 
almost 1.2 points, was the lowest ranked country 
in World Happiness Report 2015 and now ranks 
17 places higher.
The 10 countries with the largest declines in  
average life evaluations typically suffered some 
combination of economic, political, and social 
stresses. The five largest drops since 2008-2010 
were in Ukraine, Yemen, Syria, Malawi and  
Venezuela, with drops over 1 point in each case, 
the largest fall being almost 2.2 points in  
Venezuela. By moving the base period until well 
after the onset of the international banking crisis, 
the four most affected European countries, 
Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, no longer 
appear among the countries with the largest 
drops. Greece just remains in the group of 20 
countries with the largest declines, Italy and 
Spain are still significantly below their 2008-2010 
levels, while Portugal shows a small increase. 
Figure 18 and Table 34 in the Statistical Appendix 
show the population-weighted actual and  
predicted changes in happiness for the 10 re-
gions of the world from 2008-2010 to 2015-2017. 
The correlation between the actual and predicted 
changes is 0.3, but with actual changes being 
less favorable than predicted. Only in Central and 
Eastern Europe, where life evaluations were up 
by 0.49 points on the 0 to 10 scale, was there an 
actual increase that exceeded what was predicted. 
South Asia had the largest drop in actual life 
evaluations (more than half a point on the 0 to 
10 scale) while predicted to have a substantial 
increase. Sub-Saharan Africa was predicted to 
have a substantial gain, while the actual change 
was a very small drop. Latin America was  
predicted to have a small gain, while it shows a 
population-weighted actual drop of 0.3 points. 
The MENA region was also predicted to be a 
gainer, and instead lost almost 0.35 points. Given 
the change in the base year, the countries of 
Western Europe were predicted to have a small 
gain, but instead experienced a small reduction. 
For the remaining regions, the predicted and 
actual changes were in the same direction, with 
the substantial reductions in the United States 
(the largest country in the NANZ group) being 
larger than predicted. As Figure 18 shows, 
changes in the six factors are not very successful 
in capturing the evolving patterns of life over 
what have been tumultuous times for many 
countries. Eight of the nine regions were predicted 
to have 2015-2017 life evaluations higher than in 
2008-2010, but only half of them did so. In 
general, the ranking of regions’ predicted changes 
matched the ranking of regions’ actual changes, 
despite typical experience being less favorable 
than predicted. The notable exception is South 
Asia, which experienced the largest drop, contrary 
to predictions. 
Immigration and Happiness
In this section, we measure and compare the 
happiness of immigrants and the locally born 
populations of their host countries by dividing 
the residents of each country into two groups: 
those born in another country (the foreign-born), 
and the rest of the population. The United 
Nations estimates the total numbers of the 
foreign-born in each country every five years. We 
combine these data with annual UN estimates for 
total population to derive estimated foreign-born 
population shares for each country. These 
provide a valuable benchmark against which to 
compare data derived from the Gallup World Poll 
responses. We presented in Chapter 1 a map 
showing UN data for all national foreign-born 
populations, measured as a fraction of the total 
population, for the most recent available year, 2015. 
At the global level, the foreign-born population 
in 2015 was 244 million, making up 3.3% of world 
population. Over the 25 years between 1990 and 
2015, the world’s foreign-born population grew 
from 153 million to 244 million, an increase of 
some 60%, thereby increasing from 2.9% to 3.3% 
of the growing world population. 
The foreign-born share in 2015 is highly variable 
among the 160 countries covered by the UN 
data, ranging from less than 2% in 56 countries 
to over 10% in 44 countries. Averaging across 
country averages, the mean foreign-born share  
in 2015 was 8.6%. This is almost two and a half 
times as high as the percentage of total world 
population that is foreign-born, reflecting the 
fact that the world’s most populous countries 
have much lower shares of the foreign-born.  
Of the 12 countries with populations exceeding 
100 million in 2015, only three had foreign-born 
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population shares exceeding 1% – Japan at 1.7%, 
Pakistan at 1.9% and the United States at 15%. For 
the 10 countries with 2015 populations less than 
one million, the foreign-born share averaged 12.6%, 
with a wide range of variation, from 2% or less in 
Guyana and Comoros to 46% in Luxembourg. 
The 11 countries with the highest proportions of 
international residents, as represented by foreign- 
born population shares exceeding 30%, have an 
average foreign-born share of 50%. The group 
includes geographically small units like the Hong 
Kong SAR at 39%, Luxembourg at 45.7% and 
Singapore at 46%; and eight countries in the 
Middle East, with the highest foreign-born 
population shares being Qatar at 68%, Kuwait  
at 73% and the UAE at 87%.
How international are the world’s happiest 
countries? Looking at the 10 happiest countries 
in Figure 2.2, they have foreign-born population 
shares averaging 17.2%, about twice that for the 
world as a whole. For the top five countries, four 
of which have held the first-place position within 
the past five years, the average 2015 share of the 
foreign-born in the resident population is 14.3%, 
well above the world average. For the countries 
in 6th to 10th positions in the 2015-2017 rankings 
of life evaluations, the average foreign-born 
share is 20%, the highest being Australia at 28%.
For our estimates of the happiness of the foreign- 
born populations of each country, we use data 
on the foreign-born respondents from the Gallup 
World Poll for the longest available period, from 
2005 to 2017. In Statistical Appendix 2 we 
present our data in three different ways: for the 
162 countries with any foreign-born respondents, 
for the 117 countries where there are more than 
100 foreign-born respondents, and for 87 countries 
where there are more than 200 foreign-born 
respondents. For our main presentation in Figure 
2.4 we use the sample with 117 countries, since it 
gives the largest number of countries while still 
maintaining a reasonable sample size. We ask 
readers, when considering the rankings, to pay 
attention to the size of the 95% confidence 
regions for each country (shown as a horizontal 
line at the right-hand end of the bar), since these 
are a direct reflection of the sample sizes in  
each country, and show where caution is needed 
in interpreting the rankings. As discussed in  
more detail in Chapter 3, the Gallup World Poll 
samples are designed to reflect the total resident 
population, without special regard for the  
representativeness of the foreign-born  
population shares. There are a number of reasons 
why the foreign-born population shares may be 
under-represented in total, since they may be 
less likely to have addresses or listed phones that 
would bring them into the sampling frame. In 
addition, the limited range of language options 
available may discourage participation by potential 
foreign-born respondents not able to speak one  
of the available languages.20 We report in this 
chapter data on the foreign-born respondents  
of every country, while recognizing that the 
samples may not represent each country’s 
foreign-born population equally well.21 Since we 
are not able to estimate the size of these possible 
differences, we simply report the available data. 
We can, however, compare the foreign-born 
shares in the Gallup World Poll samples with 
those in the corresponding UN population data 
to get some impression of how serious a problem 
we might be facing. Averaging across countries, 
the UN data show the average national foreign- 
born share to be 8.6%, as we reported earlier. 
This can be compared with what we get from 
looking at the entire 2005-2017 Gallup sample, 
which typically includes 1,000 respondents per 
year in each country. As shown in Statistical 
Appendix 2, the Gallup sample has 93,000 
foreign-born respondents, compared to 
1,540,000 domestic-born respondents. The 
foreign-born respondents thus make up 5.7%  
of the total sample,22 or two-thirds the level of 
the UN estimate for 2015. This represents, as 
expected, some under-representation of the 
foreign-born in the total sample, with possible 
implications for what can safely be said about 
the foreign-born. However, we are generally 
confident in the representativeness of the Gallup 
estimates of the number for foreign-born in  
each country, for two reasons. First, the average 
proportions become closer when it is recognized 
that the Gallup surveys do not include refugee 
camps, which make up about 3% of the UN 
estimate of the foreign-born. Second, and more 
importantly for our analysis, the cross-country 
variation in the foreign-born population shares 
matches very closely with the corresponding 
intercountry variation in the UN estimates of 
foreign-born population shares.23
Figure 2.4 ranks countries by the average ladder 
score of their foreign-born respondents in all of 
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the Gallup World Polls between 2005 and 2017. 
For purposes of comparison, the figure also 
shows for each country the corresponding 
average life evaluations for domestically born 
respondents.24 Error bars are shown for the 
averages of the foreign-born, but not for the 
domestically born respondents, since their 
sample sizes from the pooled 2005-2017 surveys 
are so large that they make the estimates of the 
average very precise. 
The most striking feature of Figure 2.4 is how 
closely life evaluations for the foreign-born 
match those for respondents born in the country 
where the migrants are now living. For the 117 
countries with more than 100 foreign-born 
respondents, the cross-country correlation 
between average life evaluations of the foreign- 
born and domestically-born respondents is very 
high, 0.96. Another way of describing this point 
is that the rankings of countries according to the 
life evaluations of their immigrants is very similar 
to the ranking of Figure 2.2 for the entire resident 
populations of each country 2015-2017, despite 
the differences in the numbers of countries and 
survey years. 
Of the top 10 countries for immigrant happiness, 
as shown by Figure 2.4, nine are also top-10 
countries for total population life evaluations for 
2015-2017, as shown in Figure 2.2. The only 
exception is Mexico, which comes in just above 
the Netherlands to take the 10th spot. However, 
the small size of the foreign-born sample for 
Mexico makes it a very uncertain call. Finland is 
in the top spot for immigrant happiness 2005-
2017, just as it is also the overall happiness leader 
for 2015-2017. Of the top five countries for overall 
life evaluations, four are also in the top five for 
happiness of the foreign-born. Switzerland, 
which is currently in 5th position in the overall 
population ranking, is in 9th position in the 
immigrant happiness rankings, following several 
high-immigration non-European countries – New 
Zealand, Australia and Canada – and Sweden. This 
is because, as shown in Figure 2.4, Switzerland 
and the Netherlands have the largest top-10 
shortfall of immigrant life evaluations relative to 
those of locally born respondents. 
Looking across the whole spectrum of countries, 
what is the general relation between the life 
evaluations for foreign-born and locally born 
respondents? Figure 2.5 shows scatter plots of 
life evaluations for the two population groups, 
with life evaluations of the foreign-born on the 
vertical axis, and life evaluations for the locally 
born on the horizontal axis.
If the foreign-born and locally born have the 
same average life evaluations, then the points 
will tend to fall along the 45-degree lines marked 
in each panel of the figure. The scatter plots, 
especially those for sample sizes>100, show a 
tight positive linkage, and also suggest that 
immigrant life evaluations deviate from those of 
the native-born in a systematic way. This is 
shown by the fact that immigrants are more 
likely to have life evaluations that are higher than 
the locally born in countries where life evaluations 
of the locally born are low, and vice versa. This 
suggests, as does other evidence reviewed in 
Chapter 3, that the life evaluations of immigrants 
depend to some extent on their former lives in 
their countries of birth. Such a ‘footprint’ effect 
would be expected to give rise to the slope 
between foreign-born life evaluations and  
those of the locally born being flatter than the 
45-degree line. If the distribution of migrants is 
similar across countries, recipient countries with 
higher ladder scores have more feeder countries 
with ladder scores below their own, and hence  
a larger gap between source and destination 
happiness scores. In addition, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, immigrants who have the chance to 
choose where they go usually intend to move to 
a country where life evaluations are high. As a 
consequence, foreign-born population shares are 
systematically higher in countries with higher 
average life evaluations. For example, a country 
with average life evaluations one point higher on 
the 0 to 10 scale has 5% more of its population 
made up of the foreign-born.25 The combination 
of footprint effects and migrants tending to 
move to happier countries is no doubt part of 
the reason why the foreign-born in happier 
countries are slightly less happy than the locally 
born populations. 
But there may also be other reasons for immi-
grant happiness to be lower, including the costs 
of migration considered in more detail in Chapter 
3. There is not a large gap to explain, as for those 
117 countries with more than 100 foreign-born 
respondents, the average life evaluations of a 
country’s foreign-born population are 99.5% as 
large as those of the locally-born population in 
the same country. But this overall equality covers 
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Figure 2.4: Happiness Ranking for the Foreign-Born, 2005–2017, sample>100 















15. United States (6.878)
16. Oman (6.829)
17. Luxembourg (6.802)
18. Costa Rica (6.726)
19. United Arab Emirates (6.685)















35. Saudi Arabia (6.155)
36. Spain (6.107)
37. Venezuela (6.086)
38. Taiwan Province of China (6.012)
39. Italy (5.960)
40. Paraguay (5.899)











0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
   Average happiness of foreign born
    Average happiness of domestic born    
   95% confidence interval
World Happiness Report 2018





55. Northern Cyprus (5.443)
56. Croatia (5.368)




















77. Hong Kong SAR, China (4.963)
78. Tajikistan (4.955)
79. Somaliland region (4.900)






86. Palestinian Territories (4.689)
87. Congo (Kinshasa) (4.636)
88. Yemen (4.584)














0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
   Average happiness of foreign born
    Average happiness of domestic born    
   95% confidence interval
32
33
Figure 2.4: Happiness Ranking for the Foreign-Born, 2005–2017, sample>100 
 (Part 3)
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quite a range of experience. Among these 117 
countries, there are 64 countries where immigrant 
happiness is lower, averaging 94.5% of that of 
the locally born; 48 countries where it is higher, 
averaging 106% of the life evaluations of the 
locally born; and five countries where the two 
are essentially equal, with percentage differences 
below 1%.26
The life evaluations of immigrants and of the 
native-born are likely to depend on the extent  
to which residents in each country are ready to 
happily accept foreign migrants. To test this 
possibility, we make use of a Migrant Acceptance 
Index (MAI) developed by Gallup researchers27 
and described in the Annex to this Report.28 Our 
first test was to add the values of the MAI to the 
first equation in Table 2.1. We found a positive 
coefficient of 0.068, suggesting that immigrants, 
local residents, or both, are happier in countries 
where migrants are more welcome. An increase 
of 2 points (about one standard deviation) on 
the 9-point scale of migrant acceptance was 
associated with average life evaluations higher 
by 0.14 points on the 0 to 10 scale for life  
evaluations. Is this gain among the immigrants  
or the locally-born? We shall show later, when  
we set up and test our main model for immigrant 
happiness, that migrant acceptance makes both 
immigrants and locally born happier, with the per 
capita effects being one-third larger for immigrants. 
But the fact that the foreign-born populations 
are typically less than 15%, most of the total 
happiness gains from migrant acceptance are 
due to the locally born population, even if the 
per-person effects are larger for the migrants.
Footprint effects, coupled with the fact that 
happier countries are the major immigration 
destinations, help to explain why immigrants  
in happier countries are less happy than the  
local population, while the reverse is true for 
immigrants in less happy countries. Thus for 
those 64 countries where immigrants have lower 
life evaluations than the locally born, the average 
life evaluation is 6.00, compared to 5.01 for the 
48 countries where immigrants are happier than 
the locally born. When the OECD studied the life 
evaluations of immigrants in OECD countries, 
they found that immigrants were less happy  
than the locally born in three-quarters of their 
member countries.29 That reflects the fact that 
most of the happiest countries are also OECD 
countries. In just over half of the non-OECD 
countries, the foreign-born are happier than the 
locally born.
Another way of looking for sources of possible 
life evaluation differences between foreign-born 
and locally born respondents is to see how 
immigrants fare in different aspects of their lives. 
All four of the social factors used in Table 2.1 
show similar average values and cross-country 
patterns for the two population groups, although 
these patterns differ in interesting ways. The 
correlation is lowest, although still very high  
(at 0.91), for social support. It also has a lower 
average value for the foreign-born, 79% of whom 
feel they have someone to count on in times of 
trouble, compared to 82% for the locally born 
respondents. This possibly illustrates a conse-
quence of the uprooting effect of international 
migration, as discussed in Chapter 3. The slope 
of the relation is also slightly less than 45%, 
showing that the immigrant vs locally born gap 
for perceived social support is greatest for those 
living in countries with high average values for 
social support. Nonetheless, there is still a very 
strong positive relation, so that immigrants  
living in a country where the locally born have 
internationally high values of social support feel 
the same way themselves, even if in a slightly 
muted way. When it comes to evaluations of the 
institutional quality of their new countries, 
immigrants rank these institutions very much as 
do the locally-born, so that the cross-country 
correlations of evaluations by the two groups are 
very high, at 0.93 for freedom to make life 
choices, and 0.97 for perceptions of corruption. 
There are on average no footprint effects for 
perceptions of corruption, as immigrants see less 
evidence of corruption around them in their new 
countries than do locally born, despite having 
come, on average, from birth countries with 
more corruption than where they are now living. 
Generosity and freedom to make life choices are 
essentially equal for immigrants and the locally 
born, although slightly higher for the immigrants. 
To a striking extent, the life evaluations of the 
foreign-born are similar to those of the locally 
born, as are the values of several of the key 
social supports for better lives. But is the  
happiness of immigrants and the locally born 
affected to the same extent by these variables? 
To assess this possibility, we divided the entire 
accumulated individual Gallup World Poll  
respondents 2005-2017, typically involving 1,000 
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observations per year in each country, into 
separate foreign-born and domestically born 
samples. As shown in Table 10 of Statistical 
Appendix 2, immigrants and non-immigrants 
evaluate their lives in almost identical ways, with 
almost no significant differences.30
All of the evidence we have considered thus far 
suggests that average life evaluations depend 
first and foremost on the social and material 
aspects of life in the communities and countries 
where people live. Put another way, the substantial 
differences across countries in average life 
evaluations appear to depend more on the social 
and material aspects of life in each community 
and country than on characteristics inherent in 
individuals. If this is true, then we would expect 
to find that immigrants from countries with very 
different average levels of life evaluations would 
tend to have happiness levels much more like 
those of others in their new countries than like 
those of their previous friends, family and  
compatriots still living in their original countries. 
We can draw together the preceding lines of 
evidence to propose and test a particular model 
of immigrant happiness. Immigrant happiness 
will be systematically higher in countries where 
the local populations are happier, but the effect 
will be less than one for one because of footprint 
effects. Footprints themselves imply a positive 
effect from the average happiness in the  
countries from which the migrants came. Finally, 
immigrant happiness will be happier in countries 
where migrant acceptance is higher. All three 
propositions are tested and confirmed by the 
following equation, where average immigrant life 
evaluations 2005-2017 (ladderimm) are ex-
plained by average happiness of the locally born 
population (ladderdom), weighted average 
happiness in the source countries (ladder-
source),31 and each country’s value for the Gallup 
Migrant Acceptance Index as presented in the 
Annex. The life evaluation used is the Cantril 
ladder, as elsewhere in this chapter, with the 
estimation sample including the 107 countries 
that have more than 100 immigrant survey 
responders and a value for the Migrant  
Acceptance Index.
Ladderimm =  0.730 ladderdom +  
(0.033)
 0.243 laddersource +  
 (0.057)
 0.049 migrant acceptance 
 (0.014)
Adjusted R2=0.941  n=107
All parts of the framework are strongly supported 
by the results. It is also interesting to ask what 
we can say about the effects of immigration on 
the locally-born population. We have already 
seen that immigrants more often move to happier 
countries, as evidenced by the strong positive 
simple correlation between immigrant share and 
national happiness (r=+0.45). We cannot simply 
use this to conclude also that a higher immigrant 
share makes the domestic population happier. To 
answer that question appropriately, we need to 
take proper account of the established sources 
of well-being. We can do this by adding the 
immigrant share to a cross-sectional equation 
explaining the life evaluations of the locally-born 
by the standard variables used in Table 2.1. When 
this is done, the estimated effect of the immigrant 
population share32 is essentially zero. 
A similar test using the same framework to 
explain cross-country variations of the life evalua-
tions of immigrants also showed no impact from 
the immigrant share of the population. The same 
framework also showed that GDP per capita has 
no effect on the average life evaluations, once the 
effect flowing through the average life evaluations 
of the locally born is taken into account.33
We can use the same framework to estimate the 
effects of migrant acceptance on the happiness 
of the host populations, by adding the index to a 
cross-sectional equation explaining the average 
life evaluations of the host populations 2005-
2017 by the six key variables of Table 2.1 plus the 
Migrant Acceptance Index. The Migrant Acceptance 
Index attracts a coefficient of 0.075 (SE=0.028), 
showing that those who are not themselves 
immigrants are happier living in societies where 
immigrant acceptance is higher. The total effect 
of the Migrant Acceptance Index on immigrants 
is slightly larger, as can be seen by combining 
the direct effect from the equation shown above 
(0.049) plus that flowing indirectly through the 
life evaluations of the locally born (0.73*0.075),34 
giving a total effect of 0.103.
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Does this same framework apply when we 
consider migration from a variety of source 
countries to a single destination? If the  
framework is apt, then we would expect to find 
migrants from all countries having happiness 
levels that converge toward the average for the 
locally born, with the largest gains for those 
coming from the least happy origin countries. 
The existence of footprint effects would mean 
that immigrants coming from the least happy 
countries would have life evaluations slightly 
below those of immigrants from happier  
source countries. To compare life evaluations of 
immigrants from many source countries within a 
single destination country requires much larger 
samples of migrants than are available from the 
Gallup World Poll. Fortunately, there are two 
countries, Canada and the United Kingdom, that 
have national surveys of life satisfaction large 
enough to accumulate sufficient samples of  
the foreign-born from many different source 
countries. The fact that we have two destination 
countries allows us to test quite directly the 
convergence hypothesis presented above. If 
convergence is general, we would expect it to 
apply downward as well as upward, and to 
converge to different values in the two  
destination countries.
The Canadian data on satisfaction with life 
(SWL) for immigrants from many different 
countries have been used to compare the life 
evaluations of immigrants from each source 
country with average life evaluations in the 
source countries, using SWL data from the  
World Values Survey (WVS), or comparable data 
from the Gallup World Poll.35 If source country 
SWL was a dominant force, as it would be if 
international SWL differences were explained by 
inbuilt genetic or cultural differences, then the 
observations would lie along the 45-degree line 
if Canadian immigrant SWL is plotted against 
source-country SWL. By contrast, if SWL  
depends predominantly on life circumstances  
in Canada, then the observations for the SWL  
of the immigrant groups would lie along a 
horizontal line roughly matching the overall  
SWL of Canadians. The actual results, for  
immigrants from 100 different source countries, 
are shown in Figure 2.6.
The convergence to Canadian levels of SWL is 
apparent, even for immigrants from countries 
Figure 2.6 Life Satisfaction Among Immigrants to Canada from 100 Countries
Observed satisfaction with life among immigrant in the Canada (0 to 40 years since 
arrival) from 100 countries and predicted SWL in their countries
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with very low average life evaluations. This 
convergence can be seen by comparing the 
country spread along the horizontal axis,  
measuring SWL in the source countries, with the 
spread on the vertical axis, showing the SWL of 
the Canadian immigrants from the same source 
countries. For the convergence model to be 
generally applicable, we would expect to find 
that the variation of life evaluations among  
the immigrant groups in Canada would be 
significantly less than among the source country 
scores. This is indeed the case, as the happiness 
spread among the immigrant groups is less than 
one-quarter as large as among the source 
countries.36 This was found to be so whether  
or not estimates were adjusted to control for 
possible selection effects.37 Most of the  
immigrants rose or fell close to Canadian levels 
of SWL even though migrations intentions data 
from the Gallup World Poll show that those 
wishing to emigrate, whether in general or to 
Canada, generally have lower life evaluations 
than those who had no plans to emigrate.38 There 
is, as expected, some evidence of a footprint 
effect, with average life evaluations in the source 
country having a carry-over of 10.5% into Canadian 
life evaluations.39 If the convergence model 
applies strictly, and if the footprint effects are 
sufficiently large, then we would expect to find 
most or all of the points falling in the north-east 
and south-west quadrants, with life satisfaction 
increases for those coming from less happy 
countries, and decreases for those from more 
happy countries. This is confirmed by Figure 2.6, 
the only qualification being that immigrants from 
some countries less happy than Canada find 
themselves happier in Canada than the average 
of the native-born population – convergence plus 
overshoot.
It is possible that the Canadian results reported 
above might relate specifically to conditions 
facing immigrants to Canada, or to depend on 
the specific source countries from which Canadian 
migrants are drawn. Thus it is very helpful to be 
able to undertake a similar analysis for SWL data 
for immigrants to the United Kingdom, making 
use of the very large samples of well-being 
responses available from the UK Annual Population 
Survey. With the assistance of the UK Office for 
National Statistics, we have obtained, and present 
here, comparable data for the SWL of immigrants 
to the United Kingdom.40 The pattern of results, 
as shown in Figure 2.7, is strikingly similar to  
that found for Canada. As with Canada, there is 
strong evidence of convergence to the UK 
average, with a corresponding reduction in the 
vertical spread of the country points. There is 
also a footprint effect, averaging 12.6% in the  
UK case.
Bringing the Canadian and UK experiences 
together, perhaps the most interesting result is 
the extent to which convergence is not just 
generally up, but is towards the national averages 
in the destination countries. To show this most 
clearly, it is probably best to consider migration 
to Canada and the UK from countries sending 
sufficiently great numbers of migrants to enable 
them to appear in both the Canada and UK 
samples above. This is a smaller number of 
countries than either in the UK or Canadian 
groups, since Canada and the UK draw from 
differing mixes of source countries. Looking just 
at the 63 countries that have sufficiently large 
numbers of migrants to both countries to provide 
representative samples, we can compare the 
average SWL in the 63 source countries with the 
average SWL of the same immigrant groups in 
Canada and the United Kingdom. The average 
SWL across the source countries is 6.08 
(SE=0.15), while migrants to the UK have a mean 
SWL of 7.57 (SE=0.038), and those to Canada 
have a mean SWL of 7.81 (SE=0.028). The three 
means are strikingly different from each other in 
statistical terms. The immigrant happiness scores 
have converged to local averages to such an 
extent that they form two quite different groups. 
This is perhaps the strongest evidence in this 
chapter that it is local conditions that determine 
how people value their lives. Migrants who move 
to the UK tend to value their lives like others in 
the UK, while migrants from the same countries 
to Canada have life evaluations converging 
towards those of other Canadians.
The data from the United Kingdom and Canada 
can be used to shed more light on the Chapter 5 
finding that emigrants from Latin America to 
other countries have not had large happiness 
gains relative to other migrants. How does that 
relate to the evidence presented above that 
migrant happiness is determined primarily by the 
happiness in their destination countries? That 
evidence would suggest that if Latin American 
migrants came from happy countries and did not 
move to happier countries, they would not be 
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likely to gain. The way to test how well Latin 
American migrants fare, relative to migrants from 
other countries, would be to compare immigrants 
from different source countries while holding the 
destination country fixed. This we can do by 
using the large samples from the UK and Canadian 
national surveys. What do they show? For both 
the United Kingdom and Canada, the Latin 
American source countries have higher life 
evaluations than the average of source countries. 
That gives the Latin migrants less to gain compared 
to migrants from less happy countries. But in both 
countries, the happiness levels of immigrants from 
Latin America exceeds that of other immigrants, 
suggesting that at least some of the Latin  
happiness bulge described in Chapter 6 is 
brought along as part of the migrant’s posses-
sions. Putting the two bits together, immigrants 
from Latin America have life satisfaction of 7.71  
in the United Kingdom and 8.01 in Canada, a 
difference very similar to the difference between 
average life satisfaction in the two countries. This 
compares to Latin American source country life 
satisfaction of about 7.0 for the eight countries 
with sufficient numbers of migrants to both 
countries. Thus Latin migrants to the United 
Kingdom show happiness gains of about 0.7 
points, compared to 1.0 points for those bound 
for Canada. 
In both cases, the migrants from Latin America 
fare slightly better than other migrants in their 
destinations, having life satisfaction 0.10 points 
higher in the UK and 0.17 points higher in Canada, 
compared to other migrants. But their happiness 
gains from migration are smaller, reflecting the 
fact that they were already in happy countries. 
The average gain for all migrants to the UK was 
about 1.3 points, and 1.8 points for migrants to 
Canada. This reflects that Latin American countries 
are happier than most other source countries, 
and not that Latin Americans in the UK or Canada 
are less happy than other immigrants. Indeed, as 
shown by the positions of the symbols for Latin 
American countries in both Figures 2.6 and 2.7, 
immigrants from Latin America often have life 
evaluations that are higher than those of the 
locally born.
Any study of migration, especially one that 
focuses on the happiness of both migrants and 
Figure 2.7 Life Satisfaction Among Immigrants to the UK from 70 Countries
Observed satisfaction with life among immigrant in the UK (0 to 40 years since arrival) 
from 70 countries and predicted SWL in their countries
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non-migrants, leads naturally to considerations 
of the possible linkages between migration and 
world happiness. We have done our best to 
assemble the available data on the life evaluations 
of migrants and non-migrants alike. Many  
countries, especially those where people  
evaluate their lives highly, have many would-be 
migrants, on top of the humanitarian need to 
somehow accommodate those whose lives in 
their birth countries have become impossibly 
difficult. Is migration making the world as a 
whole happier or unhappier? Is there any pre-
ferred level of migration that will best serve to 
provide opportunities for newcomers, to build 
positive linkages among countries, and accom-
modate the need to find new homes for refu-
gees, while still maintaining and improving the 
quality of the social fabric that supports better 
lives? There is no easy answer to this question. 
Are countries with higher immigration rates 
thereby happier places to live, for migrants and 
non-migrants alike? We have already seen that 
most migration is from less happy to happier 
places, so we expect to find that happier countries 
do tend to have higher foreign-born population 
shares. But that does not answer the question, 
since in this case the migration is responding to 
the differences in happiness and other aspects of 
life, and is probably not responsible for creating 
the differences. One limited way of answering 
the question might be to add the foreign-born 
population share for each country to the equation 
we used in Table 2.1 to explain annual observations 
of life evaluations in the sample of 157 countries 
using data from 2005 through 2017. We did this, 
and there was no significant effect. Alternatively, 
and preferably, we repeated that analysis using 
country fixed effects, so that any influence we 
found would be free of country effects, and 
would instead look for happiness changes  
within countries in response to changes in their 
shares of foreign-born population. We found an  
insignificant negative effect that remained  
both negative and insignificant under several 
alternative specifications.41 There are only limited 
data for changes in each country’s shares of 
foreign-born population, and many other factors 
that might be in play, so there can be no firm 
conclusions drawn from these limited experiments. 
As described previously, we also tested whether 
international differences in accumulated net 
immigration (as measured by the foreign-born 
population share) had any impact in explaining 
cross-country variations in the average 2005-
2017 life evaluations for either the immigrant or 
locally born populations, once account is taken 
of the six main determinants of life evaluations. 
We found no effect, either positive or negative.
Conclusions
This chapter, as usual, has a double focus. The 
first half of the chapter presented our latest 
ranking of countries according to their average 
life evaluations over the previous three years, 
followed by a ranking of changes in life evaluations 
from 2008-2010 to 2015-2017. The second half 
turned the focus to international migration, 
ranking countries by the average life evaluations 
of all the foreign-born respondents to the Gallup 
World Poll between 2005 and 2017. 
The rankings of country happiness are based this 
year on the pooled results from Gallup World 
Poll surveys from 2015-2017, and show both 
change and stability. There is a new top ranking 
country, Finland, but the top ten positions are 
held by the same countries as in the last two 
years, although with some swapping of places. 
Four different countries have held top spot since 
2015 – Switzerland, Denmark, Norway and now 
Finland. 
All the top countries tend to have high values for 
all six of the key variables that have been found 
to support well-being: income, healthy life 
expectancy, social support, freedom, trust and 
generosity, to such a degree that year to year 
changes in the top ranking are to be expected.
This year the happiness changes reported are 
those from 2008-2010, in the immediate aftermath 
of the financial crisis of 2007-2008; to the most 
recent years, covering 2015-2017. The winner of 
the change category was Togo, as it posted the 
largest gain since 2008-2010, almost 1.2 points. It 
was the lowest ranked country in World Happiness 
Report 2015 and now ranks 17 places higher. 
Other signal success stories, countries with 
average life evaluation gains of more than a full 
point on the 0 to 10 scale since 2008-2010, 
include Latvia, Bulgaria and Sierra Leone. The 
largest happiness losses since 2008-2010 were  
in Ukraine, Yemen, Syria, Malawi and Venezuela, 
with drops over 1 point in each case, the largest 
fall being almost 2.2 points in Venezuela. 
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Five of this report’s seven chapters deal primarily 
with migration. Perhaps the most striking finding 
of the whole report is that a ranking of countries 
according to the happiness of their immigrant 
populations is almost exactly the same as for the 
rest of the population. The immigrant happiness 
rankings are based on the full span of Gallup 
data from 2005 to 2017, which is sufficient to 
have 117 countries with more than 100 immigrant 
respondents. Finland picks up a second gold 
medal here, as home to the world’s happiest 
immigrants. 
The closeness of the two rankings shows that 
immigrant happiness depends predominantly on 
the quality of life where they now live, illustrating 
a general pattern of convergence. Happiness can 
change, and does change, according to the 
quality of the society in which people live. 
Immigrant happiness, like that of the locally born 
depends on a range of features of the social 
fabric, extending far beyond the higher incomes 
traditionally thought to inspire and reward 
migration. Once the overall quality of life is taken 
into account (with income given its due weight 
as one of the six factors), there is no happiness 
gain from moving to a higher income country. 
That has been tested, but is already suggested 
by the countries with the happiest immigrants 
are not the richest countries, but instead the 
countries with a more balanced set of social and 
institutional supports for better lives. 
While convergence to local happiness levels is 
quite rapid, it is not complete, as there is a 
‘footprint’ effect based on the happiness in each 
source country. This effect ranges from 10% to 
25%. This footprint effect, coupled with the fact 
that most migration is from less happy to happier 
countries, explains why, although on average 
across the world immigrant happiness is very 
close to that of the locally born, it is less than 
that of the locals in the happiest countries and 
greater in the less happy countries.
Since immigrants tend on average to have life 
evaluations close to those of people already 
living in destination countries, does this suggest 
that world happiness would be higher if there 
were more migration from unhappy to happy 
places? Although this question underlies many 
current political debates, the available evidence 
is not yet good enough to provide anything like 
definitive conclusions. What does seem apparent, 
as will be shown in more detail in Chapter 3, is 
that every migration pathway, and each migration 
flow, has its own story, with often diverging 
well-being outcomes for the migrants, their new 
communities, and the communities left behind. 
We have shown that the happiest counties have 
higher than world average shares of foreign-born 
population. The top 10 countries in the Figure 2.2 
rankings of 2015-2017 life evaluations had foreign- 
born population shares averaging 18% in 2015, 
more than twice the global country average of 
8.7%, and covering a wide range, from 6% to 
30%. These same countries also had the happiest 
foreign-born populations. Based on the average 
life evaluations 2005-2017 for foreign-born 
respondents (in Figure 2.4), the same countries 
dominated the top spots in the world rankings, 
with all of the top 10 countries in the overall 
happiness rankings 2015-2017 being in the top  
11 countries for 2005-2017 happiness of their 
foreign-born populations. This is due to a  
combination of factors: their attractiveness to 
international migrants, their willingness to accept 
migrants, and their ability to achieve integration 
in ways that maintain life evaluations for both 
immigrants and the locally born. 
Helsinki, Copenhagen and Reykjavik are already 
very international places. What is for them, and 
for the world, the right scale and pattern of 
future migration to help support and build 
international cooperation of a sort that will help 
the billions of people still living in misery? These 
are not the world’s happiest cities because of 
where they are, but because their residents  
have over many decades built levels of trust, 
connections, cooperation and innovation  
sufficient to deliver satisfying lives for them-
selves, and to be in a position to help others do 
the same. What is needed is to look behind the 
average life evaluations to see what makes for 
better lives, and to help others to make progress 
in improving their own lives. International migra-
tion, with its increasing two-way flows, is likely to 
continue to provide international human linkages 
and shared sympathies sufficient to support 
knowledge transfers of the sort that are needed. 
But migration flows not properly managed and 
digested have the potential for destroying trust 
and inflaming anti-immigrant views.
Similar questions arise when city-level happiness 
is ranked in countries that have sufficiently great 
samples of data to make such comparisons 
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feasible. One immediate response among readers 
and commentators is to suggest that people 
should move to a happier community in order to 
make themselves happier. On reflection, when 
they see the nature of the social connections, 
and the quality of communities, governments 
and workplaces that underlie these happier lives, 
they see that the right answer is not to move to 
the happier communities but instead to learn and 
apply the lessons and inspirations that underlie 
their happiness. Happiness is not something 
inherently in short supply, like gold, inciting 
rushes to find and much conflict over ownership. 
My gold cannot be your gold. But happiness, 
unlike gold, can be created for all, and can be 
shared without being scarce for those who give. 
It even grows as it is shared.
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Endnotes
1  Gallup weights sum up to the number of respondents from 
each country. To produce weights adjusted for population 
size in each country for the period of 2015-2017, we first 
adjust the Gallup weights so that each country has the 
same weight (one-country-one-vote) in the period. Next  
we multiply total population aged 15+ in each country in 
2016 by the one-country-one-vote weight. To simplify the 
analysis, we use population in 2016 for the period of 
2015-2017 for all the countries/regions. Total population 
aged 15+ is equal to the total population minus the amount 
of population aged 0-14. Data are mainly taken from WDI 
released by the World Bank in September 2017. Specifically, 
the total population and the proportion of population aged 
0-14 are taken from the series “Population ages 0-14 
(percent of total)” and “Population, total” respectively from 
WDI. There are a few regions lack of data in WDI, such as 
Somaliland, Kosovo, and Taiwan. In this case, other sources 
of data are used if available. The share of population aged 
0-14 is missing in WDI, we thus use the data from CIA’s 
World Fact Book, 25.01% to calculate the amount of adult 
population. The total population in Taiwan in 2016 is 
23,540,000, and the aged 15+ is 20,398,000 in 2015 
(Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 2016, Table 
3). There are no reliable data on population and age 
structure in Somaliland region, therefore it is not included 
in the calculation of world or regional distributions.
2  See, for example, Atkinson (2015), Atkinson and Bourguignon 
(2014), , Kennedy, Lochner, and Prothrow-Stith (1997), 
Keeley (2015), OECD (2015), Neckerman and Torche 
(2007), and Piketty (2014).
3  See Helliwell, Huang, and Wang (2016). See also Goff, 
Helliwell, and Mayraz (2016), Gandelman and Porzekanski 
(2013), Kalmijn and Veenhoven (2005). 
4  See, for example, Evans, Barer, and Marmor (1997), Marmot, 
Ryff, Bumpass, Shipley, and Marks (1994), and Marmot 
(2005).
5 See Corak (2013).
6 See Table 17 in Statistical Appendix 1.
7  The statistical appendix contains alternative forms without 
year effects (Table 14 of Appendix 1), and a repeat version 
of the Table 2.1 equation showing the estimated year effects 
(Table 9 of Appendix 1). These results confirm, as we would 
hope, that inclusion of the year effects makes no significant 
difference to any of the coefficients.
8  As shown by the comparative analysis in Table 8 of 
Appendix 1.
9  The definitions of the variables are shown in Technical Box 
1, with additional detail in the online data appendix.
10  This influence may be direct, as many have found, e.g.  
De Neve, Diener, Tay, and Xuereb (2013). It may also 
embody the idea, as made explicit in Fredrickson’s 
broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 2001), that good 
moods help to induce the sorts of positive connections that 
eventually provide the basis for better life circumstances. 
11  See, for example, Danner, Snowdon, and Friesen (2001), 
Cohen, Doyle, Turner, Alper, and Skoner (2003), and Doyle, 
Gentile, and Cohen (2006).
12  We put the contributions of the six factors as the first 
elements in the overall country bars because this makes it 
easier to see that the length of the overall bar depends only 
on the average answers given to the life evaluation question. 
In World Happiness Report 2013 we adopted a different 
ordering, putting the combined Dystopia+residual elements 
on the left of each bar to make it easier to compare the 
sizes of residuals across countries. To make that comparison 
equally possible in subsequent World Happiness Reports, 
we include the alternative form of the figure in the online 
Statistical Appendix 1 (Appendix Figures 7-9).
13  These calculations are shown in detail in Table 19 of the 
online Statistical Appendix 1.
14  The prevalence of these feedbacks was documented in 
Chapter 4 of World Happiness Report 2013, De Neve, 
Diener, Tay, and Xuereb (2013).
15  The coefficients on GDP per capita and healthy life 
expectancy are affected even less, and in the opposite 
direction in the case of the income measure, being 
increased rather than reduced, once again just as expected. 
The changes are tiny because the data come from other 
sources, and are unaffected by our experiment. However, 
the income coefficient does increase slightly, since income 
is positively correlated with the other four variables being 
tested, so that income is now able to pick up a fraction of 
the drop in influence from the other four variables. We also 
performed an alternative robustness test, using the 
previous year’s values for the four survey-based variables. 
This also avoids using the same respondent’s answers on 
both sides of the equation, and produces similar results, as 
shown in Table 13 of the Statistical Appendix 1. The Table 13 
results are very similar to the split-sample results shown in 
Tables 11 and 12, and all three tables give effect sizes very 
similar to those in Table 2.1 in reported in the main text.
16  The data and calculations are shown in detail in Table 20  
of the Statistical Appendix 1. Annual per capita incomes 
average $46,000 in the top 10 countries, compared to 
$1,500 in the bottom 10, measured in international dollars 
at purchasing power parity. For comparison, 95% of 
respondents have someone to count on in the top 10 
countries, compared to 58% in the bottom 10. Healthy life 
expectancy is 72 years in the top 10, compared to 53 years 
in the bottom 10. 93% of the top 10 respondents think they 
have sufficient freedom to make key life choices, compared 
to 62% in the bottom 10. Average perceptions of corruption 
are 34%in the top 10, compared to 73% in the bottom 10.
17  Actual and predicted national and regional average 
2015-2017 life evaluations are plotted in Figure 16 of the 
Statistical Appendix 1. The 45-degree line in each part of 
the Figure shows a situation where the actual and predicted 
values are equal. A predominance of country dots below 
the 45-degree line shows a region where actual values are 
below those predicted by the model, and vice versa. East 
Asia provides an example of the former case, and Latin 
America of the latter.
18 For example, see Chen, Lee, and Stevenson (1995).
19  One slight exception is that the negative effect of corruption 
is estimated to be slightly larger, although not significantly 
so, if we include a separate regional effect variable for Latin 
America. This is because corruption is worse than average in 
Latin America, and the inclusion of a special Latin American 




20  The number of languages used in a country includes all 
those spoken by more than 5% of the population.
21  As noted in Technical Box 3 in Chapter 2 of World Happiness 
Report 2017, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries 
are a special case in three ways. First they have very high 
foreign-born population shares. Second, their overall 
country estimates are adjusted to reflect outside estimates 
of the non-national population, and third, Gallup Polls in 
those countries were offered in Arabic only prior to 2014, 
so that their non-national respondents in the earlier years 
were almost entirely drawn from other Arab-speaking 
countries. In Figure 2.4 we report the foreign-born ladder 
scores using all available years for all countries, while in 
Technical Box 3 of WHR 2017 the figures are based only  
on 2014 and later, permitting a comparison of the two 
procedures. For most of the GCC countries the estimates 
are quite similar, differences presumably resulting from the 
relative evaluations and numbers of the Arab-speaking and 
English-speaking respondents.
22 5.7%=100*(93/(93+1540)).
23  The correlation is 0.9 between the two country-level 
estimates of foreign-born population shares. 
24  There is a similar ranking of immigrant life evaluations for 
the OECD countries in Figure 3.21 of OECD (2017).
25  Regressing the immigrant share, as a proportion, on the 
average ladder score of the locally born gives a coefficient 
of 0.058 (t=5.5).
26  This is based on the ratios of foreign-born to locally born 
life evaluation averages for the 117 countries where there 
are more than 100 foreign-born respondents in the 
2005-2017 data period. The ratios are averaged for each 
country to the nearest percentage point – hence the 
equality for five countries.
27  The Migrant Acceptance Index is a proprietary index 
developed by Gallup, based on items it asks in its Gallup 
World Poll surveys. Their initial analysis of the data may be 
found at: http://news.gallup.com/poll/216377/new-index-
shows-least-accepting-countries-migrants.aspx. The 
definition of the index, and its values for the most accepting 
and non-accepting countries, are shown in the Annex to 
this report by Esipova, Ray, Fleming, and Pugliese (2018).
28  There is only a single value of the index for each country, 
which then has to be repeated for each country-year in  
the panel.
29 See OECD (2017), Figure 3.21.
30  A similar conclusion follows, as also shown in Statistical 
Appendix 2, if we use national average data in separate 
cross-sectional equations for the foreign-born and locally 
born sub-populations. In this instance we need to do a pure 
cross section rather than the panel approach used in Table 
2.1, because the samples of the foreign-born in each annual 
sample of 1,000 respondents are much too small to enable 
regressions using country-year data.
31  The average life evaluations of the locally born and the 
weighted average source country life evaluations also make 
use of the entire 2005-2017 sample. The Migrant Acceptance 
Index is a single value for each country, as described in 
Esipova et al. (2018).
32  The simple correlation between the ratio and the immigrant 
share of the population is significantly negative, but 
disappears when the happiness of the locally born is 
controlled for. This is because, as we have already shown, 
foreign-born population shares are higher in countries with 
happier locally born populations. 
33  This is consistent with Hendriks and Bartram (2016), who 
find economic conditions to be incomplete as explanations 
of migrant happiness. Our results are testing whether 
national income is more important for migrant than for 
non-migrant happiness, and we find that it is not, since 
there is a zero coefficient on log GDP per capita when 
added to an equation explaining immigrant happiness by 
native-born happiness and the happiness in their source 
countries. Hence the non-economic sources of life 
evaluations are equally important for both immigrant and 
locally born respondents.
34  The effect flowing through domestic happiness is equal to 
the effect in the domestic happiness equation (0.075) times 
the effect of domestic happiness on immigrant happiness 
(0.73). The total effect on immigrants is the sum of the 
direct and indirect elements (0.049 + 0.73*.075 = 0.103).
35  The use of the Gallup World Poll data permits more 
countries to be considered, as it covers many more 
countries than does the World Values Survey. Helliwell, 
Bonikowska, and Shiplett (2018) show comparable results 
using WVS and Gallup estimates for source country life 
evaluations. An empirically estimated conversion factor is 
used to convert Gallup ladder data to SWL equivalents, 
based on Gallup data from the year when ladder and SWL 
questions were both asked of all respondents.
36  More precisely, the standard deviation across countries is 
1.17 among the source countries, and 0.24 among the 
immigrant groups. The Canadian distribution is about a 
higher mean, as the average SWL in the 100 source 
countries is 6.06, compared to 7.84 among the immigrant 
groups.
37  See Helliwell et al. (2018). A similar matching process, with 
similar results, is available for a smaller number of countries 
in Frank, Hou, and Schellenberg (2016).
38 See Helliwell et al. (2018, Figure 1).
39  That is, if the average SWL of immigrants from each of the 
100 source countries is regressed on the average estimated 
SWL in those 100 countries, the estimated coefficient is 
0.105 (t=5.8).





41  For example, regressing country averages of immigrant life 
evaluations on the corresponding averages for the locally 
born and each country’s share of foreign-born population 
shows a slight but insignificant negative effect for the 
foreign-born population share. 
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The considerable happiness differences between 
countries suggest that migrating to another 
country provides for many people a major 
opportunity to obtain a happier life. However, 
negative migrant experiences are common, 
including exploitation, social exclusion, home-
sickness, and unsuccessful socioeconomic 
assimilation.1 This raises important questions in 
our globalizing world, where more than 700 
million people currently say they would like to 
move permanently to another country if they  
had the opportunity,2 and where the international 
migrant population is expected to increase from 
the current 250 million to an estimated 400 
million people in 2050.3 Do migrants generally 
gain happiness from moving to another country? 
In what specific migration flows do migrants gain 
happiness from moving abroad? Do the short-
term and long-term impacts of migration on 
migrants’ happiness differ? What is the impact  
of migration on the happiness of families  
left behind?
We assess these questions in a global context 
using Gallup World Poll (GWP) data including 
more than 36,000 first-generation migrants from 
over 150 countries and territories. By addressing 
these questions empirically, this chapter is 
intended to develop globally comparable  
information about how migration affects the 
happiness of migrants and their families. The 
outcomes in both the affective and cognitive 
dimensions of happiness will be considered.  
The affective dimension refers to the frequency 
of experiencing pleasant moods and emotions  
as opposed to unpleasant ones, whereas the 
cognitive dimension refers to a person’s  
contentment and satisfaction with life.4
Approximately 10% of international migrants  
are considered refugees who were forced to 
migrate by external circumstances such as war, 
persecution, or natural disasters.5 The other 90% 
of international migrants are believed to move 
largely voluntarily. Voluntary migrants mention  
a variety of motives for migration, including 
economic gain, career or study opportunities, 
living closer to family, or a more livable or  
suitable environment (e.g., more religious or 
political freedom). On the most general level, 
however, these concrete motives are different 
ways migrants attempt to improve their own or 
their families’ lives.6 Empirical research shows 
that, when making important decisions such as 
migration decisions, most people tend to choose 
the option they think will make them or their 
families happiest.7 This suggests that migrants 
move particularly to improve their own or their 
families’ lives in terms of happiness, with the 
exception of refugees who move primarily to 
secure their lives. Conceptually, then, happiness, 
which is often used synonymously with subjective 
well-being, provides valuable information about 
migrant well-being. 
The above considerations imply that voluntary 
migrants anticipate that migration will lead to 
improved well-being for themselves and/or  
their families. Many migrants will surely experience 
considerable happiness gains, particularly those 
who meet basic subsistence needs by migrating, 
as basic needs such as economic security and 
safety are vital conditions for happiness.8 Migrants 
moving to more developed countries may also 
experience major gains in other important 
well-being domains, such as freedom, education, 
and economic welfare.9
It should come as no surprise, however, to find 
that some migrants have not become happier 
following migration. Migration is associated with 
severe costs in other critical well-being domains, 
particularly those relating to social and esteem 
needs. Separation from friends and family, social 
exclusion in the host country (e.g., discrimination), 
and decreased social participation due to linguistic 
and cultural barriers are typical social costs of 
migration that frequently result in experiences  
of social isolation, loneliness, and impaired social 
support among migrants.10 Migration also often 
entails a lower position in the social hierarchy, a 
sense of dislocation, and acculturative stress 
(cultural clashes and identity issues).11 Additionally, 
happiness gains may falter over time because 
people tend to adapt more to the typical benefits 
of migration, such as improvements in economic 
welfare, than to migration’s typical costs, such  
as leaving behind one’s social and cultural 
environment.12
Migration decisions are complicated by major 
information constraints. Most prospective  
migrants have never been in their intended 
destination country. They necessarily resort to 
information from the media or their personal 
social network. However, these sources tend to 
provide limited and positively biased information; 
for example, migrants tend to be hesitant about 
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revealing their disappointing migration outcomes 
to people in their home country.13 In essence, 
prospective migrants must make one of the most 
important and difficult decisions of their lives 
based on limited knowledge of its consequences. 
Imperfect decisions may also follow from  
inaccurately weighing the importance of the 
anticipated advantages and disadvantages of 
migrating. Placing disproportionate weight on 
certain aspects of the outcome may be common, 
since human susceptibility to deviations from a 
standard of rationality is well-documented in the 
social sciences.14 Specifically, people are believed 
to put excessive weight on satisfying salient 
desires, most notably economic gain, at a cost  
to more basic needs such as social needs.15 These 
beliefs are inspired by the weak correlation between 
economic welfare and happiness for people who 
have sufficient money to make ends meet.16 
Migration may thus be a misguided endeavour for 
some migrants who move in search of a better 
life,17 which signals the need to evaluate whether 
migrants are truly better off after migration. 
Evaluating the outcomes of migration is compli-
cated, however, by the rarity of experimental 
studies and panel studies tracking international 
migrants across international borders. Existing 
work evaluating migrants’ happiness outcomes  
is mostly limited to comparing the happiness of 
migrants with that of demographically similar 
people living in a migrant’s home country 
(matched stayers).18 The happiness of matched 
stayers reflects what the migrant’s happiness 
would have been like had they not migrated, 
which implies that migrants benefit from  
migration if they report higher happiness levels 
than matched stayers.19 This methodology has 
limited leverage in estimating the causal impact 
of migration because the non-random selection 
of people into migration is not fully captured by 
the comparison of demographically similar 
migrants and stayers. For example, compared 
with stayers, migrants tend to be less risk-averse, 
to have a higher achievement motivation and 
lower affiliation motivation, and to differ in terms 
of pre-migration skills and wealth.20 Moreover, 
people who are relatively unhappy given their 
socio-economic conditions are more willing to 
migrate.21 Such unobserved pre-migration differ-
ences between migrants and stayers may bias 
the estimated impact of migration when using 
simple comparisons of migrants and stayers. 
The current literature generally reports happiness 
gains for migrants moving to more developed 
countries, whereas non-positive happiness 
outcomes are observed particularly among 
migrants moving to less developed countries.22 
However, there are notable exceptions to this 
general pattern. Convincing evidence comes 
from the only experimental data available, which 
concerns a migration lottery among Tongan 
residents hoping to move to New Zealand.23 Four 
years after migration, the ‘lucky’ Tongans who 
were allowed to migrate were less happy than 
the ‘unlucky’ Tongans who were forced to stay, 
even though the voluntary migrants enjoyed 
substantially better objective well-being, such  
as nearly triple their pre-migration income. 
Non-positive happiness outcomes are also 
reported among other migration flows to more 
developed countries, such as for Polish people 
moving to Western Europe24 and in the context 
of internal migration, rural-urban migrants in 
China.25 The strong dependence of migration 
outcomes on where migrants come from and 
where they go highlights the unique characteristics 
of each migration flow and the importance of 
information on the well-being outcomes of 
migrants in specific migration flows.
One possible reason for non-positive outcomes 
among some migrants is that they have not yet 
fully reaped the benefits of migration. Most 
migrants perceive migration as an investment in 
their future; they typically expect their well-being 
to gradually improve over time after overcoming 
initial hurdles, such as learning the language and 
finding a job. Conversely, as mentioned above, 
the initial effect of migration is weakened by 
migrants’ adaptation to their lives in the host 
country that may follow from a shifting 
frame-of-reference.26 The migrant’s length of stay 
may thus be important to consider when evaluating 
the well-being consequences of migration.
Another possible reason that some migrants may 
not become happier from migration is that they 
sacrifice some of their own happiness to support, 
via remittances, the well-being of family members 
and/or others who remain in the country of 
origin. The vast scope of worldwide bilateral 
remittance flows—exceeding an estimated $600 
billion in 2015 alone27—illustrates that moving 
abroad to improve the welfare of people back 
home is an established reason for migration, 
particularly among migrants moving from  
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developing to developed countries, and high-
lights that migration is often a family decision 
rather than an individual one.28 The receipt of 
remittances often results in significant economic 
gains and poverty alleviation for families left 
behind and thereby enables access to better 
health care, education for one’s children, and 
other consumption opportunities that benefit 
happiness.29 However, family separation also has 
various negative consequences for family  
members who remain in the country of origin, 
such as impaired emotional support, psychological 
disconnection from the migrant, and a greater 
burden of responsibility for household chores 
and child nurturing.30 Do the advantages of 
having a family member abroad outweigh  
the disadvantages? Although the receipt of 
remittances is associated with greater happiness,31 
having a household member abroad was not 
positively associated with life satisfaction among 
left-behind adult household members in an  
Ecuadorian community.32 Similarly, household 
members left behind in small Mexican and 
Bolivian communities do not evaluate their  
family happiness as having improved more than 
non-migrant households.33 In contrast, in a 
comprehensive set of Latin American countries, 
adult household members with relatives or 
friends abroad who they can count on evaluate 
their lives more positively than adults without 
such relatives or friends abroad.34 Causal evidence 
for emotional well-being and mental health is 
also mixed. For example, the emigration of a 
family member did not affect the emotional 
well-being of left-behind families in Tonga and 
the elderly in Moldova but did negatively affect 
various aspects of emotional well-being among 
left-behind Mexican women and caregivers in 
Southeast Asia.35 Hence, the happiness conse-
quences of migration for those staying behind 
appear to be strongly context-dependent. Given 
that the current literature has predominantly 
focused on specific countries or communities, a 
global picture is missing of how migration affects 
the happiness of those staying behind. 
This chapter contributes to existing knowledge  
in three main ways. First, it covers the happiness 
outcomes of migrants in previously unexplored 
migration flows between world regions (e.g., 
from South Asia to Southeast Asia), within world 
regions (e.g., within sub-Saharan Africa), and 
between specific countries (e.g., Russians to 
Israel) using a methodology that allows for more 
accurate estimates of the happiness consequences 
of migration than is typically used in the literature. 
Second, while previous work predominantly 
evaluated migrants’ cognitive happiness outcomes 
(life evaluations), this chapter explores migrants’ 
happiness outcomes more comprehensively by 
additionally considering the impact of migration 
on the affective dimension of happiness (moods 
and emotions).36 Third, this chapter provides a 
global overview of the relationship between 
migration and the happiness of families left 
behind and examines the impact of migration  
on families left behind in various previously 
unexplored migration flows. 
The Happiness Outcomes of  
International Migrants
To determine the impact of migration, we aim to 
compare the happiness of migrants to what their 
happiness would have been had they not migrated. 
The latter is unobserved. In the absence of 
large-scale experimental or panel data tracking 
migrants across international borders, we use 
pooled annual cross-sectional GWP data across 
more than 150 countries and territories spanning 
the period 2009-2016 to make this comparison. 
The adult sample contains more than 36,000 
first-generation migrants.37 To mitigate the above 
discussed self-selection and reverse causality 
issues in the best possible way given our 
cross-sectional data, we use a more rigorous 
approach than a simple comparison of migrants 
and matched stayers, as has been typically done 
in the literature.38 We first matched migrants to 
demographically similar people in their country 
of origin who desire to move permanently to 
another country, i.e., potential migrants. Given 
that emigration aspirations are found to be good 
predictors of subsequent migration behaviour,39 
potential migrants can be assumed to have 
similar unobserved characteristics (e.g., similar 
risk preferences and pre-migration wealth) as 
migrants had before they migrated. By using the 
happiness of potential migrants as a proxy for 
migrants’ pre-migration happiness, we created a 
synthetic panel that allows us to estimate migrants’ 
pre-versus post-migration change in happiness. 
The comparison of migrants and potential 
migrants captures a migrant’s change in happiness 
but not how the happiness of migrants would 
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have developed had they not migrated. We 
included a control group to capture this counter-
factual. Specifically, we matched migrants with 
demographically similar stayers who expressed 
no desire to migrate (reflecting the happiness of 
stayers in the post-migration period) and we 
additionally matched potential migrants with 
demographically similar stayers who expressed 
no desire to migrate (reflecting the happiness of 
stayers in the pre-migration period). In the end, 
we have four groups: migrants after migration 
(group 1), migrants before migration (group 2), 
stayers in the post-migration period (group 3), 
and stayers in the pre-migration period (group 
4). We calculated the impact of migration by 
comparing migrants’ average pre-versus  
post-migration period change in happiness to 
that of stayers (i.e., difference-in-differences). 
Our empirical strategy is described in more detail 
in Technical Box 3.1.
We ensured that our immigrant sample is as 
representative as possible for the true immigrant 
stock size of each country by virtue of a weighting 
variable using UN DESA (2015) data on each 
country’s immigrant stock. In some analyses, the 
immigrant population is divided into newcomers 
and long-timers based on whether the immigrant 
has lived for more or fewer than five years in their 
country of residence to compare the short- and 
long-term impacts of migration. We consider 
three happiness indicators that together cover the 
cognitive and affective dimension of happiness:
1.  Life evaluation—as measured by the Cantril 
ladder-of-life question that asks people to 
make a cognitive assessment of the quality of 
their lives on an 11-point ladder scale, with 
the bottom rung of the ladder (0) being the 
worst possible life for them and the top rung 
(10) being the best possible life.40
2.  Positive affect—as measured before 2012 
by a three-item index asking respondents 
whether they frequently experienced  
(1) enjoyment, (2) laughter, and (3) happiness 
on the day before the interview. For the 
2013-2016 period, a two-item index comprising 
the first two items was used because the 
latter item was not available for this period.
3.  Negative affect—as measured by a three-
item index asking respondents whether they 
frequently experienced (1) worry, (2) sadness, 
and (3) anger on the day before the interview.41
We conduct separate analyses for each happiness 
indicator because, while positively correlated, 
outcomes can differ considerably between these 
dimensions.42
The average happiness gains of the global 
immigrant population are presented in Figure 3.1. 
Immigrants across the globe evaluate their lives 
on average 0.47 points higher (on a 0-10 scale) 
after migration, which implies that migrants 
report approximately 9% higher life evaluations 
following migration.43 Migrants also experience 
5% more positive affect (0.33 points on a 0-10 
scale) and 7% less negative affect (0.23 points 
on a 0-10 scale) due to migration.44
The increased life evaluations of “newcomers”, 
and to a lesser extent their increased positive 
affect experiences,45 show that immigrants 
already achieve happiness gains during their first 
five years after migration. The happiness gains of 
long-timers are very similar to those of newcomers. 
This finding suggests that the happiness of 
immigrants does not improve much with their 
length of stay in the destination country,46 which 
is in line with previous research findings.47
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Technical Box 3.1: Estimation Strategy
We first matched each migrant to  
observably similar potential migrants and 
two groups of observably similar stayers 
who have no desire to migrate using an 
exact matching procedure. In the end,  
a synthetic panel is created with the  
following four groups:
1. Migrants after moving to another 
country.
2. Potential migrants before moving to 
another country.48 This group is obtained 
by exactly matching migrants in the first 
group with one or more respondents 
who expressed a desire to permanently 
move to another country using country 
of origin, gender, and education level as 
matching variables.49 To make realistic 
comparisons, potential migrants had to 
be younger than the migrant they were 
matched with. 
3. Stayers that are matched with Group 1. 
This group consists of those expressing 
no desire to permanently move abroad, 
and who were identified by matching 
the migrants from the first group with 
one or more stayers based on country 
of origin, gender, education level, age 
group (maximum age difference of 5 
years), and year of interview.
4. Stayers that are matched with Group 2. 
This group consists of those expressing 
no desire to permanently move abroad, 
and who were identified by matching 
the potential migrants from the second 
group with one or more stayers based 
on country of origin, gender, education 
level, age group (maximum age differ-
ence of 5 years), and year of interview.
By construction, potential migrants (group 
2) and stayers in the pre-migration period 
(group 4) are on average younger than 
migrants (group 1) and stayers in the 
post-migration period (group 3).  
Descriptive statistics of the four matched 
groups are provided in Table A1 of the 
Online Appendix. A counterfactual (groups 
3 and 4) is typically included in panel studies 
to mitigate the effect of time-varying 
extraneous factors, but the counterfactual 
has a slightly different purpose in our 
repeated cross-sectional design. In the 
context of this study, the counterfactual 
mainly mitigates possible differences 
between migrants and potential migrants 
that are due to a confounding age trend. 
This correction allows us to better account 
for how migrants’ happiness would have 
developed had they not migrated. After the 
creation of our synthetic panel, a parametric 
difference-in-difference estimator was used to 
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where H is the happiness indicator (life 
evaluation, positive affect, or negative affect). 
In case of a (potential) migrant matched with 
more than one non-migrant, the average life 
evaluation, positive affect, and negative 
affect of the matched non-migrants was 
taken. The difference-in-differences estimates 
are based on OLS regressions using robust 




Happiness Outcomes by  
Migration Flow
Table 3.1 shows the happiness outcomes in  
some of the largest migration flows within or 
between ten world regions: Latin America and 
the Caribbean (LAC), sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South 
Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS), Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE), Western Europe, and Northern 
America combined with Australia and New 
Zealand (NA & ANZ).50 We highlight the most 
important results. 
Migrants in almost all reported migration flows 
evaluate their lives more positively after migra-
tion, including migrants moving within world 
regions (e.g., migrants within CIS), migrants  
moving to more developed world regions  
(e.g., from CEE to Western Europe), and  
migrants moving between similarly developed 
world regions (e.g., from Western Europe to 
Northern America & ANZ). At the same time, 
migrants do not experience less negative affect 
following migration in the majority of considered 
migration flows. Increased positive affect  
following migration is more common than 
reduced negative affect but less common than 
life evaluation gains. Taken together, improved 
contentment is more prevalent than improved 
affective experiences. Accordingly, migration 
positively impacts all three aspects of happiness 
(life evaluations, positive affect, and negative 
affect) in only four out of the 20 considered 
migration flows. These four migration flows 
include migrants within the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, the Middle East and North 
Africa, Western Europe, and Central & Eastern 
Figure 3.1: The Happiness Outcomes of the Global Immigrant Population
Source: GWP 2009-2016. 
Note: All measures have a 0-10 scale. 95% confidence interval bars shown. The sample contains 36,574 immigrants, 
including 6,499 newcomers and 30,075 long-timers. See Table A2 for unweighted descriptive statistics of the various 


































  All Immigrants
  Newcomers
  Long-timers
Positive affect Negative affect
World Happiness Report 2018
Europe. Non-positive outcomes for all three 
happiness indicators are experienced by migrants 
who left Western European countries to live in 
Central or Eastern Europe, migrants within South 
Asia, and migrants within Northern America & 
ANZ. These findings highlight that migrants 
typically experience divergent outcomes in life 
evaluations, positive affect, and negative affect. 
Nevertheless, negative outcomes at the level  
of regional migration flows are uncommon;  
only migrants from CIS to MENA and migrants from 
Latin America to Western Europe report increased 
negative affect and decreased positive affect, 
respectively. Finally, the results show that there is no 
strong relationship between the size of the migra-
tion flow and the size of migrants’ happiness gains.
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 [-0.64 - -0.37]
22,092,847 4,176
Sub-Saharan Africa +0.21**  
[0.06 - 0.35]
NS NS 15,952,589 4,184














South Asia NS NS NS 9,653,943 524 
Southeast Asia +1.08*  
[0.13 - 2.03]
NS NS 7,044,470 607
Latin America & the Caribbean +0.45**  
[0.24 - 0.66]
NS NS 5,918,332 1,846












Northern America & ANZ NS NS NS 2,245,399 455 
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CIS  Western Europe +0.59**  
[0.22 – 0.96]
NS NS 4,053,523 396





South Asia  Southeast Asia +0.80*  
[0.08 - 1.51]
NS -0.93*  
[-1.64 - -0.22]
1,219,086 308
Western Europe  CEE NS NS NS 768,172 653 
CIS  MENA +1.11**  
[0.66 - 1.66]
NS +0.57**  
[0.14 - 1.00]
461,174 908
Sources: GWP 2009-2016. a  UN DESA (2015).51
Notes: 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, NS = not significant at the 5% level. Migration 
flows with fewer than 300 migrant-stayer matches are not reported. The composition of regional migration flows  
is presented in Table A5. 
52
53
It should be noted that the happiness outcomes 
of migrants from a given source region to the 
various destination regions are not directly 
comparable. For example, the slightly higher 
happiness gains among migrants within LAC 
compared with Latin American migrants moving 
to Western Europe does not imply that those 
who moved to Western Europe would have been 
better off had they moved within LAC. One 
reason is that the considered migration flows 
differ in the distribution of source countries.  
For example, compared with Argentinians, 
relatively more Nicaraguans move within Latin 
America than to Western Europe. Another 
reason is that migrants in different migration 
flows may have different characteristics. For 
example, many migrants moving within regions 
do not have the financial resources to move to 
another world region and certain types of  
migrants (e.g., humanitarian migrants) are 
admitted in some countries/regions but not  
in others. Moreover, the achieved happiness 
gains are not indicative of the maximum  
possible happiness gain of a certain migration 
flow. For instance, most Latin American  
migrants in Western Europe live in Spain  
and Portugal, but they may have been  
happier had they moved to another Western 
European country. 
In Table 3.2, we present migrants’ happiness 
outcomes in selected flows between specific 
nations. One general pattern that emerges is the 
positive outcomes among United Kingdom (UK) 
emigrants who moved to other Anglo-Saxon 
countries. Another general pattern is the 
non-positive outcomes of Russia-born people 
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Russia  Latvia NS NS NS 416 




















































Albania  Greece NS NS NS 355 





Ivory Coast  Burkina Faso NS -0.90** 
[-1.37 - -0.43]
NS 310
Source: GWP 2009-2016. 
Notes: 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, NS = not significant at the 5% level. Migration 
flows with fewer than 300 migrant-stayer matches are not reported. 
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who moved to the Baltic states, whereas  
Russia-born migrants in some other former 
Soviet republics did gain happiness from  
migration. A noteworthy finding is that  
Russia-born people in Israel evaluate their  
lives much more positively after migration but 
simultaneously experience adverse outcomes in 
terms of affect. These results are in line with the 
relatively high life evaluations but relatively low 
emotional well-being of Israel’s native population 
(Israel ranks 14th out of 156 countries on the 
Cantril ladder but 107th out of 156 countries  
on net affect in the period 2005-2011).52 The 
happiness outcomes of Russia-born migrants  
in Israel mainly drive the results reported in  
Table 3.1 for migrants from CIS to MENA.
In Chapter 2 of this World Happiness Report,  
it was shown that the happiness of immigrants 
does not differ much from that of the native- 
born population. This finding suggests that the 
happiness of immigrants depends first and 
foremost on their conditions in the host country 
and relatively less on their former lives in their 
countries of origin or innate cultural differences 
in happiness. We further test to what extent the 
happiness levels of migrants converge towards 
the average happiness level in the destination 
Figure 3.2: The Relationship Between Migrants’ Happiness Gains and the  
Corresponding Origin-Destination Happiness Differential
 
Source: GWP 2009-2016. 
Notes: The interpretation of these graphs can be exemplified using the upper right data point in the “life evaluations” 
panel. This data point represents migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to Western Europe, and shows that these 
migrants evaluate their lives 1.44 higher due to migration (as presented on the X-axis) while the corresponding 
difference in life evaluations between the native populations of their host- and origin countries is 2.29 (as presented 
on the Y-axis). The origin-destination differential is weighted by the size of bilateral migration flows within these 
world regions to ensure accurate comparisons. Detailed information is presented in Table A6.
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country by comparing a migrant’s happiness  
gain with the happiness differential between the 
migrant’s origin and destination country. This 
origin-destination happiness differential is 
calculated by subtracting the average happiness 
level in the country of origin from that of the 
destination country’s native-born population. 
Figure 3.2 shows three scatter plots—one for 
each happiness indicator—of migrants’  
happiness gains/losses due to migration (as 
presented on the X-axis) and the corresponding 
origin-destination happiness differentials (as 
presented on the Y-axis). The data points  
represent the 20 regional migration flows  
considered in Table 3.1. Migrants’ happiness levels 
tend to become more similar to those of people 
in their destination country when there is a high 
positive correlation between migrants’ happiness 
gains and the destination-origin happiness 
differential, i.e., when the points are closer to  
the 45-degree lines in each panel. Indeed, we 
find a strong positive correlation between the  
life evaluation gains of migrants and the life 
evaluation differentials between their origin and 
destination countries (r=0.80). The correlations 
for positive affect (r=0.48) and negative affect 
(r=0.35) are also positive but more moderate. 
These results provide further evidence that the 
happiness of migrants converges substantially 
— though not entirely — towards the average 
happiness level in the host country, particularly in 
terms of life evaluations. Migrant happiness thus 
strongly depends on the host country environment.
The refugee population requires special attention 
because refugees are exceptionally vulnerable and 
are the only migrant group for which migration is 
largely involuntary. An analysis focusing on the 
happiness of refugees is presented in Box 3.2.
Box 3.2: Refugee Happiness
As refugees cannot be identified in the GWP, 
we use migrant data from the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to empirically 
assess how the happiness of refugees 
develops with their length of stay in Germany 
and how happy refugees are relative to 
“voluntary” immigrants in Germany 
(job-seekers, expats with job offers, co-moving 
family members, etc.). We focus here on the 
cognitive dimension of happiness using a life 
satisfaction question.53 Our sample contains 
607 refugees and 4,607 voluntary migrants. 
Column 1 of Table 3.3 shows that refugees 
are significantly less satisfied with life than 
voluntary migrants and that the general 
immigrant population experiences decreasing 
life satisfaction with their length of stay in 
Germany. Column 2 shows that the non- 
positive relationship between life satisfaction 
and the time since migration holds both for 
refugees and voluntary immigrants in  
Germany.54 These findings concur with the 
previously shown global pattern that  
immigrants in general do not become 
happier with their length of stay in the host 
country. Taken together, refugees are unable 
to close the happiness gap with other 
immigrants (and natives), at least in Germany. 
However, refugees’ non-improving happiness 
with their length of stay does not necessarily 
imply that they do not become happier by 
migrating; refugees may obtain a substantial 
immediate happiness gain upon arrival in 
Germany due to their improved safety, 
freedom, and so forth. A more detailed 
analysis, reported in Table A8, shows that 
refugees are significantly less happy than all 
specific subgroups of voluntary immigrants 
(job-seekers, co-moving family members, 
and so forth).
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The Happiness Outcomes of  
Families Left Behind
We estimate the happiness consequences  
of having a household member abroad by  
comparing the happiness of individuals with  
and without a household member abroad. For 
this purpose, we use global GWP data spanning 
the period 2007-2011. To account for the 
non-random selection of households into  
migration, we employ exact matching and 
compare only individuals with the same gender 
and education level, who are from the same 
country of residence and age group (maximum 
age difference of 5 years), and who live in a 
similar type of location (rural vs. urban).55
In a first model, we estimate how having one or 
multiple household members living abroad for 
under five years affects the happiness of left- 
behind household members across 144 countries. 
We do not have information on the exact  
relationship between the migrant and left-behind 
household member and the migrant’s motive for 
migration. However, it is conceivable that one of 
the most common reasons for moving abroad 
without other household members is to improve 
the household’s living standard by working 
abroad and sending back remittances. This 
group of migrant workers is characterized by 
great diversity, ranging from female nurses from 
the Philippines to male construction workers 
from Latin America. The household member 
abroad can, however, also be another family 
member (e.g., a child or sibling) or move for 
different reasons (e.g., for study purposes). 
Household members left behind are likely to be 
Table 3.3: OLS Regression: Life Satisfaction of Refugees and Voluntary Migrants 
by Length of Stay  
Dependent variable:  
Life satisfaction (1) (2)
Type of migrant
Refugees Ref. Ref.
Voluntary migrants 0.39** 0.48**
(0.08) (0.16)
Years since migration -0.01** -0.00
(0.00) (0.01)












Sources: IAB-SOEP Migration samples M1 (2013-2015) and M2 (2015). 
Notes: Regression coefficients are displayed with robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Refugees 
moved to Germany on average 13 years ago; 48% of these refugees come from MENA (primarily Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, 
and Turkey), 26% from the former Yugoslavia, 14% from the former Soviet Union, and 12% from other world regions. 
See Table A7 for detailed sample descriptives. For the M1 sample, the average life satisfaction over the years 
2013–2015 was taken. 
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the migrant’s spouse, children, parents, siblings, 
or other extended family members. The results, 
presented in the upper left panel of Figure 3.3, 
show that individuals with a household member 
abroad typically evaluate their lives more  
positively and experience more positive affect 
than their counterparts without a relative abroad. 
However, they also experience more negative 
affect. A plausible explanation for these mixed 
happiness outcomes is that the family’s often 
significant economic gain from migration is more 
strongly related to cognitive assessments of 
quality of life (life evaluations) than affective 
experiences,56 and those left behind may  
Figure 3.3: The Impact of Migration on the Happiness of Household Members  
Left Behind
Sources: a Worldwide GWP 2007-2011 data. b GWP 2009 data covering all countries of the former Soviet Union, most 
Latin American countries, and some Caribbean countries. c GWP 2007 data covering most Latin American countries 
and the Dominican Republic. 
Note: 95% confidence interval bars shown.
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often suffer emotionally because they may 
experience increased sadness from being  
separated from the migrated household member 
and increased worry from communicating 
infrequently with the family member and  
being unable to share responsibilities such  
as child nurturing.57
The two right panels of Figure 3.3 present the 
outcomes of household members left behind by 
household members who specifically moved 
abroad for temporary work or permanent  
residence, respectively. The analysis sample is 
limited to countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean and countries of the former Soviet 
Union. Household members left behind by 
migrants moving for temporary work or to 
permanently live abroad evaluate their lives  
more positively than their counterparts without  
a household member abroad. However, they do 
not benefit from migration in terms of emotional 
well-being; most notably, individuals with a 
household member abroad for temporary work 
experience increased negative affect following 
migration. Similarly, as shown in the lower left 
panel, Latin Americans who receive remittances 
from relatives abroad evaluate their lives more 
positively and experience more positive affect 
but they do not experience less negative affect 
compared with non-migrant households. 
Taken together, the results reported in Figure 3.3 
suggest that migration generally improves the 
perceived quality of life of household members 
back home but not necessarily their emotional 
well-being. Particularly interesting is that having 
a household member abroad generally does not 
reduce—and often even increases—negative 
affect experiences among the family back home. 
Hence, migration often requires trade-offs 
between different aspects of happiness for 
people staying behind. 
In Table 3.4, we present the impact of migration 
on left-behind household members for selected 
migration flows within or between world regions. 
The analysis sample contains all individuals with 
a household member abroad, i.e., the sample as 
in the upper left panel of Figure 3.3. There is  
considerable heterogeneity in outcomes be-
tween migration flows. The benefits in terms of 
life evaluations and positive affect are particularly 
large for individuals in the developing world  
who have a household member living in Western 
Europe, Northern America, Australia, or New 
Zealand. It is plausible that benefits are largest in 
these migration flows given that the large wage 
gaps between these origin and destination 
regions allow for high remittances. However, in 
some cases, benefits are also present among 
families left behind in other types of migration 
flows, such as migrants moving within the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. In 8 out 
of 21 migration flows, non-positive outcomes are 
experienced for all three aspects of happiness. 
For example, household members left behind by 
migrants within MENA experience increased 
negative affect and no improvements in life 
evaluations or positive affect. Interestingly,  
there are no migration flows in which migration 
reduced negative affect experiences among 
families back home, which highlights the  
prevalence of a non-positive impact of migration 
on the negative affect experiences of those 
staying behind. Outcomes between bilateral 
migration flows are presented in Table 3.5.
Robustness Checks and Limitations
Some possible validity threats cannot be fully 
addressed in our cross-sectional study, which  
is typical of empirical literature estimating the 
impact of migration on migrants and families  
left behind.58 A first concern relates to migrant 
selectivity. In our analysis of migrant outcomes,  
we mitigated possible selection bias in terms of 
demographics, skills, ability, personality, and 
other characteristics to the extent possible by 
introducing potential migrants as a comparison 
group and by comparing migrants only to 
demographically similar stayers. Nevertheless, 
unobserved migrant-stayer differences in per-
sonal characteristics that affect happiness could 
remain present and may bias our results to some 
extent. To alleviate this concern, we conducted a 
robustness check in which potential migrants 
were replaced by a smaller sample of migrants 
with concrete plans to migrate within a year. The 
pre-migration characteristics of our migrant 
sample may be more similar to those of people 
with concrete migration plans than to those of 
people expressing only a willingness to migrate. 
A potential limitation of using migrants with 
concrete migration plans as a comparison group 
is that their anticipated migration may have 
affected their happiness. The results using this 
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alternative comparison group are reported in 
Figure A1 and are consistent with our main finding 
that migrants are generally better off after migra-
tion on all three happiness indicators. However, 
compared with our main results, migration has a 
somewhat weaker impact on positive affect and  
a stronger impact on negative affect.
Second, temporary migrants live for a shorter 
period in the host country compared with 
permanent migrants and thus have a smaller 
chance of being sampled in the host country. 
Therefore, temporary migrants are likely to be 
under-represented in our sample. This may bias 
the results if returnees achieve relatively better 
or worse happiness outcomes in the host country 
than permanent migrants. However, return  
migration is in many cases not primarily driven 
by the success of the migration experience  
(e.g., for refugees returning home), whereas in 
other cases return migration resulting from a 
disappointing migration experience is to some 
extent counterbalanced by return migration 
resulting from having successfully achieved one’s 
migration goals.59 Nevertheless, non-causal 
evidence shows that returnees tend to be less 
happy than stayers in the home country and 
non-returned migrants, which may be either 
because return migrants were already relatively 
unhappy before moving abroad or because 
migrants with disappointing migration outcomes 
are more inclined to return home.60 Based on the 
current evidence, we cannot provide a reliable 
estimate of the extent and direction of the bias 
resulting from the underrepresentation of  
temporary migrants.
Third, our migrant sample excludes some migrant 
groups. Migrants in Gulf Cooperation Council 
countries and sparsely populated countries and 
island states are excluded, representing altogether 
less than 8% of the world’s migrant population.61 
Aside from the exclusion of these groups, the 
analysis sample was made representative, to the 
extent possible, of each destination country’s 
immigrant stock size by virtue of a weighting 
adjustment. By contrast, the sample is not fully 
representative of the migrant populations within 
host countries, since the GWP is not specifically 
designed to study migrants. The analysis sample 
may particularly under-represent undocumented 
migrants and excludes migrants in refugee 
camps, migrant children, and migrants who do 
not speak the host country’s most common 
languages. The latter two groups are excluded 
because GWP respondents are aged 15+ and 
interviews are only held in each country’s most 
common languages, respectively. Initial evidence 
suggests that proficiency in the host country 
language may improve immigrant happiness,62 
whereas there is no specific research available  
on the happiness gains of the other excluded 
immigrant groups.63 The exclusion of these 
groups must be taken into account when  
interpreting the results. 
Fourth, interviews are conducted over the  
phone in developed countries, including Western 
Europe, Northern America & ANZ, and some 
East-Asian countries, but face-to-face in most of 
the developing world, including CIS, sub-Saharan 
Africa, South Asia, and much of Latin America, 
Southeast Asia, and MENA (see Table A11). 
Approximately 25% of the face-to-face interviews 
in our migrant sample were computer-assisted 
(CAPI). The lack of within-country variance in 
survey mode in a given year constrained us from 
statistically correcting for possible survey mode 
bias in our main analysis. In Table A12, we show 
that life evaluations and self-reported negative 
and positive affect are not significantly affected 
by survey mode (phone, face-to-face without 
CAPI, or face-to-face with CAPI), with one 
exception. A person interviewed by phone 
reports 0.60 points higher negative affect on  
a 0-10 scale than if s/he had been interviewed 
face-to-face without CAPI.64 Particularly for 
negative affect, then, survey mode differences 
may somewhat bias outcome estimations for 
migration flows between developing and  
developed regions. Nevertheless, this bias will 
have a negligible impact on the average global 
happiness outcome from migration because 
migration flows in opposite directions counter-
balance this bias to some extent, and many 
migrants move between countries with the  
same survey mode. 
We ask readers to take these limitations into 
account when interpreting our results. 
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Table 3.4: The Impact of Migration on Left-Behind Household Members  
by Regional Migration Flow
Migration flow Life evaluation Positive affect Negative affect N 
Within regions:












Latin America & the Caribbean NS NS +0.37** 
[0.18 - 0.56]
1,776
Middle East and North Africa NS NS +0.34** 
[0.11 - 0.57]
1,552
Western Europe NS NS NS 1,074 
Central & Eastern Europe NS NS NS 550 
Southeast Asia NS NS NS 309 









CEE  Western Europe +0.12** 
[0.04 - 0.21]
NS NS 3,311















South Asia  MENA +0.29** 
[0.15 - 0.42]
NS NS 1,024





SSA  MENA NS +0.42* 
[0.03 - 0.82]
NS 717










East Asia  NA & ANZ NS NS NS 637 





Western Europe  NA & ANZ +0.21* 
[0.00 - 0.42]
NS NS 463
Source: GWP 2007-2011. 
Notes: 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. NS = not significant at the 5% level. Migration 





Using Gallup World Poll data, this chapter sheds 
light on the happiness consequences of migration 
for international migrants and families left behind 
across the globe. Three types of happiness 
outcomes were considered: life evaluations, 
positive affect (experiences of enjoyment, 
happiness, and laughter), and negative affect 
(experiences of worry, sadness, and anger). 
By comparing migrants to matched potential 
migrants and stayers without migration plans, we 
estimate that migrants across the globe evaluate 
the quality of their lives on average 9% higher 
following migration. They also experience ap-
proximately 5% more positive affect and 7% less 
negative affect due to migration. Accordingly, 
the happiness levels of migrants converge 
substantially towards the average happiness level 
in the host country, particularly in terms of life 
evaluations. Most of these happiness gains are 
already experienced within the first five years 
after migration given that the happiness of 
international migrants generally does not further 
improve following those first five years. 
A happiness gain in at least one of the three 
happiness indicators is not only the dominant 
outcome among migrants moving to more 
developed world regions (e.g., from Central and 
Eastern Europe to Western Europe) but also 
among migrants moving between similarly 
developed world regions (e.g., from Western 
Europe to Northern America & ANZ), or within 
world regions (e.g., migrants within Latin America 
and the Caribbean). Notable groups that have 
not become happier, in some or all aspects of 
happiness, by migrating include migrants within 
South Asia, migrants within Northern America & 
ANZ, Albanian migrants in Greece, migrants from 
the Ivory Coast in Burkina Faso, and Russian- 
born migrants in the Baltic states. These findings 
imply that despite the happiness gains achieved 
Table 3.5: The Impact of Migration on Left-Behind Household Members  
in Migration Flows Between Specific Nations
Migration flow Life evaluation Positive affect Negative affect N
Tajikistan  Russia +0.22* 
[0.09 – 0.35]
NS NS 918
Kyrgyzstan  Russia NS +0.61** 
[0.27 - 0.94]
NS 642
Armenia  Russia +0.48** 
[0.27 - 0.68]
NS NS 360
Moldova  Russia NS NS NS 323 
Honduras  United States NS NS NS 493 
El Salvador   United States NS NS NS 466 
Guatemala  United States +0.23* 
[0.00 - 0.26]
NS NS 361





Zimbabwe  South Africa NS +0.65* 
[0.10 - 1.19]
NS 385





Source: GWP 2007-2011. 
Notes: 95% confidence intervals in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, NS = not significant at the 5% level. Migration 
flows with fewer than 300 home stayer matches are not reported. 
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by a majority of migrants, there is a considerable 
group of international migrants who do not 
become happier from migration. 
Migration has a mixed impact on the happiness 
of possible household members who stay behind 
in the country of origin. Household members left 
behind generally evaluate their lives more posi-
tively after the migration of a household mem-
ber. A plausible reason for this positive impact is 
the receipt of remittances. However, they also 
experience on average more—or at least no 
reduced—negative affect. This suggests that the 
disadvantages of migration, such as impaired 
emotional support, are more related to affect, 
while the benefits of migration, such as an 
increased living standard, are more related to life 
evaluations. Not surprisingly, the greatest bene-
fits are experienced by families in the developing 
world who have a household member living in a 
developed country. 
Our findings suggest that it is likely that a  
portion of migrants who did not gain happiness 
from migration sacrificed happiness for the 
benefit of their family back home. However,  
for many other migrants who are not happier 
after migration, this reason may not apply. For 
instance, in some migration flows in which 
non-positive outcomes are common, such as 
migration flows between developed countries, 
the entire household typically moves or the 
migrant does not specifically move to improve 
the lives of family members back home. One 
question that thus requires attention is why 
some migrants voluntarily move abroad if it 
benefited neither themselves nor their families 
back home. These non-positive happiness 
outcomes cannot be justified by the argument 
that one invests in one’s own long-term  
happiness or the happiness of one’s children 
because we do not find that happiness increases 
with the migrant’s length of stay, while existing 
literature shows that the second generation is 
not happier than first-generation migrants.65 
Migrants may trade off happiness for other goals, 
such as economic security, freedom, safety,  
and health. However, in most cases, positive 
outcomes in these other domains go together 
with greater happiness. For example, greater 
happiness often accompanies greater health and 
safety. A more worrisome but oft-mentioned 
potential cause of negative outcomes is migrants’ 
excessive expectations about their future happiness 
in the destination country, which originate from 
inaccurate perceptions about what determines 
their happiness and inaccurate or incomplete 
information about the destination country.66
The opposite question also requires attention: 
Considering the substantial happiness gains 
experienced by most international migrants, why 
don’t more than the current 250 million people 
(3.3% of the world population) live in a country 
other than where they were born? It seems likely 
that more people could benefit from migration, 
given the large happiness differences between 
countries and the benefits for the current  
international migrant population. Several  
reasons may apply. First, many people are 
restricted from migration by personal  
constraints, such as financial, health, or family 
constraints. Second, many people cannot move 
to their preferred destination countries because 
of those countries’ restrictive admission  
policies.67 Third, many people are locally  
oriented and moving abroad is simply not a 
salient pathway in people’s long-term orientation 
toward improving their lives. Finally, according  
to prospect theory, the human tendency for 
risk- and loss aversion may cause people to stay 
in their home countries given that many people 
face great uncertainty about the outcomes of 
migration as they have little knowledge about  
life abroad.68
In sum, international migration is, for many 
people, a powerful instrument to improve their 
lives given that the majority of migrants and 
families back home benefit considerably from 
migration. Nevertheless, not all migrants and 
families left behind gain happiness from  
migration, and the happiness of migrants does 
not increase over time as they acclimatize to 
their new country. Therefore, there is still much 
to be done, and much to be learned, to ensure 
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1. Introduction
This chapter links the literatures on rural-urban 
migration and on subjective well-being in developing 
countries and is one of the few to do so. Using 
microeconomic analysis (of people and households), 
it poses the question: why do rural-urban migrant 
households settled in urban China have an 
average happiness score lower than that of rural 
households? Three basic possibilities of mistaken 
expectations are examined: migrants had false 
expectations about their future urban conditions, 
or about their future urban aspirations, or about 
their future selves. Estimations and analyses, 
based on a national household survey, indicate 
that certain features of migrant conditions make 
for unhappiness, and that their high aspirations 
in relation to achievement, influenced by their 
new reference groups, also make for unhappiness. 
Although the possibility that migrants are not 
typical cannot be ruled out, it is apparently 
difficult for migrants to form unbiased expectations 
about life in a new and different world. Since the 
ongoing phenomenon of internal rural-urban 
migration in developing countries involves many 
millions of the world’s poor, it deserves more 
attention from researchers and policymakers, 
especially on the implications of migration for 
subjective well-being.
Migration can be viewed as a decision, taken 
independently by myriad rural-dwellers, to better 
themselves and their families by moving to where 
the jobs and facilities are. It is generally viewed 
as a force for good, albeit one that poses many 
challenges for society and for the state. There 
are two main forms of rural-urban migration. One 
is the permanent movement of entire households 
to the city or town. The other is the temporary 
movement of individual migrant workers, with at 
least part of the household remaining in the 
village. The choice is influenced by government 
policies of encouragement or discouragement 
and by the institutions which can impose private 
costs and benefits on the workers or their house-
holds. Both forms of rural-urban migration can 
take place simultaneously.
Rural-urban migration in developing countries is 
the great exodus of our time. Rapid urbanisation 
is taking place in Asia, Africa, Latin America and 
elsewhere. Table 4.1 shows urbanisation in the 
regions of the developing world over the period 
1990-2015. In each region there was a sharp rise 
in the urban population as a percentage of total 
population. The increase in the urban population 
of the developing regions as a whole was no less 
than 1,535 million. China was outstanding both in 
its increase in the urbanisation rate (by 30 
percentage points) and in the number of people 
becoming urbanised (by 463 million). China 
accounted for 30% of the increase in urban 
population of the developing world as a whole 
over the period.
China’s urbanisation is not the same as its rural- 
urban migration. Urbanisation comprises three 
elements: reclassification of rural places as urban 
places, natural increase of the urban population, 
and rural-urban migration. However, China’s 
rural-urban migration is likely to have made up 
much of the rise in its urban population over this 
quarter century.1
The data on migrants in China pose an interesting 
and socially important puzzle. Migration theory 
usually assumes that rural people migrate in 
order to raise their utility, at least in the long run. 
Thus, migrants who have made the transition into 
urban employment and living are expected to be 
happier than they would have been had they 
remained at home. Yet our sample of rural-urban 
migrants has an average happiness score of 2.4, 
well below the average score of the rural sample 
(2.7) and also below that of the urban-born 
sample (2.5). Of course, initial hardship is to be 
expected – and indeed it is predicted by migra-
tion models. However, our sample comprises 
migrants who have established urban households 
and whose average urban stay is no less than 7.5 
years. So why is it that even seven and a half 
years after migrating to urban areas, migrants 
from rural areas are on average less happy than 
they might have been had they stayed at home?
Unfortunately, there is as yet scant evidence to 
measure and explain the subjective well-being of 
rural-urban migrants in the developing world. 
There is more literature on their objective 
well-being (not only income but also other 
physical measures of the quality of life). Fortu-
nately, there is more evidence on migrants and 
their happiness in China, the country which, it is 
commonly said, has recently experienced ‘the 
greatest migration in human history’. There are 
many lessons that China can offer policymakers 
elsewhere in the developing world.
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One of the themes explored in this chapter is  
the relationship between actual and hoped-for 
achievement, i.e. between what people manage 
to achieve and what they aspire to achieve. 
Reported happiness might be determined by the 
extent to which aspirations are fulfilled. That 
raises research questions to be explored. How 
best can aspirations be measured? For instance, 
are the aspirations of migrants moulded by the 
achievements of the people with whom they 
make comparisons? Rising aspirations in their 
new environment might provide an explanation 
for the relatively low happiness of rural-urban 
migrants.
2. Rural-Urban Migration in China
The phenomenon of rural-urban migration has 
been different in China from that in most other 
poor countries.2 During its early years in power 
the Communist Party separated China into two 
distinct compartments – creating an ‘invisible 
Great Wall’ between rural and urban China -  
primarily as a means of social control. Integral  
to this separation was a universal system of 
household registration, known as hukou, which 
accorded rights, duties and barriers. Rural-born 
people held rural hukous, urban-born people 
(including migrants from other urban areas) held 
urban hukous, and (with a few exceptions such 
as university graduates from rural areas) rural- 
urban migrants retained their rural hukous. By the 
late 1950s, a combination of hukou registration, 
the formation of the communes, and urban food 
rationing had given the state the administrative 
levers to prevent rural-urban migration. Throughout 






Urbanisation rate (%) 26 56 30
Urban population (millions) 300 763 463
Other East Asia and Pacific
Urbanisation rate (%) 48 59 11
Urban population (millions) 305 516 211
Latin America and the Caribbean
Urbanisation rate (%) 70 80 10
Urban population (millions) 313 504 191
Middle East and North Africa
Urbanisation rate (%) 55 64 9
Urban population (millions) 140 275 135
South Asia
Urbanisation rate (%) 25 33 8
Urban population (millions) 283 576 293
Sub-Saharan Africa
Urbanisation rate (%) 27 38 11
Urban population (millions) 138 380 242
All Developing Country Regions
Urbanisation rate (%) 30 49 19
Urban population (millions) 1479 3013 1535
Notes: Derived from World Bank, World Development Indicators 2017, Online Tables, Table 3.12
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the period of central planning the movement  
of people, and especially movement from the 
communes to the cities, was strictly controlled 
and restricted. 
Even after economic reform began in 1978, 
migration was very limited although temporary 
migration was permitted when urban demand  
for labour exceeded the resident supply. The 
hardships and disadvantages facing temporary 
migrants holding rural hukous caused many to 
prefer local non-farm jobs whenever they were 
available.3 When, increasingly, migrants holding 
rural hukous began to settle in the cities with 
their families, they faced discrimination in access 
to jobs, housing, education and health care. City 
governments favoured their own residents, and 
rural-urban migrants were generally treated as 
second class citizens.4 For instance, they were 
allowed only into the least attractive or remuner-
ative jobs that urban hukou residents shunned; 
many entered self-employment, which was less 
regulated. Although the urban labour markets  
for urban-hukou and rural-hukou workers have 
become less segmented over time, the degree of 
competition between them remained very limited 
in 2002.5 The tough conditions experienced by 
rural-urban migrants living in urban China might 
provide another explanation for their lower 
happiness.
Despite these drawbacks, rural-urban migration 
has burgeoned as the controls on movement 
have been eased and the demand for urban 
labour has increased. A study drawing on official 
figures, reported that the stock of rural-urban 
migrant workers was 62 million in 1993 and 165 
million in 2014, in which year it represented 43% 
of the urban labour force.6 An extrapolation from 
the 2005 National Ten Percent Population Survey 
on the basis of forecast urban hukou working 
age population and of assumed urban employment 
growth derived a stock of rural-hukou migrant 
workers in the cities of 225 million in 2015, 
having been 125 million in 2005.7 Despite the 
difficulties of concept, definition and measurement 
(which no doubt explain much of the difference 
between the estimates for 2014 and 2015), it is 
very likely the case that China is indeed experi-
encing ‘the greatest migration in human history’. 
Although a large percentage of migrants come 
temporarily to the cities with the intention of 
returning home, an increasing percentage wish 
to settle in the cities, and are establishing urban 
households. As Figure 4.1 below suggests, and  
as evidence of migrant wages in urban China 
confirms8, the prospect of income gain was the 
likely spur to the great migration.
3. Overview of Rural-Urban  
Migration in China
This study is based on an urban sample of rural- 
urban migrant households collected as part of a 
national household-based survey.9 The survey was 
conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics 
early in 2003 and its information generally relates 
to 2002. There was no repeat interviewing of the 
same households although there were some 
questions that required recall of the past or projec-
tion of the future. The urban and rural samples were 
sub-samples of the official annual national house-
hold survey. However, because the official urban 
survey covered only households possessing urban 
hukous and did not yet cover households possessing 
rural hukous, the rural-urban migrant sample was 
based on a sampling of households living in 
migrant neighbourhoods in the selected cities. 
Migrants living on their own temporarily in the 
city before returning to the village were excluded.
The migrant survey contains a great deal of 
information about the household and each of  
its members, including income, consumption, 
assets, housing, employment, labour market 
history, health, education, and rural links. Less 
commonly, various migrant attitudes and  
perceptions were explored. The great advantage 
of this survey is that the separate questionnaire 
module on subjective well-being contained 
specially designed questions that help to answer 
the questions posed in this chapter. 
The question on subjective well-being that was 
asked of one of the adults in each sampled 
household was: “Generally speaking, how happy 
do you feel nowadays”? The six possible answers 
were: very happy, happy, so-so, not happy, not at 
all happy, and don’t know. They were converted 
into cardinal scores as very happy = 4, happy = 3, 
so-so = 2, not happy = 1, and not at all happy = 0; 
the small number of don’t knows were not used 
for the analysis. The happiness variable is critical 
for our analysis as it is the dependent variable in 




It is helpful first to provide descriptive informa-
tion about the migrants before presenting the 
happiness functions that will explain what makes 
rural-urban migrants happy or unhappy. This  
will inform our interpretations. Consider the  
characteristics of those household members 
– 77% of whom were the household head - who 
responded to the attitudinal questions: 61% were 
men, 90% were married, 93% were employed, 
and 88% were living with their family. These 
respondents were generally not pessimistic 
about the future: 7% expected a big increase in 
real income over the next five years, 55% a small 
increase, 28% no change, and only 10% a de-
crease. Rural links were commonly retained: 53% 
had family members who still farmed in the village, 
51% remitted income to the village, and 32% had 
one or more children still living in the village.
Figure 4.1 shows the average happiness of the 
three groups rural-urban migrants, rural-dwellers 
and urban-dwellers (possessing rural hukous, 
rural hukous and urban hukous respectively), and 
also their average income per capita. Although 
the happiness of the migrants was lower than 
that of rural dwellers, their income was not. The 
average income per capita of migrant households 
was 2.39 times that of rural households. Even 
allowing for the smaller number of dependants in 
migrant households by comparing total instead 
of per capita household incomes, the ratio is still 
1.54. The ratios of household income per worker 
and of wage income per employee are 2.01 and 
3.02 respectively. Whichever concept is considered 
most relevant; migrants were at a considerable 
income advantage. The higher income of rural- 
urban migrants appears not to raise their happiness 
above that of rural dwellers. Yet when rural- 
urban households are divided into income per 
capita quintiles, their happiness level increases 
steadily (from 2.13 for respondents in the lowest 
fifth to 2.56 for those in the highest fifth). This 
sensitivity to income compounds the puzzle.
The respondents in the categories “unhappy” 
and “not at all happy” were asked the reason for 
their unhappiness. More than two-thirds of the 
respondents said that their income was too low. 
The next most important reason, reported by 
over 11%, was uncertainty about the future, 
suggesting that insecurity was a problem. This 
evidence suggests that income can be expected 
to be an important determinant of migrant 
happiness. In a separate question, migrants were 
asked what they thought was the most important 
social problem: lack of social security as it 
affected migrants (e.g. unemployment benefit, 
pension, access to health care) was the most 
common response to the options available, 
mentioned by 24% of respondents. Environmental 
pollution was the second-most reported problem 
(20%), corruption came third (18%), followed by 
social polarization (11%), discrimination against 
migrants (10%), and crime (8%).
Figure 4.1: Rural-Urban Migrant, Rural Hukou and Urban Hukou Mean Household 
Income per Capita and Mean Happiness Score
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Migrants were also asked: “Compared with your 
experience of living in the rural areas, are you 
happier living in the city”? No fewer than 56% felt 
that urban living gave them greater happiness, 
41% reported themselves equally happy in rural 
and urban life, while only 3% reported greater 
rural happiness. When asked what they would do 
if forced to leave the city, more migrants would 
go to another city (54%) than would go back to 
their village (39%). These results add to the 
puzzle. If most migrants view urban living as 
yielding them greater happiness, and most wish 
to remain in an urban area, why are their mean 
happiness scores lower than those of rural 
residents?
4. Possible Explanations
There are several possible explanations for these 
results. The first possibility is that migrants, when 
they decided to migrate from the village, had 
excessively high expectations of the conditions 
that they would experience in the city. We shall 
look for evidence that this might be the case by 
considering the characteristics of their urban life 
that reduce their welfare.
Second, the puzzle might be solved by recourse 
to the possibility of adaptation, following Easterlin’s 
evidence.10 He argues that happiness depends 
both on income and aspirations, the former 
having a positive and the latter a negative effect. 
Moreover, as income rises over time, aspirations 
adapt to income, so giving rise to what has been 
called a ‘hedonic treadmill’.11 When respondents 
are asked to assess how happy they had been in 
the past, when their income was lower, they tend 
to judge that situation by their current aspirations 
for income and therefore to report that they are 
more happy now. Similarly, when they are asked 
to assess their happiness in the future, when they 
expect to have higher income, they do not realise 
that their aspirations will rise along with their 
income and therefore report that they will be 
happier. This is possibly because, as findings  
from social psychology suggest, ‘We don’t always 
predict our own future preferences, nor even 
accurately assess our experienced well-being 
from past choices’.12
If current judgements about subjective well- 
being, whether in the past, the present, or the 
future, are based only on aspirations in the 
present, this might explain why migrants on 
average are less happy than rural people:  
aspirations could have risen after having made 
the decision to migrate. While aspirations might 
not be directly measurable, the implications of 
adaptation can be tested. Similarly, we might also 
find an explanation for why it is that migrants 
generally report that their happiness is higher, or 
at least no lower, in urban than in rural areas. 
A second possibility is that people form their 
aspirations relative to some ‘reference group’, i.e. 
the people with whom they compare themselves. 
The reference group can change when they 
move to the city and find themselves with richer 
neighbours. The notion that aspirations depend 
on income relative to that of the relevant reference 
group comes from the sociological literature,13 
and has been developed for China in related 
papers on subjective well-being.14 The literature 
on relative income was well summarised and 
evaluated in 2008,15 since when many more 
studies of the effects of relative income have been 
made, albeit mainly for developed economies. 
Other studies for developing countries which 
show the importance of reference groups include 
shifts in reference norms in Peru and Russia,16 
comparison with close neighbours in South 
Africa,17 and rural-urban migrants retaining a 
village reference group in Nepal.18 If the group 
with which the migrants compare themselves 
changes as a result of rural-urban migration  
and urban settlement, this might explain why 
their aspirations change. We can test whether 
migrants show ‘relative deprivation’ in relation  
to urban society.
Our third possibility is that the presence of 
members left behind in the village can place a 
burden on the urban members of the two-location 
family. Insofar as migrants remit part of their 
income, their own happiness score might fall and 
that of their rural family rise. Equivalently, our 
measure of the income per capita of the urban 
migrant household might overstate its disposable 
income per capita.
Fourth, our results might be explained by the 
untypical nature of the migrants. The lower 
happiness of migrants may be the result of their, 
or of their households, having characteristics 
different from those of the rural population as a 
whole. If this were the case, they could indeed 
have been less happy on average had they 
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remained in the village. Such happiness-reducing 
characteristics might be captured by the survey 
data – and thus be capable of being accounted 
for in the statistical estimations - or they might 
be unobservable to the researcher. For instance, 
it is possible that those rural-dwellers who by 
nature are melancholy or have high and unfulfilled 
aspirations hold their rural life to be responsible 
and expect that migration will provide a cure. 
They might therefore be more prone to leave the 
village for the city. If the self-selected migrants 
are intrinsically less happy, this might explain 
why the sample of rural-urban migrants has a 
lower average happiness score than does the 
sample representative of the rural population of 
which they were previously a part. Self-selection 
of this sort might also involve false expectations, 
in this case based on self-misdiagnosis. Its 
implications can be tested. 
5. The Determinants of Happiness
Happiness functions were estimated to discover 
the factors associated with the happiness of 
rural-urban migrants19 so as to test the possible 
explanations 1, 2 and 3, just outlined. We proceed 
in stages: first, we estimate ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimates of the happiness score 
with a full set of explanatory variables. Second, 
we investigate whether these explanatory variables 
have different effects on happiness depending 
on the length of time that the household had 
been living in urban areas by dividing the migrant 
sample into ‘short-stayers’ and ‘long-stayers’, i.e. 
those who had settled in the city for less and more 
than the median time (7.5 years) respectively. 
Third, we confine the sample to employed 
migrants, as this enables us to see whether 
working conditions, denoted by work-related 
variables, have an impact on happiness. However, 
because the full results are available elsewhere 
(Knight and Gunatilaka, 2009, 2012, on which 
this chapter draws heavily) we report only the 
variables that are critical for our story.
Table 4.2 reports, for the full sample but with only 
the most relevant variables shown, the average 
values of the explanatory variables (column 1) 
and then coefficients in the happiness function 
estimated with the full set of available explanatory 
variables (column 2). With the happiness score 
as the dependent variable (the variable to be 
explained) and various independent variables 
(chosen as the explanatory variables), the  
estimated ‘coefficients’ on the explanatory 
variables indicate the effect on happiness made 
by a unit change in each explanatory variable, 
holding all other explanatory variables constant. 
The asterisks show levels of statistical significance: 
the more asterisks against a coefficient, the more 
statistically significant is the effect on happiness. 
In column 2, the coefficient on log of income per 
capita is significantly positive, and its value 
(0.20) indicates that a doubling of income raises 
the happiness score by about 0.14 points. Income 
is relevant, as predicted, but its effect does not 
appear powerful by comparison with either the 
presumptions of economists or the estimated 
effects of some other variables. For example, 
reporting to be in good health (rather than not in 
good health) raises the happiness score by 0.12 
points according to column 2.
Migrants can be expected to adjust over time to 
urban life in various ways. On the one hand, as 
they overcome initial difficulties and become 
more settled, we expect their happiness to rise. 
On the other hand, their reference groups might 
change, from the poorer, village society to the 
richer, urban society, and this fall in perceived 
comparative status might reduce happiness. The 
length of time spent in the urban area is introduced 
as an explanatory variable, and also its square so 
as to allow the possibility that the relationship is 
curved rather than being a straight line. The 
variable and its square are both significant, the 
former positively and the latter negatively 
although only at the 10% critical level. The 
coefficients imply that the happiness score rises 
to a peak after 12 years and then declines. 
However, it is possible that there is selective 
settlement: happier migrants are more likely to 
choose to stay long in the city. This would tend to 
bias upwards the estimated returns to duration of 
urban residence. In summary, it would appear 
that migrants’ happiness tends to rise over several 
years of urban living, but the evidence is weak.
In order to pursue the notion that reference 
groups can be important, the effect of relative 
income was investigated. Drawing on the urban 
and rural samples of the 2002 national house-
hold survey, the average urban income per capita 
in the destination city and (lacking information 
on the origin county) the average rural income 
per capita in the origin province of the migrant, 
are introduced. The expectation is that both have 
World Happiness Report 2018
a negative coefficient, reflecting relative  
deprivation. The coefficient on destination 
income is indeed large and negative but not 
significantly so; that on origin income is small 
and positive and not significantly different from 
zero. If the migrant is living with family, or has 
relatives in the city who can be turned to for 
help, the effect on happiness is positive, but  
not significantly so in the former case. Having  
a child still in the village has a significant  
depressing impact. Of the housing variables,  
only lack of heating is significant: the effect is 
predictably negative. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.2 reproduce the 
equation for two sub-samples: those who had 
less than 7.5 years of urban residence and those 
who had more, respectively. Only the notable 
variables for which there is a significant difference 
in coefficients are mentioned. The long-stayers 
have a higher coefficient on the income variable 
(0.25 compared with 0.12). This might be because, 
through self-selection, they are more successful 
and happier than the short-stayers. However, the 
result is also consistent with migrants learning to 
enjoy the costly pleasures of urban life and so 
becoming more materialistic as they get more 
involved in urban society. The long-stayers are 








(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of per capita household 
income 
8.55 0.2081*** 0.1295*** 0.2766***
Duration of urban residence 
(years)
7.51 0.0136*               
Duration of urban residence, 
squared
84.83 -0.0005*               
In good health 0.90 0.1231** 0.0266 0.1691** 
Expect big increase in income over 
next 5 years
0.07 0.2984*** 0.2673** 0.3373** 
Expect small increase in income 
over next 5 years
0.55 0.0262 0.0508 -0.0035
Expect decrease in income over 
next 5 years
0.10 -0.4033*** -0.3221** -0.4506***
Log of average per capita income 
in city of current residence
8.97 -0.1204 0.0053 -0.2800** 
Log of average rural income in 
province of origin
7.81 0.0700 0.1245 0.0519
Living with family members 0.88 0.1347 0.2079** 0.1283
Number of relatives and friends in 
city
7.19 0.0039* 0.0076 0.0016
Child still in village 0.32 -0.1250** -0.1254** -0.1131
No heating 0.65 -0.1499** -0.2042*** -0.1166*  
Constant 1.0248 0.4658 1.6702
R-squared 0.100 0.091 0.134
Number of observations 1850 925 926
Notes: Dependent variable in this table and in Table 4.4: Score of happiness based on cardinal values assigned to 
qualitative assessments as follows: very happy=4; happy=3; so-so=2; not happy=1 and not at all happy=0.Model 1 is 
for the full sample. Models 2 and 3 are based on sub-samples selected according to the length of stay in urban areas. 
The omitted categories in the dummy variable analyses are: single female; employed or labour force non-participant 
not healthy; in normal or worse than normal mood; change in income expected in the next five years. In this and 
subsequent tables, ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the one per cent, five per cent and ten per cent levels 
respectively. The models have been clustered at city level for robust standard errors.
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more sensitive to average urban income per 
capita in the destination city (a significant -0.28 
compared with a non-significant -0.01). This 
suggests that over time urban residents increas-
ingly become the reference group for migrants. 
Moreover, the fact that this makes them relatively 
less happy might explain why additional income 
becomes more important for their happiness. 
The sensitivity of happiness to relative income in 
the destination city, especially for long-stayers, 
seems to agree with our second possible  
explanation, i.e. that migrants’ aspirations rise as 
they adjust to their new urban environment. The 
extreme sensitivity of migrant happiness scores 
to income rank in the city (shown in Table 4.5 
below) provides further supporting evidence.
These results were found to be unchanged using 
alternative versions of the happiness variable20. 
An attempt was also made to examine the 
sensitivity of our results to the influence of the 
unobserved determinants of happiness.21 For 
instance, unobserved characteristics such as 
personal energy might raise both income and 
happiness, or happiness itself might improve 
motivation and so raise income. The income 
variable was therefore adjusted to correct for 
such unobserved influences, but the results of 
this exercise did not alter our story.22
We investigated the effect of working  
conditions on the subjective well-being of 
employed respondents. In other words, does  
the unpleasantness and insecurity of urban work 
contribute to the unhappiness of migrants?  
Table 4.3 is based on estimates of the full sample 
equation of Table 4.2 but for employed respondents 
only, the reason being that it is then possible to 
add various employment-related explanatory 
variables.23 The first column provides mean 
values and the second shows only the results for 
the additional variables as the coefficients of the 
variables in common barely change.
Where satisfaction with the current job is rated 4 
for ‘very satisfied’ down to 0 for ‘not at all 
satisfied’, this variable has the expected positive 
and significant coefficient. Respondents were 
asked whether rural workers enjoyed the same 
treatment as urban workers in seven different 
aspects of the employment relationship. The 
negative answers were added to form an index 
of discrimination (ranging from 0 to 7). The 
coefficient is negative and significant, indicating 
that perceptions of discrimination contribute  
to unhappiness. Compared with being self- 
employed, having permanent work or long term 
contract work raises happiness but this result is 
not statistically significant, i.e. it could arise by 
Table 4.3: Happiness Functions of Employed Rural-Urban Migrants: OLS Estimation
Mean or proportion Coefficient
Satisfaction with job 1.98 0.0735*  
Index of discrimination 5.35 -0.0322***
Permanent or long-term contract work 0.05 0.1338
Temporary work 0.24 0.0079
Can find another job in two weeks 0.11 -0.0997
Can find another job in a month 0.23 -0.1213** 
Can find another job in 2 months 0.10 -0.1478*  
Can find another job in 6 months 0.13 -0.1917** 
Need more than 6 months to find another job 0.17 -0.2140***
R-squared 0.129
N 1715
Notes: With the addition of employment-related variables, the specification of column 2 is identical to that of column 
2 of Table 4.3, but the variables presented in Table 4.3 are not reported. The omitted categories in the dummy 
variable analyses reported are: self-employed; can find a job immediately. The equation has been clustered at city 
level for robust standard errors.
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chance. Another aspect of the insecurity of 
urban employment can also be incorporated. 
Respondents were asked how long it would take 
them to find another job with equivalent pay if 
they lost their current job. Compared with ‘within 
one week’ - the reference category with which 
other categories are compared - the coefficients 
are generally significantly negative and increase 
steadily in size. The evidence is consistent with 
our first possible explanation: migrant employ-
ment can be unpleasant and insecure, and this 
depresses migrant happiness. 
The third possible explanation emerges from 
theories of rural-urban migration expressed in 
terms of decision-making by the rural family, of 
which the migrant remains a part. The inference 
is that the average happiness score of migrants  
is low because they support their rural family 
members by remitting part of their income to 
them. In that case, our dependent variable 
cannot reflect the full gain in happiness of the 
two-location family. In principle the argument is 
weak. First, it is less plausible for settled than for 
temporary migrants. Second, ‘utility-maximising 
economic agents’ (a concept commonly used by 
economists!) are assumed to allocate their 
income optimally, i.e. at the margin gifts yield  
as much utility for the giver as consumption. 
Altruism and satisfaction that they are fulfilling 
their family obligations might raise migrants’ 
happiness. So happiness need not fall if income 
is remitted. It is nevertheless true that migrant 
household disposable income per capita is often 
reduced by the presence of family members 
elsewhere.
It is relevant that 51% of migrant households made 
remittances, and that remittances represented 9% 
of household income for the sample as a whole 
and 17% for the remitting households. Do  
remittances reduce the happiness of respondents 
in migrant urban households, and so contribute 
to the low average happiness score? If that were 
the case, the variable log of household remittance 
per capita would be significantly negative in the 
estimated happiness function.24 However, whether 
this term is added to the full estimated equation 
or the sub-sample of remitters, the coefficient on 
the remittance variable remains no different from 
zero. To illustrate, when the variable log remittances 
per capita is added to column 2 of Table 4.2  
(not shown), the coefficient is a non-significant 
0.0064. Thus, we found no evidence in support 
of the third possible explanation, i.e. that migrants’ 
happiness is reduced because they remit part of 
their income, 
6. Why Are Migrants Less  
Happy Than either Rural Dwellers  
or Urban Dwellers?
Migrants might be less happy on average than 
either rural or urban people because they differ 
in their average characteristics, i.e. average 
endowments of happiness-affecting attributes 
such as health status. Here a different testing 
methodology is required. The migrants are 
compared with both rural and urban residents, 
employing a standard decomposition technique. 
The objective is to pinpoint the reasons for the 
difference in happiness. The decomposition 
shows the contribution to the difference in 
happiness that is made by each determinant  
of happiness.
We began by conducting a decomposition 
analysis of the difference in household mean 
income per capita, in order to throw some light 
on the representativeness and the motivation of 
the migrants. The decomposition methodology is 
explained in the technical box below, where it is 
illustrated in terms of differences in average 
happiness. Those migrating from rural China are 
indeed a selective and unrepresentative group. 
Migrant households, had they remained in the 
rural areas, would on average earn 10% less 
income than do rural resident households. There 
is also a considerable income advantage to their 
migration: the average income that migrant 
households actually earn is 2.64 times what they 
would earn in the rural areas. By contrast, if they 
were to migrate, average rural households would 
earn 2.19 times more than they actually earn. It 
appears that rural households possess productive 
characteristics that are relatively valuable in the 
countryside whereas migrant households possess 
productive characteristics that are relatively  
valuable in the city.
The average happiness score of rural people  
was 2.68 and that of migrants 2.37, implying a 
migrant shortfall of 0.31. Table 4.4 decomposes 
this gap into the parts which can be explained  
by differences between the two groups in the 
average values of their characteristics and  
by differences in the coefficients in the two 
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happiness functions. The figures show the 
percentage contributions of the difference in 
average values of characteristics and of the 
difference in coefficients respectively. 
We see from the first column of Table 4.4 that  
the share of the difference in average happiness 
scores that is attributable to differences in 
average characteristics sums to -35%, and from 
the second column that the share attributable  
to differences in coefficients sums to 135%. The 
effect of characteristics is therefore actually to 
increase the difference in mean happiness scores. 
This is mainly due to the variable log of income 
per capita: the effects of income are the same  
in the two samples but migrants have higher 
incomes. The reason why migrants have lower 
average happiness must therefore be found in 
the different explanations for the happiness of 
the rural and urban residents, based on their 
different coefficients. The constant term, health, 
and income expectations are the main  
contributors, and age is the big exception.  
The importance of the constant term implies  
that there are unobserved characteristics that  
we have not been able to include in the model 
which reduce migrant relative to rural happiness. 
For example, we are unable to standardise for 
the various social disadvantages that migrants 
encounter in the cities because the same  
variables are not available in the rural data set. 
Perhaps because rural people are on average  
less healthy than migrants - poor health being  
a deterrent to migration - they place a higher 
value on good health.
In both samples happiness is highly sensitive to 
expectations about future income in five years’ 
time. It appears from Figure 4.2 that expectations 
of future income can influence current happiness. 
With the expectation of no change in income as 
the reference category in the dummy variable 
Technical Box
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique is employed to explain the difference in 
mean happiness between migrant and rural households. This is based on identical happiness 
regression equations for the two groups being compared. The choice of explanatory 
variables used is governed by the availability of the same variable in the two data sets, and 
by whether it is a successful predictor of happiness in the estimated happiness functions.
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vectors of rural and migrant coefficients. Equation (1) enables us to pose the counterfactual 
question ‘what would be the effect on the mean happiness of migrants if they had the 
same happiness function as rural people?’, and equation (2) the question ‘what would be 
the effect on the mean happiness of rural people if they had the same happiness function 
as migrants?’ To illustrate the decomposition according to equation (2), the entry -55.39 in 
row 1, column 1 of Table 4.4 is obtained by multiplying the difference in mean log of income 
per capita by the migrant coefficient of log of income per capita, and the entry 1.01 in row 
1, column 2 by multiplying the mean rural log of income per capita by the difference in 
coefficients, and then expressing these products as percentages of the gross mean difference 
in happiness. Only the decomposition based on equation (2) is reported in the table. 
However, the results for the alternative decomposition are very similar.
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analysis, the coefficients in the migrant sample 
vary from 0.31, if a large increase is expected, to 
0.05, if a small increase is expected, and to -0.39, 
if a decrease is expected; the corresponding 
estimates for the rural sample are 0.41, 0.19 and 
-0.19 respectively. The fact that in the migrant 
sample the coefficients are uniformly lower, in 
relation to the expectation of static income, 
suggests that migrants have higher aspirations 
relative to their current income. This can be 
expected if aspirations depend on the income of 
the relevant comparator group. Whereas the 
Table 4.4: Decomposition of the Difference in Mean Happiness Score  
between Rural-Urban Migrants and Rural Residents: Percentage Contribution  
to the Difference
Using the migrants’ happiness function
Due to characteristics Due to coefficients
Log of income per capita -55.39 1.01
Health -5.81 94.41
Income expectations 11.34 36.36
Age 6.69 -131.54
Other variables 7.95 5.48
Sum (percentage) -35.23 135.23
Sum (score) -0.1078 0.4137
Notes: The mean happiness scores are 2.6764 in the case of rural residents and 2.3703 in the case of migrants, 
creating a migrant shortfall of 0.3061 (set equal to +100%) to be explained by the decomposition. This represents 100 
per cent. The composite variables are age and age squared for age, married, single, divorced and widowed for marital 
status, and big increase, small increase and decrease for income expectations. ‘Other variables’ included in the 
equation but not reported are education, age, male, marital status, ethnicity, CP membership, unemployment, 
working hours, and net financial assets.
Figure 4.2: Rural-Urban Migrant and Rural Dweller Coefficients Of Variables 
Denoting Expectations of Income in the Next Five Years, Derived from the 
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rural respondents are fairly representative of 
rural society, and so their mean income is close 
to the mean income of their likely comparator 
group, the migrant sub-sample is unrepresentative 
of urban society: migrants tend to occupy the 
lower ranges of the urban income distribution. If 
migrants make comparisons with urban-born 
residents, their aspirations will be high in relation 
to their current income.
Is the low mean happiness of migrants a general 
characteristic of city life? The inquiry can be 
pursued further by comparing migrants with 
‘urban residents’, i.e. persons who are urban-born 
and or in other ways have acquired urban hukou 
status, with the rights and privileges that  
accompany it. The average happiness score of 
urban residents is 2.48 and that of migrants  
2.37, implying a migrant shortfall of 0.11. Table 4.5 
provides a decomposition exercise similar to that 
of Table 4.4 but with a different set of explanatory 
variables - those that are common to the two 
datasets. 
In this case the differences in coefficients  
add slightly to the migrant shortfall in average 
happiness score (in total, coefficients’ share of 
the explanation for the difference in average 
happiness is -21%). The coefficient on the income 
variable is higher for urban residents (0.173) than 
for migrants (0.111), so raising urban relative to 
migrant happiness. The positive effect of income 
expectations reflects the lower coefficients in the 
migrant sample: with static expectations as the 
reference category, for migrants an expected big 
increase in income has a coefficient of 0.21, a 
small increase 0.00, and a decrease -0.37, whereas 
for urban residents the corresponding estimates 
are 0.34, 0.10, and -0.29 respectively. Again, 
migrants appear to have higher aspirations 
relative to their current income. 
The contribution of the various income coefficients 
to the explanation of the difference in mean 
happiness is offset by the negative effects of 
such variables as age, gender and the constant 
term. Note that position in the city income 
distribution has a powerful effect on happiness. 
With the highest quarter of households being the 
omitted category, the happiness coefficient falls 
monotonically, to lower than -0.80 in the lowest 
Table 4.5: Decomposition of the Difference in Mean Happiness Score between 
Rural-Urban Migrants and Urban-Hukou Residents: Percentage Contribution to 
the Difference
Using the migrants’ happiness function
Due to characteristics Due to coefficients
Log of income per capita 28.15 472.62
Income expectations -39.92 59.32
Living standard in second highest quarter in city -33.68 26.28
Living standard in third highest quarter in city -11.71 77.84




Other variables 1.14 36.97
Constant term 0.00 -96.38
Sum (percentage) 120.67 -20.67
Sum (score) 0.1342 -0.0230
Notes: The mean happiness scores are 2.4845 in the case of urban residents and 2.3703 in the case of migrants, 
creating a migrant shortfall of 0.1143 (set equal to +100%) to be explained by the decomposition. This represents 100 
per cent. The composite variables are age and age squared for age, married, single, divorced and widowed for marital 
status, and big increase, small increase and decrease for income expectations. ‘Other variables’ are education, marital 
status, ethnicity, CP membership, unemployment, working hours and net financial assets.
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quarter. As this is true of both samples, it does 
not affect relative happiness.
The migrant shortfall in happiness therefore has 
to be explained in terms of differences in average 
characteristics (the total share of characteristics in 
accounting for the difference in average happiness 
is 121%). Two variables stand out: the higher 
mean income of urban residents improves their 
relative happiness, and their superior position in 
the city income distribution has the same effect. 
A far higher proportion of migrants than of urban 
residents fall in the lowest quarter of city house-
holds in terms of living standard (35% compared 
with 11%). This fact alone can explain more than 
the entire migrant deficit. If the income of the 
relevant comparator group influences aspirations, 
the inferior position of migrants in the city 
income distribution can also explain why they 
appear to have higher aspirations in relation to 
their current income.
7. Are Migrants Self-Selected?
It is evident that differences in unobserved 
characteristics are important for the differences 
in happiness. For example, the constant term in 
the decomposition presented in Table 4.4 explains 
more than the entire difference in the average 
happiness scores of migrants and rural-dwellers. 
Migrants might be less happy on average simply 
because inherently unhappy people tend to be 
the ones who migrate. Support for this idea comes 
from answers to the question as to whether urban 
living had yielded greater happiness than rural 
living. Despite the average happiness score being 
lower for migrants than for rural people, 56% of 
migrants thought that urban living made for 
greater happiness and only 3% disagreed. This is 
the picture that could emerge if migrants are 
intrinsically unhappy people whose happiness 
remains low despite improving after migration.
Migrants might be unhappy people because by 
nature they are melancholy or they have high but 
unfulfilled aspirations. However, the latter reason 
fits ill with the stereotype of migrants as relatively 
self-confident, optimistic, risk-loving individuals. 
Consider the implications of assuming both that 
migrants are naturally unhappy people and that 
migration does indeed generally raise happiness. 
Insofar as those migrants with a relatively unhappy 
disposition become absolutely happier albeit still 
relatively unhappy after migration, we might 
expect as high a proportion of unhappy as of 
happy migrants to report that their life is more 
satisfactory in urban than in rural areas. In fact 
the proportion falls, from 67% in the highest 
happiness category to 34% in the lowest  
Figure 4.3: Rural-Urban Migrant and Urban Dweller (with Urban Hukou)  
Coefficients of Variables Denoting Expectations of Income in the Next Five 
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happiness category, suggesting that this sort  
of self-selection can at best be only a partial 
explanation for the lower average happiness  
of migrants.
The Technical Box below explains how it was 
possible to isolate that part of the happiness of 
each migrant that cannot be explained by our 
variables. We could then test whether this 
residual helps to explain the respondent’s report 
that they are happier in the city than in the 
village. Table 4.6, predicting an affirmative answer, 
identifies the characteristics which have raised 
happiness. When the residual is introduced  
into the equation (column 2) the prediction is 
that it will not be different from zero if inherent 
and unchanging personality is the cause of 
unhappiness. However, the positive effect  
suggests that migration changed the unobserved 
characteristics of migrants. In that case inherent 
disposition cannot solve out puzzle. 
Instead, migrants might select themselves on  
the basis of unobserved characteristics that are 
different or have different effects in the two 
locations. Several examples come to mind 
(beyond the case discussed under our second 
possible explanation, i.e. migrants’ aspirations 
rise). If people who are dissatisfied with life in 
general but with village life in particular have a 
high propensity to migrate, migrants might have 
low average happiness in both locations but 
particularly in the village. For instance, own  
or family misfortune or bad family or village 
relationships could reduce a person’s happiness 
but more so if they remained in the village. If 
migrants have high pre-existing aspirations 
which cannot be fulfilled in the village but have 
the potential to be better met in the city, this 
might have the same effect. In each of these 
cases the migrants would be likely to report that 
their urban life is better than their rural life had 
Table 4.6: Determinants of Urban Living Happier than Rural Living:  
Employed Sample, Probit Estimation
Marginal Effects of Probit Estimation
(1) (2)
Log of per capita household income 0.0506* 0.0466*  
Duration of urban residence (years) 0.0174*** 0.0190***
Duration of urban residence, squared -0.0003 -0.0004
Expect big increase in income over next 5 years 0.1657** 0.1766***
Expect small increase in income over next 5 years 0.0869** 0.0941***
Expect decrease in income over next 5 years -0.0557 -0.0559
Difference between actual and predicted happiness score 0.1736***
Living with family members 0.1286** 0.1070*  
Living in own house 0.1304** 0.1286** 
Satisfaction with job 0.0719*** 0.0768***
Number of observations 1715 1715
Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of being happier in urban areas. For the dummy variables denoted 
by (d), the marginal effects are denoted by dy/dx for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
The variable, difference between actual and predicted happiness score, has been derived by obtaining predicted 
happiness score from estimating Model (1) in Table 4.3.The omitted categories in the dummy variable analyses are: 
single female; employed or labour force non-participant; not healthy; in normal or worse than normal mood; change 
in income expected in the next five years. Explanatory variables estimated in the equations but not reported in the 
table are: male, married, male and married, education, working hours, net financial assets, ln average household per 
capita income in city of current residence, ln household per capita rural income in province of origin,, permanent or 
long-term contract work, index of discrimination, can find another job in two weeks, .one month, two months, six 
months, needs more than six months to get another job. The equations have been clustered at city level for robust 
standard errors.
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been, despite their low average urban happiness. 
A test of this type of explanation would require  
a survey which could reveal the happiness  
score, and the reasons given for unhappiness, 
before migrating 
8. Other China Studies
One other study deals specifically with migrants.25 
It analysed the China Household Income Project 
(CHIP) survey [also known as the Rural-Urban 
Migration in China (RUMIC) survey] relating 
mainly to 2007. The research interest is in the 
effects of various measures of relative income on 
happiness. The data differed from that used in 
the analysis above in that it contained all rural 
hukou people present in the urban areas, i.e.  
both temporary and settled migrants, and the 
dependent variable was an aggregation of 
twelve measures of mental health.
It was found that subjective well-being is  
negatively affected by the incomes of other 
migrants and of workers in the home region. 
However, a positive coefficient was obtained  
on average income in the local urban area.  
This was interpreted as a ‘signal’ effect, i.e. the 
higher incomes of urban people served as a 
signal of future income prospects. A similar 
positive coefficient had been obtained and 
similarly explained for Russia.26 It contrasts 
sharply with our finding of a negative coefficient. 
The contrast was explained as arising because 
our sample contained only settled migrants,  
who were more likely to have transferred their 
reference group from the village to the city. In 
support of this explanation, it was noted that  
the positive coefficient declined with years  
since migration. Containing very different  
definitions both of a migrant and of subjective 
well-being, the two analyses are not necessarily 
contradictory. 
Technical Box
The argument can be tested rigorously as 
follows. Estimating the predicted happiness 
score for each respondent (from column 2 
of Table 4.2), the residual (actual minus 
predicted) score is the part of happiness 
that cannot be explained by our equation. 
The residual is made up of measurement 
error and two sorts of unobserved  
characteristics of the respondent: those 
which were present before migration and 
those which came after migration. A  
disposition to be happy or unhappy is of  
the former sort. Assume that migration  
had a similar effect on the happiness of  
all respondents whose unobserved  
characteristics did not change pre- and 
post-migration. In that case, we can test 
whether the residual helps to explain 
whether the respondent reported that  
their happiness was higher in the city than 
in the village.
Table 4.6 shows the results of a Probit  
regression predicting an affirmative answer. 
Its two columns, presenting the marginal 
effects of each explanatory variable, both 
refer to the employed sample. The object is 
to identify the characteristics which have 
raised happiness. Comparing Tables 4.2 and 
4.3 (using OLS) with Table 4.6 (using Probit), 
we see that some of the same variables that 
determine happiness also correspondingly 
determine an increase in happiness. When 
the residual is introduced into the equation 
corresponding to column 2 of Table 4.6, the 
expectation is that it will not be significantly 
different from zero if inherent and unchanging 
personality is the cause of unhappiness. 
However, the coefficient is positive and 
significantly so at the 1% level (column 2), 
and the marginal implies that a residual of 
+1.0 raises the probability of an affirmative 
answer by 17 percentage points. This 
positive effect suggests that migration 
changed the unobserved characteristics of 
migrants, in which case inherent disposition 
cannot solve the puzzle.
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Another study examined the changes in the 
average happiness of urban, rural, and rural- 
urban migrant households between the CHIP 
2002 and CHIP 2013 national household surveys.27 
The ratio of migrants’ to rural households’ 
income per capita was higher in 2013 than it had 
been in 2002: again, the economist’s expectation 
is that rural people would have an incentive to 
migrate to raise their utility. However, the average 
happiness of rural-dwellers remained higher than 
that of migrants, although the gap had narrowed. 
The rise in migrant happiness was probably due 
to the rapid growth of their income, associated 
with the growing scarcity of migrant labour, and 
gradual (but minor) improvements in their urban 
treatment and conditions in recent years. We 
surmise that the fall in average rural happiness, 
despite a rise in average rural income, was 
because the loss of household members to the 
cities often left unbalanced families and villages 
behind, or because rural households’ aspirations 
rose rapidly as their information about urban  
life improved.
9. Studies in Other Developing  
Countries
To what extent can the China story be  
generalised? In one respect – the harsh  
institutional and policy treatment of rural hukou 
migrants in the cities – China is likely to be 
exceptional. However, in many countries rural- 
urban migrants are at a disadvantage: their  
social networks are often weak, their education  
is liable to be of poor quality for urban life and 
work, and their village customs and weak  
assimilation might cause social discrimination. 
However, the available evidence cannot provide  
a clear answer to this question. It appears that 
research on the relationship between rural-urban 
migration and happiness in developing countries 
remains very limited. 
Whereas our China case study found that  
migration may well have had the consequence  
of reducing subjective well-being, a study of 
Thailand found that a somewhat higher propor-
tion of the permanent migrants in that sample 
experienced an increase in life satisfaction after 
migration than experienced a decrease.28
The interpretation of our main finding in terms  
of changing reference groups is echoed in a 
pioneering study for developing countries of 
aspirations relative to achievement which  
examined ‘frustrated achievers’ in Peru. More 
than half of those who had objectively achieved 
the largest income growth subjectively reported 
that their economic condition had deteriorated 
over the previous decade. Part of the explanation 
was to be found in their perception of increased 
relative deprivation.29
In South Africa a very extensive system of 
temporary circular migration prevailed in the 
past. However, since the advent of democracy 
the country has increasingly experienced the 
permanent urban settlement of rural-dwellers. 
The same question has been posed for South 
Africa as was posed above for China.30 That 
study reached similar results and suggested 
some of the same interpretations but used a 
different methodology. A longitudinal panel 
survey identified the happiness of rural people 
and their happiness four years later after  
rural-urban migration (excluding temporary 
migration). The real income of the migrants rose 
substantially, largely because of their migration. 
Yet sophisticated estimation yielded a fall in 
subjective well-being (measured on a scale of 0 
to 10) of 8.3%. A favoured interpretation was that 
this reduction was the result of false expectations 
and changing reference groups after the migrants 
settled in the urban areas.
10. Summary and Conclusion
This chapter illustrates how it should be possible 
to go beyond a description of happiness and  
its correlates. Using microeconomic (individual 
and household) data based on a well-designed 
survey and questionnaire, microeconomic  
analysis can be used to explore and to answer 
interesting and important questions about what 
makes people happy or unhappy. The settled 
rural-urban migrants that we study are the 
vanguard of a great wave of settlement as the 
urban economy becomes increasingly dependent 
on migrants from rural China.
We have posed the question: why do rural-urban 
migrant households which have settled in urban 
China report lower happiness than rural house-
holds? Migrants had lower average happiness 
despite their higher average income: the income 
difference merely adds to the puzzle. It is a 
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question that cannot easily be answered in terms 
of economists’ conventional models of rural- 
urban migration based on ‘utility maximisation’. 
Four possibilities were examined. We found  
no evidence for the idea that happiness was 
reduced by the need for the migrants to provide 
support for family members in the village.  
Each of the other three possibilities involves  
false expectations, of three different types: 
prospective migrants may have false expectations 
about their urban conditions, or about their 
urban aspirations, or about themselves. What 
they have in common is that rural-urban migrants 
are likely to lack the necessary information to 
enable them to judge the quality of their new 
lives in a different world. For each of the three 
types of belief there are reasons why they are 
too optimistic about life in the city.
Consider first the idea that migrants are too 
optimistic about the conditions of city life. The 
fact that happiness appears to rise over several 
years suggests that migrants are able to over-
come the early hardships of arriving, finding 
work, and settling in the city. However, some 
hardships remain, relating to accommodation, 
family, and work. Provided that accurate  
information had been available to prospective 
migrants, they should have taken account of 
adverse conditions reducing their happiness 
when deciding to migrate: expectations would 
not have been false. Why might migrants  
overestimate the conditions of their urban life 
and work? It is possible that, whereas expected 
income is quantifiable and understandable, other 
aspects of urban life have to be experienced  
to be understood. Moreover, expectations of  
conditions might be based on images of the  
lives of urban residents rather than those of 
rural-urban migrants, or the reports provided  
by migrant networks might be too rosy. The 
migrants, when they made their decisions to 
move, may have been realistic about their urban 
income prospects, whereas their expectations  
of living and working conditions could have been 
biased upwards. However, there is a caveat:  
the better the information flows to the villages, 
the weaker is the case for this possibility.
The second possibility is that migrants had 
falsely believed, at the time of migration, that 
their aspirations would not alter in the city. 
Consider the reasons why migrants’ aspirations 
may have risen and now exceed their actual 
achievements. When we conducted a decompo-
sition analysis to discover why migrants have a 
lower mean happiness score than both rural 
dwellers and urban dwellers possessing urban 
hukous, in each case a major contribution came 
from the higher aspirations of migrants in relation 
to current income. This is consistent with the fact 
that over two-thirds of migrants who were 
unhappy or not at all happy gave low income as 
the predominant reason for their unhappiness. 
The relatively high aspirations might be explained 
by the lowly position of most migrants in the city 
income distribution: having relatively low income 
was shown to reduce their happiness. The 
evidence suggests that migrants draw their 
reference groups from their new surroundings, 
and for that reason have feelings of relative 
deprivation. It is plausible that migrants, when 
they took their decisions to move, could predict 
that their incomes would rise but not how their 
aspirations would rise as they became part of  
the very different urban society.
Consider the possibility that people with  
unobserved and invariant characteristics that 
reduce happiness have a higher propensity to 
migrate, in the false expectation that migration 
will provide a cure, and that their continuing 
unhappiness pulls down the mean happiness 
score. However, our test using the residual, 
unexplained component of individual happiness 
scores provided no support for this argument. 
Inherent disposition is unlikely to provide a good 
explanation for the low average happiness score 
of migrants.
There are other possible explanations which 
cannot be adequately tested by means of our 
data set. The one mentioned above is that 
migration is subject to ‘selection bias’ on the 
basis of unobserved characteristics which are 
different or have different effects in the two 
locations. Another is that rural-urban migrants, 
once they settle in the city, are induced by  
urban cultural norms to use a different scale  
for measuring happiness, and thus to report 
happiness scores lower than those of rural 
residents. We would expect the reported  
happiness of migrants to be higher before  
they have time to adjust their happiness scale. 
However, the average happiness score of  
migrants who have been in the city for less than 
three years is 0.08 points lower than the average 
for all migrants, and the regression results in 
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Tables 4.3 and 4.4 suggest that the standardised 
happiness score rises for more than a decade 
after arrival. Although it is not possible to refute 
the rescaling explanation, this evidence fails to 
confirm it. Yet another possibility is that migrants 
are willing to sacrifice current happiness for 
future happiness - plausible in a country with  
an overall household saving rate of no less than 
24%. Migrants might be willing to put up with 
unhappiness because they feel that life will 
eventually get better for them or their children. 
Analysis of the 2002 CHIP survey found that a 
reason for the high happiness of rural-dwellers is 
that they place a high value on village personal 
and community relationships (Knight et al., 
2009). A further possible contribution to the 
lower happiness of rural-urban migrants is  
that they come to realise that their social  
environment is less friendly and less supportive 
than it was in the village.
The absence of tests for these alternative  
explanations means that our conclusions have  
to be qualified. Further research based on better 
data sets is required to explain the puzzle in 
China and, if it is found to be a general  
phenomenon, in other poor urbanising societies.
Whatever the explanation, the obvious question 
arises: why do unhappy migrants not return to 
their rural origins? One reason is that the majority 
do perceive urban living to have yielded them 
more happiness than rural living. This result was 
found to be sensitive to expected income, and 
the majority of migrants did indeed expect that 
their incomes would rise over the next five years. 
Migrants were also more likely to favour urban 
living the longer they stayed in the city – possibly 
because they increasingly valued aspects of 
urban living that were not to be found in rural 
areas. Social psychology might again be relevant: 
migrants do not take into account how their 
aspirations will adjust if they return to village life. 
Alternatively, migrants might correctly expect 
that their new aspirations will not adjust back. So 
there might be symmetry in the way they view 
leaving their rural residence and not leaving their 
urban one. Another possible reason why unhappy 
migrants do not return to their origins – unfortu-
nately not pursued in the survey - is that the cost 
might be prohibitive. This is plausible if their 
households have forgone the tenurial rights to 
village farm land and housing land that they 
previously held.
The main policy instrument available to a  
government that is concerned to improve the 
subjective well-being of rural-urban migrants is 
to reform the range of institutions and policies 
which place the migrants at a disadvantage in 
the cities. In some respects, however, migrants 
might have to take the initiative. There is scat-
tered evidence that some rural-urban migrants 
have created a more supportive and helpful city 
environment for themselves - where migrants 
from the same village, county or area choose to 
concentrate in particular parts of a city.
The study has broader implications. Should 
social evaluation by policy-makers reflect  
measured happiness? The contrary argument  
has been examined and found wanting.31 The 
distinction made above between expected utility 
(which economic agents are assumed to  
maximise) and experienced utility (which  
happiness scores are assumed to measure) is 
relevant. Insofar as there is a systematic  
difference between the two, this can arise 
because of an unpredicted change in aspirations, 
for instance, owing to a change in reference 
group. In our judgement, changes in aspirations 
should be taken into account in assessing  
people’s perceptions of their own welfare. To 
regard some objectively based ‘true’ utility  
as existing separately from subjectively  
perceived utility is effectively to make a  
normative judgement about what is socially 
valuable.
In many developing countries rapid rural-urban 
migration gives rise to various social ills – such as 
urban poverty, slums, pressure on infrastructure, 
unemployment and crime – which adversely 
affect the welfare of all urban residents. In 
contrast, by attempting to restrict migration the 
Chinese government has curbed these outcomes. 
For instance, in the 2002 national household 
survey few urban hukou residents reported that 
the presence of migrants constituted the greatest 
social problem - well behind corruption, lack of 
social security and environmental pollution. The 
fact that rural-urban migrants were the least 
happy group suggests that they themselves might 
foment unrest. However, because social instability 
probably requires not only unhappiness but also 
a perception that it is man-made and capable of 
being remedied, no such conclusion can be 
safely drawn.
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The ongoing phenomenon of internal rural-urban 
migration in developing countries involves many 
millions of the world’s poor. Not only their 
objective well-being but also their subjective 
well-being deserves more extensive and more 
intensive research. There is much to be done, 





1  China’s rate of natural increase of the urban population was 
low on account of the one-child family policy, and much 
reclassification was the result of migration from rural areas.
2 Knight and Song (1999: chs. 8,9)
3 Zhao (1999).
4 Knight and Song (1999: ch.9; 2005, chs.5,6).
5 Knight and Yueh (2008).
6   Gao et al. (2017: 285). These labour force figures are of 
course lower than the urban population figures of Table 4.1.
7 Knight et al. (2011: 597)
8 Knight et al. (2010: table 1).
9  Organised by the Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences, and designed by Chinese and foreign 
scholars including one of the authors.
10 In several papers but especially Easterlin (2003).
11  The explanation draws on the psychological literature to 
make the distinction between ‘decision utility’ and 
‘experienced utility’: the utility expected at the time of 
making a choice and the utility subsequently experienced 
from that choice.
12 Rabin (1998:12).
13 At least as far back as Runciman (1966).
14 Knight et al. (2009); Knight and Gunatilaka (2010).
15 Clark et al. (2008).
16 Graham and Pettinato (2002), Senik (2004).
17 Kingdon and Knight (2007).
18 Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008).
19  Unless a variable is both important to our story and likely  
to be endogenous (as in the case of income, discussed 
below), we interpret the coefficients as indicating causal 
effects on happiness.
20  First, happiness was made a binary variable and estimated 
by means of a probit model; secondly, happiness was 
converted into a multinomial variable and estimated with 
an ordered probit model. The pattern of results was very 
similar to that of Table 4.3.
21  The same specification as in Table 4.3 (column 2) with the 
potentially endogenous variable that is most relevant to  
our tests, log of income per capita, now instrumented.  
The exclusion restrictions are mother’s years of education, 
spouse’s years of education, and the income that the 
migrant earned in the village before migrating, It is 
plausible that these variables do not directly influence 
current happiness (not even own happiness has a positive 
effect in Tables 4.3 and 4.4). The instrument passed the 
conventional tests.
22  The coefficient on income was raised but the effect was 
modest. One possible explanation for the rise is that hidden 
relationships have the opposite sign, e.g. higher aspirations 
raise income but lower happiness, or happiness discourages 
effort.
23 Fortunately, few observations are lost.
24 With zero remittances set equal to one yuan.
25 Akay et al. (2012).
26 Senik (2004).
27 Luo (2017).
28 De Jong et al. (2002).
29 Graham (2005).
30 Mulcahy and Kollamparambil (2016).
31 Clark et al. (2008).
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Latin Americans consistently score higher on 
happiness—and on a range of other subjective 
well-being indicators—than respondents in other 
world regions with comparable income levels 
(see Chapter 6 in this report). Yet there is 
substantial out-migration from the region. Why  
do many Latin Americans move abroad? Does 
emigration increase or decrease their happiness? 
How does migration affect the well-being of the 
families at the origin?
In this chapter, we build on our earlier work on 
well-being and migration to explain this seeming 
paradox.1 We use data from the Gallup World Poll 
(GWP) for 2009-20162 and focus on two distinct 
subjective well-being dimensions—hedonic  
(i.e., experienced) and evaluative (i.e., overall life 
evaluations). Specifically, we explore whether 
pre-migration levels of well-being can help explain 
the emigration decision. We then look at the 
well-being costs or benefits of that decision, both 
for migrants themselves and for the families they 
leave behind in the origin countries. 
We primarily focus on migration to other  
countries within Latin America and to the United 
States and Europe. While there is a historical 
literature on the large migration episodes that 
occurred from rural areas to the major Latin 
American cities in earlier decades, there has not 
been much work in the area of rural to urban 
migration in recent years. Nor are there sufficient 
fine-grained within-country-level data to study 
this in a consistent manner across the region. 
John Knight’s excellent work on internal  
migration for this report uses extensive data  
for China; we do not know of similar data on 
internal migration for Latin America.3
1. Emigration Aspirations  
and Emigration Plans
Who are the potential emigrants from Latin 
America? Where would they like to go? How 
much do happiness and economic considerations 
matter for the decision to move abroad? To 
answer these questions, we explored variables 
measuring two different degrees of willingness 
to emigrate – emigration intentions (aspirations) 
and emigration plans (for definitions, see Table 
A1).4 While emigration intentions are tentative 
and some respondents may never end up  
moving abroad, several studies show that such 
moving intentions are relatively good predictors 
of subsequent behavior.5
Unsurprisingly, potential migrants weigh the 
costs and benefits of migration before undertaking 
the move.6 Migration costs can include payments 
for visas, transportation, or language courses as 
well as psychological costs related to separation 
from family and friends. Emigrants hope to benefit 
from moving in the form of higher earnings, better 
opportunities, and a better quality of life. Most 
studies of migration predict that the least happy 
and poorest individuals will migrate because 
they have the most to gain (and the least to lose) 
from emigration.
In reality though, the poorest people often do not 
emigrate, as a certain level of income is necessary 
to finance moving abroad.7 Similarly, the out- 
migration of relatively rich people is also low as 
the expected benefits abroad are smaller relative 
to the psychological costs that migration entails. 
Nevertheless, we know less about the happiness 
or unhappiness of the individuals who intend to 
emigrate, and how or if that affects their emigration 
decisions. The few existing studies reveal that 
respondents who report emigration intentions are 
relatively less happy than the average; only one 
study finds the opposite.8
The evidence for Latin America9 shows that 
individuals who intend to migrate have the 
means and capabilities to migrate (in terms  
of income and education) but are relatively 
dissatisfied with their lives. As such, they fit  
into the category of “frustrated achievers.”10 
Specifically, analysis based on Latinobarometro 
data demonstrates that a one-point increase in 
happiness (on a 1-4 scale, where 1 is the least 
happy and 4 is the most happy) decreases the 
predicted probability of emigration by about  
two percentage points.11,12
Following up on these studies, we used  
GWP data for Latin America (2009-2016) to  
understand whether potential Latin American 
emigrants are really “frustrated achievers.” We 
also explored whether income or well-being is 
more important for the decision to move.
Our data reveal that a relatively large percentage 
– 25% – of respondents in the Latin American 
sample in the Gallup World Poll reported that 
given the opportunity, they would migrate to 
another country (Figure 1). Among the countries 
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with the highest proportions of potential emigrants 
were Honduras (47%), El Salvador (42%), and 
Peru (33%). The top five potential destinations 
mentioned were the United States, Spain, Canada, 
Argentina, and Brazil. A considerably smaller 
share of respondents, about 3% of the sample, 
reported plans to emigrate permanently to 
another country in the next 12 months (Figure 5.1). 
Among those with emigration plans, the top 
desired destination countries were the United 
States, Spain, Argentina, Costa Rica, and Canada. 
In Figure 5.2, we document the life evaluations and 
incomes of Latin Americans with and without 
emigration aspirations and plans (comparisons 
along other variables are available in Table A3).13 
Our results are highly suggestive of a frustrated 
achiever pattern, with those who intend to 
migrate being unhappier but richer (more likely 
to be in the upper income quintiles) than those 
who want to stay. The differences in life evalua-
tions and incomes in Figure 2 may appear small, 
but are meaningful in the statistical sense. At the 
same time, potential emigrants are more likely to 
report difficulties with living comfortably on their 
current income and lower satisfaction with their 
living standards than those who do not intend to 
emigrate. Potential emigrants were also more 
likely to be unemployed and educated (Table A3). 
We also estimated the probabilities of reporting 
emigration aspirations and plans in a regression 
framework, whereby we hold constant certain 
characteristics such as age, education, gender, 
income, employment status, and perceptions of 
the country’s economic, political, and institutional 
situation. Simply put, regression analysis allows 
us, to the extent possible, to compare similar 
groups of Latin Americans with and without 
emigration intentions.
Figure 5.1: Share of Respondents Reporting Emigration Aspirations and Plans, 
Analysis Samples
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Gallup World Poll data
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These regression results (shown in Table A4) 
confirm the frustrated achiever story. First, 
emigration aspirations and plans for Latin  
American respondents decrease as happiness 
(evaluative and hedonic well-being) increases. 
Simply put, the happier people are, the less likely 
they are to want to leave their homes and emigrate 
abroad. A one-unit increase in evaluative well- 
being is associated with a 0.3 percentage point 
decline in the probability of reporting emigration 
aspirations and a 0.1 percentage point decline  
in the probability of reporting emigration plans. 
Having smiled the day before is also associated 
with a lower chance of reporting emigration  
aspirations and plans. 
Figure 5.3 displays the key findings from the 
regression analyses. The predicted probability of 
having emigration aspirations is 27% for the least 
happy respondents (whose best possible life 
evaluation scores are at 0), while it is 23% for the 
happiest respondents (whose life evaluations are 
at 10), a difference of 4 percentage points. 
Another way to put these effects in perspective is 
to look at the difference in predicted emigration 
intentions of those at the bottom quartile and 
Figure 5.2: Average Life Evaluations and Percent of Respondents in Upper 
Income Quintiles, Analysis Samples
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Gallup World Poll data
Notes: N=101,317 in the emigration aspirations sample; N=77,459 in the emigration plans sample. See Table A3 for 
more details. Percent high-income refers to the “share of respondents in the top two income quintiles.” The differences 
in means between all groups are statistically significant. The p-value of the t-test of equality of means between those 
with and without emigration intentions (top left panel) is 0.000 (t-stat=12.2).  
The p-value of the t-test of the equality of means (percent high-income) between those with and without emigration 
intentions (bottom left panel) is 0.000 (t-stat=12.9). The p-value of the t-test of the equality of means (percent 
high-income) between those with and without emigration plans (bottom right panel) is 0.000 (t-stat=5.2). The 
p-value of the t-test of the equality of means (life evaluations) between those with and without emigration plans  
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top quartile of the life evaluations distribution. 
Specifically, the emigration probability for those 
at the 25th percentile of the happiness distribution 
(life evaluation=5) is 25.5%, while for those at the 
75th percentile of happiness distribution (life 
evaluation score=8) it is 24.6%, a difference of 
just 1 percentage point. The difference in the 
predicted emigration aspirations for respondents 
reporting no smiling (a measure of hedonic 
well-being/affect) and those who do is about  
2.4 percentage points, meanwhile (see Table A4). 
The predicted probability of having emigration 
plans is much lower than that for having  
emigration aspirations, with the difference 
between the probability of reporting emigration 
plans being 3.3% for the least happy Latin 
Americans in the sample and 2.6% for the  
happiest ones. These results are in line with the 
findings in other studies on Latin American 
emigration intentions.14
Further interesting findings emerge from the 
analyses (Table A4). For example, as in other 
studies,15 we document that rich individuals are 
more likely to express emigration aspirations 
compared to poorer individuals within the same 
Latin American country. At the same time, those 
who find it difficult to get by with their current 
income are more likely to want to emigrate than 
those who live comfortably with their means. 
This reflects that income aspirations matter as 
much as current conditions for the emigration 
decision. When it comes to the probability of 
having concrete emigration plans, however, the 
relatively rich and the poor do not differ from 
each other. 
Figure 5.3: Emigration Aspirations and Plans, Adjusted Predictions with 95% 
Confidence Intervals
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Gallup World Poll data
Notes: N=101,317 in the emigration aspirations sample; N=77,459 in the emigration plans sample
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Emigration aspirations and plans also vary 
according to how Latin Americans in our sample 
perceive their economic mobility. Those who 
reported no change in their economic situation 
are less likely to have emigration aspirations and 
plans compared with those who report that their 
economic situation has improved (again reflecting 
differences in aspirations). Individuals who report 
worsening economic mobility are even more 
likely than those reporting economic improvement 
to want to move abroad. 
There are some additional findings (shown in 
Table A4), which are highly intuitive – the more 
educated, the unemployed, those living in urban 
areas, those with networks abroad, and those 
reporting that corruption is present in government 
and in business are more likely to want to move.16 
The old, females, the married, and those who are 
satisfied with institutions and their freedom, as 
well as those who have social support, are less 
likely to want to move. Respondents experiencing 
physical pain are also more likely to want to 
emigrate, while household size does not seem  
to make a difference for emigration aspirations 
and plans.17
We next look at how important different  
circumstances are in explaining emigration 
intentions and plans.18 Specifically, we show in 
Table A4 whether each variable in our analysis  
is positively or negatively associated with  
emigration intentions and plans, and we here 
examine its explanatory power (relative weight 
or statistical importance) for the overall  
variation in emigration intentions and plans. 
Figure 5.4 shows that socio-economic variables 
(such as age, marital status, gender, education), 
country of origin, and year trends are by far the 
biggest predictors of emigration aspirations. 
Having a network of contacts abroad is also  
a pivotal determinant of potential emigration, 
accounting for almost half of the explained 
variation in emigration plans, and 16% in  
emigration aspirations. At the same time,  
subjective well-being is a relatively weak  
Figure 5.4: Relative Contribution of Explanatory Variables to Overall Variation in 
Emigration Aspirations and Plans (Percent Contribution to Pseudo R2)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Gallup World Poll data

































predictor of potential emigration, with  
happiness/life satisfaction explaining just 1% of 
the intent to migrate response, and smiling even 
less. Income factors are about six to eight times 
more important for potential emigration than 
subjective well-being. As such, while subjective 
well-being plays a role in the decision to  
emigrate or not, it is a minor one compared  
to that of the objective factors. 
2. The Well-being Consequences of 
Migration for Those Who Move
Our findings thus far suggest that potential 
emigrants from Latin America are frustrated 
achievers who are less happy but wealthier than 
respondents who wish to remain in their countries 
of origin. What happens to these frustrated 
achievers once they reach their desired destina-
tions? Does their perceived well-being improve?
Chapter 3, which is in part based on a methodology 
we developed in earlier work,19 provides evidence 
that Latin Americans may positively benefit from 
emigrating. In this section, we extend this analysis 
by providing further insights into the relationship. 
To that end, we again utilize data from the GWP 
for 2009-2016 but to increase our statistical 
power and be able to reveal more about migration 
patterns, we rely on all available Latin American 
and Caribbean countries, including those with 
small sample sizes.
Studying migration’s consequences for those 
who move is challenging as migration does not 
occur at random and emigrants take their selective 
traits with them when they move.20 Moreover, 
while migration may influence well-being, those 
who leave might have lower life satisfaction before 
the move, as we show in the previous section. 
Thus, a valid analysis must rely on constructing  
a comparison group that demonstrates the 
counter-factual – i.e. what would have happened 
to migrants’ well-being if they had not migrated 
(see Chapter 3 in this report).
Relying on a statistical matching procedure,  
we compare the post-migration outcomes of 
immigrants from Latin America living abroad 
with those of a matched group of non-migrants 
(stayers) at the origin. Specifically, based on 
information about country of birth, we identify 
Latin American immigrants living abroad and 
pair them with similar native-born individuals 
from the same origin country who have no 
emigration intentions.21 This second group 
provides some insight into what might have 
happened to the life evaluations of Latin  
Americans if they had not emigrated.
While arguably less robust than the methodology 
in our earlier work, where we found that migrants 
from post-socialist countries moving to developed 
countries experienced gains in subjective 
well-being,22 our method allows us to rely on 
larger sample sizes necessary to look at specific 
nuances in the migration experiences of Latin 
Americans from particular countries and living in 
certain destinations.23
Our main findings are featured in Table 5.1. As in 
Chapter 3, overall, we find that Latin American 
emigrants have higher life evaluations compared 
to similar stayers from the same country (Model 
(1)).24 Specifically, the life evaluations differential 
between immigrants and stayers is about 0.3 on 
a scale of 0-10, which represents about 5% of the 
sample mean of 6.3. This effect is relatively 
modest, yet meaningful in the statistical sense. 
We further explore nuances and patterns behind 
this finding. Specifically, in Model (2) we only 
compare stayers with migrants who go to  
advanced developed countries – such as those in 
Western Europe, the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and others (see the Notes to Table 5.1 for 
the included countries), while in Model (3), only 
stayers and Latin American immigrants going to 
other Latin American countries are included. Our 
findings suggest that Latin Americans moving to 
other Latin American countries may gain more in 
terms of life evaluations compared to those in 
developed countries. In part, this finding is likely 
due to the fact that distance and culture play a 
role for the “happiness premium” immigrants are 
able to realize, which is also what our earlier work 
on immigrants from transition economies finds.25
We next exclude the Caribbean countries, so that 
the results are restricted to the countries in the 
analyses of potential emigrants in the previous 
section (Model (4)). The findings and main 
conclusions remain robust. Finally, the results in 
Models (5)-(9) suggest that while migrant men 
and women benefit equally from migration in 
terms of their life evaluations, the “happiness 
gains” from migration are clearly concentrated 
for the middle-aged Latin Americans (those 
aged 35 to 50). This is likely because migrants in 
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this age group are in their prime working years, 
whereby their chances of income and opportunity 
gains are highest, while younger and in particular 
older migrants may benefit more from being 
near their families, and have less to trade off in 
terms of income gains.
We next turn our attention to the experiences of 
migrants from the sending countries with at least 
90 migrants. These results should be interpreted 
with caution due to the small sample sizes. Table 
5.2 reveals that not all migrants uniformly gain 
from emigrating. For example, the post-migration 
life evaluation levels of Venezuelans, Mexicans, 
Argentinians, Bolivians, and Chileans are, on 
average, indistinguishable from those of their 
compatriots who did not emigrate. Moreover, 
Brazilian immigrants, whose top three destination 
countries are Portugal, Paraguay, and Uruguay, 
may even incur life evaluation losses compared 
to comparable non-migrant Brazilians at the 
origin. At the same time, Colombians, Nicaraguans, 
Paraguayans, and Peruvians living abroad are 
happier than their stayer counterparts. It is 
difficult to explain the differences across so many 
different countries. It is more intuitive for some, 
such as Nicaragua, Colombia, and Paraguay, 
where migrants are leaving either civil violence 
or generally poor governance behind, than for 
others. In the specific case of Venezuela, mean-
while, it is plausible that many migrations were 
not desired paths, but rather an escape from an 
atmosphere of rapidly deteriorating political 
freedom and economic stability. 
Finally, Table 5.3 offers some insights into the 
happiness differential between migrants and 
stayers at particular destination countries. 
Immigrants from Latin American countries living in 
Spain, Costa Rica, and Argentina, may be better off 
in terms of happiness compared to their counter-
parts in the origin countries. Yet immigrants in the 
United States, Panama, and Portugal may not be 
happier after migrating, though the non-statistically 
significant findings may be due to the small 
sample sizes. Given the largest immigrant group 
in the United States in our matched sample are 
Mexicans, the nil happiness gains may also reflect 
Table 5.1: Difference in Life Evaluation Levels Between Latin American Migrants 
and Matched Stayers








Females Males Age 34 and 
younger




0.316*** 0.171* 0.481*** 0.287*** 0.267*** 0.238** 0.145 0.473*** 0.171
(0.070) (0.096) (0.099) (0.071) (0.090) (0.109) (0.109) (0.120) (0.133)
N 4,262 1,722 2,426 4,006 2,546 1,716 1,610 1,328 1,324
Adj. R2 0.065 0.069 0.050 0.060 0.063 0.063 0.041 0.076 0.063
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Gallup World Poll data  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The differences are based on OLS regressions applied after statistical 
matching. All estimates are adjusted for the pre-treatment covariates (age groups, gender, education levels, country  
of origin, and year of interview). Column (1) shows the estimates for the full matched sample for all matched Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. The advanced country destinations in (2) are based on all available countries 
from the list in Nikolova and Graham (2015a) and include: United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, The 
Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Greece, Denmark, Hong Kong, Japan, Israel, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, South Korea, Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, and 
Switzerland. The LAC destinations in (3) are: Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica, Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Puerto Rico, and Uruguay. The restricted sample in (4) includes the following origin countries: Brazil, Mexico, Costa 
Rica, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 




the illegal and low-skilled nature of this particular 
migrant stream.26 The largest immigrant groups 
in Spain in our analysis sample are Argentinians 
and Colombians; and in Costa Rica – the  
Nicaraguans. Similarly, the largest immigrant 
group in our sample residing in Argentina are the 
Paraguayans; in Panama – the Colombians; and 
 in Portugal – Brazilians. 
The findings in Tables 5.1-5.3 suggest that while 
Latin Americans may realize some modest life 
evaluation gains due to migrating, the costs and 
benefits of migration are not uniform and depend 
on the context and the particular migration 
stream. These varied outcomes may be due to 
differing reasons for migrating, such as paths 
chosen for economic opportunity versus cultural 
affinity versus escaping from deteriorating 
political conditions. While it is not possible to 
observe the drivers of these individual choices, 
one can imagine that they could have differential 
Table 5.2: Difference in Life Evaluation Levels Between Latin American  
Immigrants and Matched Stayers, Origin Countries with at Least 90 Migrants
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Venezuela Brazil Mexico Argentina Bolivia Chile Colombia Nicaragua Paraguay Peru
Life evaluations 
difference
0.245 -0.516*** 0.025 -0.299 0.400 -0.124 0.396* 1.058*** 0.677** 0.685***
(0.332) (0.180) (0.262) (0.214) (0.281) (0.277) (0.202) (0.191) (0.303) (0.258)
N 196 500 236 348 190 210 556 718 186 222
Adj. R2 0.024 0.060 0.105 0.041 0.032 0.095 0.078 0.058 0.052 0.060
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Gallup World Poll data          
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The differences are based on OLS regressions applied after statistical 
matching. All estimates are adjusted for the pre-treatment covariates (age groups, gender, education levels, country 
of origin, and year of interview).
Table 5.3: Difference in Life Evaluation Levels Between Latin American  
Immigrants and Matched Stayers, Destinations with at Least 90 Immigrants
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
United States Spain Costa Rica Argentina Panama Portugal
Life evaluations difference 0.038 0.396** 0.920*** 0.587*** 0.115 -0.326
(0.291) (0.173) (0.190) (0.202) (0.330) (0.362)
N 196 500 236 348 190 210
Adj. R2 0.024 0.060 0.105 0.041 0.032 0.095
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Gallup World Poll data      
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The differences are based on OLS regressions applied after statistical 
matching. All estimates are adjusted for the pre-treatment covariates (age groups, gender, education levels, country 
of origin, and year of interview).
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effects on subjective well-being outcomes. Our 
work comparing the life satisfaction of migrants 
from transition countries suggests that migrants 
who move to places where it is easy to assimilate 
culturally and/or also have the ability to return 
home frequently and with ease tend to have 
higher gains in subjective well-being than those 
who do not.27
3. Emigration’s Consequences for the 
Well-being of the Family Left Behind 
at the Origin
Thus far, we have found that potential Latin 
American emigrants are frustrated achievers who 
may gain in terms of happiness from migrating. 
In this section, we examine the well-being of 
migrants’ family members left behind in the 
countries of origin.
We rely on two questions in the Gallup World 
Poll: (i) whether the respondent has family 
abroad who left in the last five years and is still  
in the destination country and (ii) whether the 
respondent’s household receives remittances 
(both in kind and monetary) from abroad. All 
analyses are for 2009-2010 due to the availability 
of the family abroad variable. The Poll included a 
question about which country respondents’ 
relatives are in, and the top locations for Latin 
Americans were the U.S., Spain, and Argentina. 
We use several outcome variables capturing 
evaluative well-being, and positive and negative 
hedonic affect.28
Emigration can have conflicting consequences 
for the subjective well-being of the left behind. 
On the one hand, it may result in negative 
emotions due to the pain of separation. On the 
other hand, it may also increase psychological 
well-being if relatives back home know that 
migrants are expanding their opportunities 
abroad. Furthermore, remittances should at least 
in part compensate for the pain of separation. 
For example, remittance receipt is positively 
associated with life satisfaction in Latin America, 
possibly through increased financial security.29 
An additional study documents that migrant and 
non-migrant households in Cuenca, Ecuador 
experience similar happiness levels, arguing that 
remittances compensate migrant households for 
the pain of separation and the disruption of 
family life.30
About 17% of respondents in our analysis sample 
have a family member abroad who emigrated in 
the last five years (see Tables A6 and A7 in the 
Appendix for information regarding the analysis 
sample). The first set of results (Table 5.4) 
document the relationship between the  
emigration of family members and life evaluations 
(See Table A8 for detailed findings).
Our findings suggest a positive relationship 
between having family members abroad and life 
evaluations, which is independent of remittance 
receipt (Table 5.4). Having family abroad corre-
sponds to an average increase in life evaluations 
by about 0.10 points (on a 0-10 scale) Models 
(1)-(2). This associated influence is substantively 
small.31 Next, we net out the influence of the 
within-country income quintile of the respondent, 
thus comparing the well-being of households 
with similar levels of income Models (3)-(6). 
Having relatives and friends abroad is still  
positively associated with life evaluations.32
We next include variables for financial and living 
standard satisfaction and economic mobility, 
which are important determinants of the emigration 
decision, as shown above (Models (5)-(6) in Table 
5.4). Once we control for this perceived economic 
status, the positive influence of having relatives 
and friends abroad becomes smaller and indistin-
guishable from zero. This suggests that part of 
the happiness “premium” for the left behinds 
associated with having relatives and friends 
abroad stems from the perceived economic 
mobility and financial security that comes with it.33
We also examined the relationship between 
family members moving abroad and smiling, 
stress, and depression (Table A9 in the Appendix). 
Having relatives abroad and remittance receipts 
have no association with smiling and stress. 
There is, however, is a clear relationship with 
reporting depression, which is independent of 
remittance receipt. Having relatives abroad is 
associated with one percentage point increase in 
the probability of feeling depressed the previous 
day; meanwhile, 13.7% of respondents with family 
abroad report depression feelings (Table A7). 
This likely reflects the pain of separation, and is 
independent of having a social network of family 
and friends on whom to rely in times of need. 
Additional analyses (not shown) reveal that the 
associated increase in depression resulting from 
the out-migration of family members also holds 
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once we net out the influence of income, financial 
and standard of living satisfaction, and economic 
mobility perceptions. 
Our results are in line with to those in an earlier 
study, which looks at out-migration from several 
world regions.34 Sub-Saharan Africa is the only 
other region displaying a similar statistically 
significant relationship between depression and 
the out-migration of family members. This very 
likely reflects the longer distance and at times 
illegal status that emigrants from these two 
regions (Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa) 
face when they arrive in the U.S. and Europe, and 
their related inability to return home frequently. 
4. Conclusions
Chapter 6 in this report, as well as our earlier 
findings,35 highlight the complex reasons for 
Latin Americans’ higher than average well-being 
scores. The hedonic dimensions of well-being 
play a strong role in this explanation, and likely 
reflect cultural traits, such as the high value that 
Latins attach to family ties and quality of social 
life. Nevertheless, the strong role that learning or 
creativity plays in Latins’ well-being goes well 
beyond the hedonic or daily dimensions of 
well-being and suggests a deeper appreciation 
of quality of life in the region. A puzzle, then,  
is why there is so much out-migration from  
the region.
Our exploration of the reasons for and the 
consequences of emigration in this chapter finds 
that factors such as income and perceived 
mobility lead many Latin Americans to sacrifice 
their family and social life at home to seek 
opportunities and better life chances abroad. 
Those who wish to emigrate are less satisfied 
with their lives and their economic situations 
than their counterparts who stay behind, and on 
average, they realize modest gains in terms of 
happiness once they move. While their family 
members left in the places of origin realize 
Table 5.4: Emigration of Family Members, Remittances, and Life Evaluations
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Life evaluations Life evaluations Life evaluations Life evaluations Life evaluations Life evaluations
Relatives abroad
 
0.124*** 0.108** 0.085** 0.078* 0.063* 0.058
(0.043) (0.045) (0.039) (0.041) (0.037) (0.039)
Remittances
 
 0.073  0.032  0.025
 (0.062)  (0.056)  (0.054)
Remittance control N Y N Y N Y
Income quintile controls N N Y Y Y Y
Economic mobility, financial 
satisfaction, living standard 
satisfaction
N N N N Y Y
Country dummies and control 
variables
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 23,909 23,909 23,909 23,909 23,909 23,909
Adjusted R2 0.152 0.152 0.163 0.163 0.230 0.230
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Gallup World Poll data
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All models include controls for social support, age, age 
squared, gender, marital status, child in the household, household size, education, unemployment status, pain 
yesterday, health problem, religiosity, freedom, urban location, and a dummy for year 2010. All regressions use the 
Gallup-provided survey weight. The sample includes Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay and excludes 
the foreign-born in each country of interview. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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modest life evaluation gains and benefit from the 
income gains that result from remittances, they 
are also more likely to report depression than are 
those without family members abroad. 
In short, the Latin American happiness “premium” 
is not without its own paradoxes – migration 
being a primary example. Many individuals choose 
to leave to seek opportunities elsewhere, in order 
to be better able to provide for themselves and 
for the families they leave behind. Some migrant 
groups – such as the Paraguayans, Peruvians, 
and Nicaraguans abroad – may realize happiness 
benefits from emigrating. Yet not all Latin American 
migrants become happier by emigrating. Nor are 
there net positive effects for the families left 
behind, as increases in reported depression often 
offset their income gains. This reflects progress 
paradoxes that we have identified elsewhere, 
meanwhile, where significant income gains can 
co-exist with psychological costs.36
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Table A1: Variables Included in the Analyses (in Alphabetical Order)
Variable Explanation
Anger yesterday A binary indicator coded as 1 if the respondent reported experiencing a lot of anger the day before and 0 
otherwise
Belief in hard work A binary indicator coded as 1 if the respondent answered that people in this country can get ahead by 
working hard, and 0 if not
Children grow/Overall country 
assessment
Whether the respondent thinks that most children in this country have the opportunity to learn and grow 
every day (1=yes, 0=no)
Christian Whether the respondent's religion is Christian or not
Confidence in government Whether the respondent has confidence in the national government (1=yes, 0=no)
Corruption Two separate binary indicators measuring whether the respondent thinks there is corruption in government 
(1=no, 2=yes, 3=no answer); Whether the respondent thinks there is corruption in businesses (1=no, 2=yes, 
3=no answer). 
Depressed yesterday A binary indicator coded as 1 if the respondent felt depressed a lot during the previous day and 0 otherwise
Economic mobility Respondent's assessment of current living standard: 1=Living standard getting better, 2=Living standard the 
same; 3=Living standard getting worse
Emigration aspirations A binary indicator coded as 1 if respondents answered "yes" to the question "Ideally, if you had the 
opportunity, would you like to move PERMANENTLY to another country, or would you prefer to continue living 
in this country?" and 0 if they answered "no"
Emigration plans A binary indicator coded as 1 if respondents answered "yes" to the question "Are you planning to move 
permanently to another country in the next 12 months, or not?"  and 0 if they had no migration intentions. 
(Defined for all respondents who answered the emigration aspirations question)
Financial satisfaction Feeling about current household income, coded as 1 if respondents are "living comfortably on present 
income," 2 if they responded "getting by on present income," and 3 if they responded "finding it difficult on 
present income" or "finding it very difficult on present income"
Freedom Whether the respondent is satisfied with the freedom to choose what do to with his or her life in this country 
(1=yes, 0=no)
Health problem Whether the respondent has a health problem preventing him or her to do things other people his or her age 
normally do (1=yes, 0=no)
Household and demographic 
variables
Age, age squared gender, education, household size, indicator for presence of child(ren) in the household, 
religiosity, marital status, urban/rural location dummy, employment status. 
Household income This variable is based on the Gallup-provided household income in international dollars
Income quintile Within-country income quintiles based on household income in the local currency. Respondents are coded as 1 
if they belong to the respective quintile and 0 otherwise. Respondents can only belong to one quintile. 
Learned yesterday A binary indicator coded as 1 if respondents answered "yes" to the question "Did you learn or do something 
interesting yesterday?" and 0 if they answered "no"
Life evaluations The response to the question of respondents' assessment of their current life based on an imaginary 11-point 
scale whereby 0 designates one's worst possible life and 10 denotes the best possible life respondents can 
imagine for themselves. Based on the question "Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered from zero at the 
bottom to ten at the top. Suppose we say that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you, 
and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you 
say you personally feel you stand at this time, assuming that the higher the step the better you feel about your 
life, and the lower the step the worse you feel about it? Which step comes closest to the way you feel?"
Living standard satisfaction Satisfaction with living standard, whereby 1=yes, and 0=no
Network Constructed using a series of questions related to whether the respondent has friends or relatives on whom 
they can count when they need them, whether household members or relatives work abroad, and whether the 
respondent's household has received remittances
Pain Whether the respondent experienced a lot of physical pain the day before 
Relative abroad A binary indicator variable based on responses to the question "Have any members of your household gone 
to live in a foreign country permanently or temporarily in the past five years?"  Respondents who have family 
members who are still there are coded as 1 and those with family members who returned from abroad and no 
family members abroad in the past five years are coded as 0. 
Remittances Based on the question: "In the past 12 months, did this household receive help in the form of money or goods 
from another individual?" A binary indicator variable was constructed taking the value of 1 for respondents 
receiving money or goods from an individual abroad and both abroad and from this country, and zero otherwise
Smiled yesterday A binary indicator coded as 1 if the respondent reported smiling a lot the day before and 0 if they did not
Social support Whether the respondent has family and friends to rely on in times of trouble (1=yes, 0=no)
Stress yesterday A binary indicator coded as 1 if the respondent reported experiencing a lot of stress the day before and 0 
otherwise
Source: Authors based on Gallup World Poll documentation; the questions pertain to Gallup: Copyright © 2005-2018 
Gallup, Inc.
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Table A2: Number of Observations per Country and Year of Interview,  
Emigration Intentions and Aspirations Analysis Samples
 Emigration aspirations Emigration aspirations
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Argentina 813 783 808 791 828 827 714 774 783 808 791 828 827 714
Bolivia 753 836 843 854 850 831 676 753 836 843 854 850 831
Brazil 916 900 914 1,780 902 921 890 900 914 1,780 902 921
Chile 836 817 876 791 879 806 903 870 817 876 791 879 806 903
Colombia 807 887 866 902 852 897 870 833 887 866 902 852 897 870
Costa Rica 771 793 785 810 746 700 651 771 793 785 810 746 700
Ecuador 800 817 838 875 841 817 838 875
El Salvador 790 793 839 896 871 842 675 636 793 839 896 871 842 675
Guatemala 818 840 880 834 634 626 840 880 834 634
Honduras 784 670 857 862 844 862 729 591 670 857 862 844 862 729
Mexico 624 758 766 701 782 877 851 758 766 701 782 877
Nicaragua 884 788 786 832 856 805 662 799 788 786 832 856 805 662
Panama 843 730 811 780 848 756 817 635 730 811 780 848 756 817
Paraguay 795 748 828 894 849 830 739 748 828 894 849 830 739
Peru 745 734 753 737 820 770 831 812 734 753 737 820 770 831
Uruguay 771 629 657 762 737 796 710 668 629 657 762 737 796 710
Venezuela 634 771 782 806 809 795 773 845 771 782 806 809 795 773
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Gallup World Poll data
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Table A3: Selected Summary Statistics for Respondents with Emigration  




N=23,550 No plans, N=75,378 Plans, N=2,081
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Live evaluations (0-10 scale) 6.349 2.354 6.134 2.420 6.311 2.355 6.038 2.499
Smiled yesterday (1=yes) 0.863 0.344 0.848 0.359 0.862 0.345 0.844 0.363
Within-country income quintiles         
Q1 0.213 0.410 0.182 0.386 0.205 0.404 0.167 0.373
Q2 0.201 0.400 0.184 0.388 0.200 0.400 0.174 0.379
Q3 0.194 0.395 0.194 0.396 0.193 0.394 0.179 0.384
Q4 0.190 0.392 0.205 0.404 0.192 0.394 0.203 0.402
Q5 0.202 0.402 0.234 0.423 0.211 0.408 0.276 0.447
Financial satisfaction         
Living comfortably on current income 0.147 0.354 0.137 0.344 0.150 0.357 0.163 0.369
Getting by on current income 0.472 0.499 0.432 0.495 0.465 0.499 0.424 0.494
Difficult on current income 0.380 0.485 0.430 0.495 0.385 0.487 0.413 0.493
Living standard satisfaction 0.741 0.438 0.668 0.471 0.734 0.442 0.682 0.466
Economic mobility         
Better 0.517 0.500 0.524 0.499 0.527 0.499 0.550 0.498
No change 0.313 0.464 0.250 0.433 0.303 0.459 0.216 0.412
Worse 0.170 0.375 0.227 0.419 0.171 0.376 0.234 0.423
Education         
Elementary 0.376 0.485 0.262 0.440 0.354 0.478 0.247 0.431
Secondary 0.513 0.500 0.601 0.490 0.531 0.499 0.565 0.496
Tertiary 0.110 0.313 0.136 0.343 0.115 0.319 0.188 0.391
Unemployed 0.067 0.249 0.113 0.317 0.079 0.269 0.155 0.362
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Gallup World Poll data
Notes: The reported statistics were weighted using the Gallup-provided survey weight. The sample includes Venezuela, 
Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay and excludes the foreign-born in each country of interview. The means of all 
variables are statistically significantly different from each other at the 5% confidence level or lower. The exceptions 
are: the proportion of respondents in Q3 for those in the aspirations sample and Q2 in the plans sample.
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Table A4: Emigration Aspirations and Plans, Logistic Regressions,  
Average Marginal Effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aspirations Plans Aspirations Plans
Key independent Variable:  
Life evaluations
Key independent Variable:  
Smiled yesterday
Subjective well-being -0.003*** -0.001** -0.024*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.002)
Within-country income quintiles (Ref: Q1(poorest))
Q2 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Q3 0.011** 0.001 0.010** 0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Q4 0.010** -0.001 0.010* -0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Q5 0.011** 0.001 0.010* 0.001
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Financial satisfaction (Ref: Living comfortably on current income)
Getting by on current income
 
0.005 -0.001 0.006 -0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Difficult on current income
 
0.029*** 0.000 0.030*** 0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Living standard satisfaction -0.044*** -0.004** -0.045*** -0.005**
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Economic mobility (Ref: Better)
No change -0.013*** -0.005*** -0.013*** -0.005***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Worse 0.040*** 0.008*** 0.042*** 0.008***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Education (Ref: Elementary)
Secondary 0.029*** 0.003 0.029*** 0.003
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Tertiary 0.042*** 0.011*** 0.041*** 0.010***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Unemployed 0.041*** 0.015*** 0.042*** 0.015***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Age -0.004*** 0.001* -0.004*** 0.001*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Age2/100 -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001* -0.001***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Female -0.027*** -0.007*** -0.027*** -0.007***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Married/Partnership -0.039*** -0.010*** -0.039*** -0.010***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Child in household 0.009** 0.000 0.009** 0.000
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Household size 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Health problem -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Pain 0.014*** 0.003* 0.012*** 0.003*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Freedom -0.016*** -0.004** -0.016*** -0.004**
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
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Table A4: Emigration Aspirations and Plans, Logistic Regressions,  
Average Marginal Effects (continued)      
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aspirations Plans Aspirations Plans
Key independent Variable:  
Life evaluations
Key independent Variable:  
Smiled yesterday
Social support -0.018*** -0.006*** -0.018*** -0.006***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Children grow/Overall country assessment -0.026*** 0.001 -0.025*** 0.001
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Confidence in government -0.054*** -0.006*** -0.054*** -0.006***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Corruption in government (Ref: No)
Yes 0.025*** -0.000 0.025*** -0.000
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
No answer -0.001 -0.009** -0.001 -0.009**
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
Corruption in business (Ref: No)
Yes 0.040*** 0.006*** 0.040*** 0.006***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
No answer 0.018** 0.002 0.019** 0.002
(0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
Urban location 0.029*** 0.003** 0.029*** 0.003**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Network 0.130*** 0.036*** 0.130*** 0.036***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Country and Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 101,317 77,459 101,317 77,459
Pseudo R2 0.137 0.135 0.137 0.135
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Gallup World Poll data
Notes: The table shows the average marginal effects from logistic regression estimates (using the Gallup-provided 
survey weight).  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in all models equals 1 if 
the individual expressed willingness or plans to move permanently to another country. The subjective well-being 
variable in Models (1)-(2) is life evaluations, and in models (3)-(4)-smiling yesterday. Life evaluations (Best Possible 
Life) measures the respondent’s assessment of her current life relative to her best possible life on a scale of 0 to 10, 
where 0 is the worst possible life and 10 is the best possible life.  Smiled yesterday is a binary indicator for whether 
the respondent reported smiling the previous day. The sample includes Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica, 
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama Paraguay, Peru, 
and Uruguay and excludes the foreign-born in each country of interview. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
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Table A5: Summary Statistics, Latin American Immigrants and Stayers,  
Matched Sample
 Immigrants, N=2,131 Stayers, N=2,131
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 41.968 16.166 41.888 16.065
Female 0.597 0.491 0.597 0.491
Education     
Elementary 0.283 0.451 0.283 0.451
Secondary 0.555 0.497 0.555 0.497
Tertiary 0.162 0.368 0.162 0.368
Country of birth     
Venezuela 0.046 0.210 0.046 0.210
Brazil 0.117 0.322 0.117 0.322
Mexico 0.055 0.229 0.055 0.229
Costa Rica 0.009 0.096 0.009 0.096
Argentina 0.082 0.274 0.082 0.274
Bolivia 0.045 0.206 0.045 0.206
Chile 0.049 0.216 0.049 0.216
Colombia 0.130 0.337 0.130 0.337
Dominican Republic 0.028 0.165 0.028 0.165
Ecuador 0.029 0.168 0.029 0.168
El Salvador 0.030 0.169 0.030 0.169
Guatemala 0.034 0.182 0.034 0.182
Haiti 0.023 0.148 0.023 0.148
Honduras 0.017 0.131 0.017 0.131
Jamaica 0.003 0.057 0.003 0.057
Nicaragua 0.168 0.374 0.168 0.374
Panama 0.007 0.084 0.007 0.084
Paraguay 0.044 0.204 0.044 0.204
Peru 0.052 0.222 0.052 0.222
Puerto Rico 0.001 0.038 0.001 0.038
Suriname 0.004 0.061 0.004 0.061
Trinidad and Tobago 0.001 0.031 0.001 0.031
Uruguay 0.024 0.154 0.024 0.154
Survey year     
2009 0.105 0.306 0.105 0.306
2010 0.115 0.320 0.115 0.320
2011 0.113 0.317 0.113 0.317
2012 0.129 0.335 0.129 0.335
2013 0.091 0.287 0.091 0.287
2014 0.179 0.384 0.179 0.384
2015 0.132 0.338 0.132 0.338
2016 0.137 0.343 0.137 0.343
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Gallup World Poll data
Notes: The table shows the means and standard deviations of the analysis samples after matching - the means and 
standard deviations are (almost) identical for both groups due to the exact matching technique we applied. 
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Table A7: Summary Statistics for Respondents with and Without Relative Abroad
 No family abroad, N=19,933 Family abroad,  N=3,976
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Live evaluations (0-10 scale) 6.414 2.305 6.336 2.287
Smiled yesterday (1=yes) 0.859 0.348 0.868 0.338
Stress yesterday (1=yes) 0.256 0.437 0.271 0.444
Depressed yesterday (1=yes) 0.113 0.317 0.137 0.344
Remittances 0.038 0.192 0.302 0.459
Age 37.994 16.905 36.001 17.176
Female 0.516 0.500 0.489 0.500
Married 0.539 0.499 0.479 0.500
Child in household 0.607 0.488 0.650 0.477
Household size 4.691 2.083 4.977 2.217
Education
Elementary 0.372 0.483 0.335 0.472
Secondary 0.522 0.500 0.537 0.499
Tertiary 0.111 0.314 0.148 0.355
Unemployed 0.068 0.251 0.064 0.245
Pain 0.259 0.438 0.282 0.450
Health problem 0.208 0.406 0.220 0.414
Religiosity 0.795 0.403 0.830 0.375
Freedom 0.749 0.433 0.742 0.437
Social support 0.871 0.336 0.899 0.302
Urban location 0.615 0.487 0.602 0.490
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Gallup World Poll data  
Notes: The reported statistics were weighted using the Gallup-provided survey weight. The sample includes Venezue-
la, Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Panama Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay and excludes the foreign-born in each country of interview. All 
differences in means between the two groups are statistically significant except those for smiling, depression, 
unemployment, freedom, and urban location.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Gallup World Poll data
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Table A8: Emigration of Family Members, Remittances, and Life Evaluations
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Life evaluations Life evaluations Life evaluations Life evaluations Life evaluations Life evaluations
Relatives abroad
 
0.124*** 0.108** 0.085** 0.078* 0.063* 0.058







0.755*** 0.752*** 0.688*** 0.687*** 0.405*** 0.404***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044)
Within-country income quintiles (Ref: Q1(poorest))
Q2
 
0.254*** 0.253*** 0.155*** 0.155***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044)
Q3
 
0.463*** 0.462*** 0.270*** 0.269***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045)
Q4
 
0.640*** 0.639*** 0.355*** 0.354***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045)
Q5
 
0.869*** 0.868*** 0.435*** 0.434***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049)
Financial satisfaction (Ref: Living comfortably on current income)























-0.053*** -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.032*** -0.032***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Age2/100
 
0.047*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Female
 
0.108*** 0.107*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.138*** 0.138***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Married/In partnership
 
-0.003 -0.002 -0.019 -0.018 -0.028 -0.028
(0.036) (0.036) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Child in household
 
-0.120*** -0.120*** -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.089*** -0.089***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033)
Household size
 
-0.016 -0.016 -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.012 -0.012




0.445*** 0.444*** 0.285*** 0.284*** 0.249*** 0.249***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035)
Tertiary education
 
0.761*** 0.760*** 0.426*** 0.426*** 0.353*** 0.353***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048)
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Table A8: Emigration of Family Members, Remittances, and Life Evaluations 
 (continued)      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Life evaluations Life evaluations Life evaluations Life evaluations Life evaluations Life evaluations
Unemployed
 
-0.615*** -0.615*** -0.575*** -0.575*** -0.317*** -0.317***
(0.074) (0.074) (0.063) (0.063) (0.061) (0.061)
Pain yesterday
 
-0.377*** -0.377*** -0.371*** -0.371*** -0.215*** -0.215***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
Health problem
 
-0.458*** -0.459*** -0.449*** -0.449*** -0.276*** -0.276***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036)
Religiosity
 
0.036 0.035 0.062* 0.061* 0.005 0.005
(0.041) (0.041) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034)
Freedom
 
0.295*** 0.295*** 0.251*** 0.251*** 0.086*** 0.086***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
Urban location
 
0.255*** 0.254*** 0.154*** 0.153*** 0.197*** 0.197***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Year 2010
 
0.051 0.051 0.073** 0.073** 0.022 0.022
(0.035) (0.035) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029)
Constant
 
6.498*** 6.498*** 6.382*** 6.382*** 6.480*** 6.480***
(0.129) (0.129) (0.114) (0.114) (0.117) (0.117)
Country dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 23,909 23,909 23,909 23,909 23,909 23,909
Adjusted R2 0.152 0.152 0.163 0.163 0.230 0.230
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Gallup World Poll data
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions use the Gallup-provided survey weight. 
The sample includes Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay and excludes the foreign-born in each 
country of interview. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1          
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Table A9: Emigration of Family Members, Remittances, Positive and Negative 
Hedonic Well-Being, Logistic Regressions, Average Marginal Effects
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)






0.008 0.011 0.010 0.006 0.010* 0.011*







0.064*** 0.064*** -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.054***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Age
 
-0.004*** -0.004*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age2/100
 
0.004*** 0.004*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female
 
-0.009* -0.009* 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Married/In partnership
 
0.008 0.008 0.000 0.000 -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Child in household
 
-0.005 -0.005 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Household size
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001




0.008 0.008 0.022*** 0.022*** -0.013** -0.013**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Tertiary education
 
0.014 0.014 0.029*** 0.028** -0.043*** -0.043***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
Unemployed
 
-0.023** -0.023** 0.016 0.016 0.059*** 0.059***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Pain yesterday
 
-0.094*** -0.094*** 0.243*** 0.243*** 0.136*** 0.136***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Health problem
 
-0.028*** -0.028*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.063*** 0.063***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Religiosity
 
0.036*** 0.036*** -0.006 -0.006 0.002 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Freedom
 
0.043*** 0.043*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.023*** -0.023***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Urban location
 
0.004 0.004 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.010** 0.010**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Year 2010
 
0.009* 0.009* -0.009 -0.009 -0.009* -0.009*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Country dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 23,909 23,909 23,909 23,909 23,909 23,909
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.0541 0.096 0.096 0.137 0.137
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Table A9: Emigration of Family Members, Remittances, Positive and Negative 
Hedonic Well-Being, Logistic Regressions, Average Marginal Effects (continued)  
   
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Gallup World Poll data
Notes: The table shows the average marginal effects from logistic regression estimates (using the Gallup-provided 
survey weight). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in all models equals 1 if 
the individual experienced the emotion the day before (smiling in Models (1)-(2), stress in Models (3)-(4), or depres-
sion in Models (5)-(6)). The sample includes Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay and excludes the 
foreign-born in each country of interview. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Endnotes
1 Ivlevs et al. (2016), Nikolova & Graham (2015a, 2015b).
2  The GWP is an annual survey fielded in about 160 countries 
worldwide, and is representative of each country’s civilian 
population aged 15 and older, and more than 99% world’s 
adult population. Here we provide insights for these 
questions using the latest available data for Latin America 
in the Poll. Since key variables for our analyses such as 
income and employment status are available from 2009 
onwards, our analyses focus on the years 2009-2016 and 
cover the following Latin American countries: Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,  
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. As they are 
geographically and culturally distinct from the Latin 
American countries, we exclude the Caribbean nations 
(Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Puerto Rico). Due to the small sample size of 
about 500 respondents – polled only once – we also 
exclude Suriname and Belize. Graham is a Senior Scientist 
at Gallup and Nikolova a collaborator and, as such, have 
access to the data. 
3  One notable exception is a recent study of return migration 
to rural areas in Peru conducted by Richard Webb (2013). 
Webb highlights the important role of improved transporta-
tion infrastructure and access to technology (cell phones in 
particular) in spurring rural residents to return to rural 
towns and villages to start small businesses. While there are 
likely other countries that display these trends, we do not 
have sufficient data, either on return migration or on 
well-being, to take this topic on. 
4  The emigration plans variable is defined for all respondents 
who answered the emigration aspirations/intentions 
question. The emigration plans question was not asked in 
2009 and 2016. 
5  Creighton (2013), Simmons (1985), van Dalen & Henkens 
(2008, 2013)
6 Massey et al. (1993), Sjaastad (1962)
7 Hanson (2010)
8 Ivlevs (2014)
9 Chindarkar (2014), Graham and Markowitz (2011)
10 Graham and Pettinato (2002)
11 Graham and Markowitz (2011)
12  Similarly, again relying on Latinobarometro data, Chindarkar 
(2014) shows that life satisfaction is also associated with 
emigration intentions. Respondents with life satisfaction 
scores of 3 and 4 (on a 1-4 scale) were two to four 
percentage points less likely to express emigration 
intentions.
13  The sample sizes for each country and year are in Table A2 
in the Appendix.
14 Graham and Markowitz (2011), Chindarkar (2014)
15 Manchin & Orazbayev (2015)
16  These findings are corroborated by some earlier work by 
the Gallup Organization and the IOM. See Esipova, Ray, and 
Pugliese (2011). 
17  Our results should be interpreted as conditional correlations 
rather than as causal estimates, due to a number of 
methodological and data issues – in particular the 
cross-sectional nature (see Ivlevs (2014) for a discussion  
of the methodological challenges).
18  We rely on Shapley-based decomposition, which splits the 
goodness of fit statistic (i.e., the pseudo R2 in this case) into 
the relative percentage contributions of each included 
independent variable (Israeli, 2007; Shorrocks, 2013). To 
conduct the decompositions, we relied on Stata’s user-written 
command shapley2 (Juarez, 2012). The pseudo R2 value 
shows that we were only able to explain about 14% of the 
variation in emigration aspirations and plans using the 
included variables in the model.
19  Nikolova and Graham (2015a); see also Esipova, Ray, and 
Pugliese (2011).
20  By “selective traits,” we mean characteristics such as ability, 
risk preferences, and aspirations. See Chapter 3 in this 
report and Nikolova (2015) for the associated challenges of 
measuring migration’s subjective well-being consequences.
21  We used one-to-one nearest neighbor matching without 
replacement with a caliper (i.e., maximum allowable 
distance between the propensity scores) of 0.01. Our 
matching covariates include age group indicators, as well 
as gender, country of origin, year of interview, and 
education. Specifically, we applied exact matching. We 
excluded income and employment status from the 
matching covariates as these variables may be influenced 
by migration itself (see Nikolova and Graham (2015a)). 
Next, we checked whether on average, the matching 
covariates are balanced for the migrants and stayers  
(i.e., whether the means are statistically indistinguishable 
from zero) and our checks indicate that covariance balance 
is achieved. Summary statistics are available in Table A5. 
Finally, we kept the pairs of immigrants and matched 
stayers that were on the common support. We ran OLS 
regressions with the matched sample whereby the 
dependent variable is life evaluations, the focal independent 
variable is whether the immigrant is a migrant or a stayer. 
We also include the matching covariates for precision.
22 Nikolova and Graham (2015a)
23  The matched sample is representative of the birth countries 
and destination countries of all Latin-American immigrant 
respondents in the GWP.
24  Our findings are very similar to yet slightly different from 
those in Chapter 3 due to the differences in methodology. 
Our findings also differ from those in Stillman et al. (2015) 
who document that migration from Tonga to New Zealand 
lowers movers’ hedonic well-being despite improvements 
in income, mental well-being, and income adequacy 
perceptions. The differences with Stillman et al. (2015) are 
likely due to differences in the origin and destination 
countries and in methodology.
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25  In Nikolova and Graham (2015a), we show that migrants 
from transition economies realize happiness, income, and 
freedom perception gains when they move to developed 
countries. In that paper, we also present suggestive 
evidence that distance (cultural as well as physical) is 
negatively correlated with the life evaluations of the 
immigrants. We also document a North/South difference in 
terms of well-being gains (with migrants living in advanced 
western societies gaining more than those living in the 
South i.e., Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain) and post-socialist 
migrants moving to the “old” EU gaining the most in terms 
of both happiness and income. 
26  It is important to note that Gallup does not collect data on 
the legal status of immigrants. This is our interpretation of 
the results. 
27 Nikolova and Graham (2015a)
28 Our methodology is similar to that in Ivlevs et al. (2016).
29 Cárdenas et al. (2009)
30 Borraz et al. (2010)
31  Evaluated at the sample mean, the coefficient estimate is 
about 1.5 percent. 
32  These findings resonate with those for Latin America and 
the Caribbean in Ivlevs et al. (2016). The main difference is 
that in Ivlevs et al., in addition to having relatives and 
friends abroad, the remittance variable is also positive and 
statistically significant, likely due to the inclusion of the 
poorer Caribbean countries, whereby remittances enhance 
the life evaluation effects of being a migrant-sending 
household.
33  Our findings corroborate those in Nobles et al. (2015) and 
Marchetti-Mercer (2012), who find a negative relationship 
between the emigration of household members and the 
mental well-being of those left behind in Mexico and South 
Africa. They also echo our previous finding that the 
emigration of family members is associated with higher 
levels of depression in more unequal countries (and the 
world’s most unequal countries are in sub-Saharan Africa 
and Latin America) (see Ivlevs et al. (2016)).
34 Ivlevs et al. (2016)
35 Graham and Nikolova (2015)
36 Graham & Pettinato (2002), Graham et al. (2017)
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Introduction
Latin Americans report high happiness levels. 
Positive-affect scores are substantially high both 
in comparison to other countries in the world 
and to what income levels in the region would 
predict. Latin Americans’ evaluation of life is also 
above what income levels would predict. It is 
clear that there is more to life than income and 
that there is something to learn from the Latin 
American case about the drivers of happiness. 
There are deeper lessons to be learned from the 
high happiness situation in Latin America. Our 
results confirm that currently used development 
indicators neglect important aspects in life which 
are of relevance for people’s well-being. By 
appropriately incorporating people’s values, 
subjective well-being measures become highly 
relevant in addressing development debates and 
strategies. These measures recognize human 
universality in the experience of being well, but 
allow for heterogeneity in the relationship 
between this experience and its drivers.  
Heterogeneity emerges from historical processes 
that shape culture and influence values. Hence, 
well-being is better assessed by subjective 
well-being measures than by indicators of its 
potential drivers.
The happiness situation of Latin Americans can 
be considered as very favorable, especially when 
contrasted with commonly used socio-political 
and economic indicators. These indicators often 
portray a situation of weak political institutions, 
high corruption, high violence and crime rates, 
very unequal distribution of income, and high 
poverty rates in many Latin American countries. 
The chapter does suggest neglecting these  
problems. In fact, happiness in Latin America 
could be higher if these problems were properly 
solved. However, the chapter shows that by 
focusing primarily on these problems scholars 
and journalists get a misleading impression of  
life in Latin America. Furthermore, the exclusive 
focus on problems could lead scholars and 
journalists to neglect the positive drivers of 
happiness in Latin America and could induce  
policy makers to undertake wrong policies by 
lacking a more balanced and complete view  
of human beings and societies.
As a matter of fact, even on the basis of  
traditional development indicators, not  
everything is problematic in Latin America.  
For example, per capita incomes are not low and 
there is reasonable provision of public goods  
and an acceptable provision of health and 
education services in most countries. Many Latin 
American countries are classified by the United 
Nations Development Programme as having 
‘High Human Development’.1
In addition, this chapter argues that high happiness 
in Latin America is neither an anomaly nor an 
oddity. It is explained by the abundance of family 
warmth and other supportive social relationships 
frequently sidelined in favor of an emphasis on 
income measures in the development discourse. 
Happiness research has shown that relationships 
are important for people’s happiness; and that 
positive relationships are abundant in Latin 
America. Hence, happiness in Latin America has 
social foundations.
The chapter starts by arguing that Latin America 
is more than a geographic region: it is the home 
to a culture which presents particular features 
that are relevant in generating high happiness. 
The subsequent section provides a description of 
the happiness situation in Latin America, showing 
that Latin Americans enjoy very high positive 
affective states, as well as evaluative states that 
are above what income levels would predict for 
the region. The chapter then moves on to show 
that happiness in Latin America does suffer from 
the effects of the many social and economic 
problems in the region. The life satisfaction of 
people in Latin America is negatively impacted 
by corruption, violence and crime, and economic 
difficulties. An explanation for the relatively high 
happiness levels in Latin America is provided in 
the following section, which describes the 
abundance and relevance of close and warm 
interpersonal relations in the region. The patterns 
of interpersonal relations in Latin America differ 
significantly from those in other regions of the 
world. The specific pattern of interpersonal 
relations leads to Latin Americans enjoying high 
family satisfaction levels and experiencing many 
daily positive emotions. A more relational sense 
of purpose in life also contributes in explaining 
the favorable evaluation of life. Final considerations 
are presented in the last section.
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Latin America: Not Just a  
Geographical Region
One could think of Latin America as a collection 
of countries that happen to be in the same 
geographical region However, Latin America is 
much more than this. It is a distinct culture. Of 
course, there is considerable intra-regional 
heterogeneity as well as substantial similarities 
with other regions of the world, but it is possible 
to think of a Latin American culture with a clearly 
recognized way of life where close interpersonal 
relations and the enjoyment of positive affective 
states predominate.2 The Latin American culture 
emerged from particular historical processes, 
and some of its features are relevant in explaining 
happiness in the region.3
The Latin American Region
The Latin American category usually includes 
those countries in the American continent where 
romance languages are predominant. On the basis 
of this vague definition the region incorporates 
Brazil – where Portuguese is the official language 
– and 18 countries where Spanish is an official 
language: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela. Puerto Rico, another state where 
Spanish is spoken, is not usually included due to 
its status as unincorporated territory of the 
United States; however, it is recognized that 
Puerto Ricans have a Latin American character. 
On the basis of a romance-language criterion 
Haiti – where French is widely spoken – could  
also be considered as being part of the region. 
However, its history and culture are very different 
from those of the Spanish and Portuguese- 
speaking countries. 
It is important to note that many indigenous 
languages are also widely spoken in the region 
– such as Quechua, Guaraní, Nahuatl, Maya,  
Zapotec, Mapuche, Aymara, and others. These 
languages are particularly important in some 
countries where the indigenous population is 
large, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Paraguay, Peru, and Mexico. 
The region goes from the northern 32° parallel  
to the southern 56° parallel (not considering 
Antarctic territories). It comprises a population 
of about 620 million people living in a geograph-
ical area of about 19.5 million square kilometers. 
In terms of population size the largest countries 
in the region are, by far, Brazil and Mexico, with 
population figures of 209 million and 129 million 
people, respectively. Colombia, Argentina, Peru 
and Venezuela can be considered mid-size 
countries, with populations in between 50 and 
25 million people.
Latin America is not a high income region, and 
no Latin American country would be classified as 
developed on the basis of its per capita income 
level. Some social indicators point towards the 
existence of many social problems, such as 
corruption and lack of transparency, high income 
inequality, and high crime and victimization rates.4
As expected, Latin America is a diverse region; 
there are significant inter-country differences,  
as well as substantial intra-country disparities. 
However, there is a general idea of the region  
as a single entity, and most people in the region 
can identify themselves as Latin Americans.
The Latin American Culture
The Latin American identity is not defined by 
language alone or by sharing a geographic space 
in the world. The Latin American identity points 
towards a culture that has emerged from historical 
processes that have been common to all countries 
in the region.5 With the emergence of happiness 
research and the gathering of happiness  
information it has become visible that the Latin 
American way of life is associated with high 
happiness. The emerging data from Latin America 
shows that life evaluation indicators are high in 
relation to what income levels in the region 
would predict and that positive affect indicators 
are outstandingly high with respect to the rest  
of the world. In other words, it seems that the set 
of social and economic indicators which are 
commonly used in development studies do not 
provide a complete picture of the well-being of 
Latin Americans. 
It is the collision of major civilizations which gave 
rise to the Latin American nations. Christopher 
Columbus’ journeys in the late years of the 15th 
century and the beginning of the 16th century 
triggered this process. The European civilizations 
– mostly Spaniards and Portuguese – collided with 
the large pre-Columbian indigenous civilizations 
which existed in the region. Three main  
World Happiness Report 2018
civilizations existed in the Latin American  
region by the end of the 15th century when the 
Europeans arrived to the so-called ‘new world’: 
the Aztecs, the Incas, and the Mayans.6  
Archeological evidence shows that the Aztec 
empire had a population of about 5 million 
people at the time. The Aztec capital,  
Tenochtitlan, had about 200,000 people when 
the Spaniards arrived, a population more or less 
similar to that of Paris, the largest European  
city at the time. In addition to the Aztecs, the 
Mayans, and the Incas, many other groups 
populated the region, such as the Guarani and 
Mapuche in South America. The collision of these 
major civilizations was not a peaceful process; it 
is a history of battles and impositions, of treason 
and ambition, of conquering and colonization, of 
being forced to adapt to rapidly changing social 
and political circumstances and to understand 
unfamiliar points of view. 
The large indigenous populations were neither 
exterminated nor segregated, and over time 
Europeans and indigenous groups mixed,  
creating “mestizo” (racially mixed ancestry 
between American Indian and European – usually 
Spanish or Portuguese).7 Many Indians died as  
a consequence of the new illnesses brought 
by Europeans, and many others died as a  
consequence of unhealthy working conditions. 
But it was not in the interest of the conquerors 
to exterminate the local populations, and some 
religious congregations fought for the  
incorporation of the indigenous groups into the 
new society.8 It was clear that the Europeans 
were the conquerors, but the society emerging 
from this process incorporated both the  
conquerors and the conquered. A majority of  
the Latin American population is considered to 
be “mestizo” and there are large indigenous 
populations in countries such as Mexico,  
Guatemala, El Salvador, Ecuador, Peru, and 
Bolivia. For example, in Guatemala, about 50% of 
the population speaks an indigenous language, 
whereas another 40% are considered mestizo. 
It has been more than 500 years since the 
beginning of the conquest. Latin American culture 
has evolved during the 300 years of colonial 
times and the 200 years of independence times. 
Many factors intervened in the shaping of the 
current Latin American culture, and the blending 
of the values and worldview of the indigenous 
people with those of Spaniards and Portuguese 
is an important one.9 Coexistence with – rather 
than dominance of – nature was a central value of 
many indigenous groups; this value contributes 
to generate a society that is not as interested in 
changing the social and natural context as it is in 
living within it.10 This leads to a society that has a 
slower pace of life and that is not so focused on 
transforming and mastering nature and in  
generating economic growth as it is in living and 
enjoying life within the existing conditions.11 In 
addition, the extended-family values of the 
conquerors blended with the communitarian 
values of indigenous groups – where relatives 
tended to live together and to be in close  
contact.12 This generated societies where  
interpersonal relations centered in the family and 
relatives were dominant, with the corresponding 
abundance of disinterested and collaborative 
interpersonal relations. In other words, the 
purpose of the relationship is not motivated by 
an external task that needs to be performed  
but by the existence of family ties and the 
expectation for the relationship to be close, 
warm, and enjoyable. It could be said that this 
process leads to societies where the purpose  
of the relationship is the relationship itself.
The culture that has emerged in Latin America 
can be characterized by: the focus on the  
nurturing of warm and close interpersonal 
relations with relatives and friends, the centrality 
of the family – both nuclear and extended – an 
affective regime that values and encourages the 
experience and manifestation of emotions, the 
existence of relatively weak civic relationships 
(those relations beyond family, friends, neighbors, 
and colleagues), a relative disregard for  
materialistic values, and weak political institutions.143 
It can be stated that the Latin American culture 
has a human-relations orientation. These cultural 
features play a central role in explaining happiness 
in Latin America.14 Culture plays a role in the 
relevance of affective and evaluative aspects in 
life, in how these affective and evaluative aspects 
relate, and in the importance some drivers have 
in explaining them. Affective experiences of 
being well are highly relevant in Latin Americans’ 
happiness; in addition, affective and evaluative 
aspects are not highly correlated in the region. 
Hence, life evaluation measures provide an 
incomplete picture of the Latin American  
happiness situation. Furthermore, the variables 
most often used to explain life evaluations play a 
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smaller role in explaining affective states in Latin 
America. In consequence, it is necessary to have 
a broader perspective in order to get a better 
explanation of happiness in Latin America. This 
chapter provides an explanation based on the 
relevance of interpersonal relations, which are 
abundant and of high quality in Latin America, 
and which are not fully captured by commonly- 
used indicators in the development discourse.
A cultural explanation necessarily relies on 
comparisons, since the particular features of a 
culture can only be shown when it is compared to 
others. In order to portray some Latin American 
cultural features we will compare them to their 
counterparts in some Western European and 
Anglo-Saxon countries.15 This comparison can 
highlight the special features of the Latin American 
culture, at least relative to the Anglo-Saxon and 
Western European countries. Of course, it is 
important to state that culture and region are 
two different concepts that may overlap in some 
cases but which are not exactly identical. By 
associating culture with region one makes the 
assumption that the particular features of a 
culture predominate in a specific region, but this 
does not make these features to be exclusive in 
and of this region.
Life Evaluation and Affect  
in Latin America
In general, Latin Americans’ evaluation of life16  
is high with respect to what income and other 
social indicators would predict; this finding 
points toward the existence of an omitted- 
variable situation in the explanation of Latin 
Americans’ life evaluation. The affective state  
– in particular positive affect – is outstandingly 
high in Latin America; as a matter of fact, Latin 
American countries usually show up in the top 
positions when rankings are elaborated on the 
basis of the experience of positive affect.  
Moreover, the low correlation between affect  
and evaluation in Latin America points towards 
Figure 6.1: Life Evaluation in Latin American Countries
Note: Country means. Regional figures are computed as simple regional averages of country means.
Source: Gallup World Poll, waves 2006 to 2016.
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the need of incorporating people’s affective  
state when aiming to have an overall assessment 
of their happiness. 
Life Evaluation in Latin America
Life evaluations in Latin American range from an 
average of 7.15 in Costa Rica to 4.93 in Dominican 
Republic on the basis of information from Gallup 
World Polls from 2006 to 2016 (See Figure 6.1). 
The simple country average for the Latin  
American region is 6.07, which is not as high as 
the average for the group of Western European 
countries (6.95) or for the Anglo-Saxon countries 
(7.38), but which is much greater than the simple 
country average for all the countries in the world 
(5.42).17 Given the economic and social conditions 
in Latin America it comes as no surprise that, on 
average, life evaluation in the region is much 
lower than that in the European and Anglo- 
Saxon countries, which continuously show much 
better indicators in terms of income, income 
distribution, income-poverty rates, transparency, 
crime and violence rates, and education and 
health. The high evaluative levels reported by 
Costa Ricans (7.15) (See Figure 6.1), which are 
above the average Western European levels, are 
partially explained by the existence of a relatively 
good welfare system in the country. There is no 
army in Costa Rica since 1949, and the country’s 
inhabitants have universal access to health care 
and primary and secondary education, with the 
government providing many services that ensure 
the satisfaction of basic needs for most Costa 
Ricans, independently of their income. 
Figure 6.2 presents time trends in life evaluation 
for some Latin American countries. Venezuela – a 
country undergoing difficult political, social and 
economic processes during the past years 
– shows an astonishing decline in people’s  
evaluation of life, moving from 7.6 in 2010 to 4.1 
in 2016. The volatility of life evaluation is also 
extremely high in Venezuela; as a matter of fact, 
the average year to year change in Venezuela is 
0.67. Peruvians have moved from an average life 
Figure 6.2: Trends in Life Evaluation. Some Latin American Countries 
Note: Country means over time.
Source: Gallup World Poll, waves 2006 to 2016.
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evaluation of 4.9 in 2006 to one of 5.8 in 2016; 
some increase in life evaluation is also observed 
during the past years in Chile. The largest  
countries in the region – Brazil and Mexico – 
show a slightly negative trend in recent years.
One of the main questions regarding Latin 
Americans’ life evaluation is whether it  
corresponds to the social and economic  
conditions in the region as they are portrayed  
by commonly used indicators such as income 
levels and other socio-economic indicators. Two 
ordinary least square regression exercises are 
implemented on the basis of all observations 
from all countries in the Gallup World Polls 
surveys from 2006 to 2016 in order to study this 
correspondence between life evaluation in Latin 
America and some relevant variables which have 
been used to explain happiness. The first exercise 
(model 1) uses the logarithm of household per 
capita income as the unique explanatory variable 
of life evaluation. The second exercise (model 2) 
adds other explanatory variables such as: count 
on the help, donated money, freedom in your life, 
corruption within businesses, and corruption in 
Government.18 Figure 6.3 presents the mean of 
the estimated errors from these regressions for 
the Latin American countries; as observed, with 
the exception of the Dominican Republic all 
other Latin American countries show actual life 
evaluations higher than those predicted by the 
global equation. This finding indicates that Latin 
Americans tend to evaluate their lives above 
what their income and what the set of commonly 
used explanatory variables would predict. The 
simple country average of the estimated error for 
the whole region is between 0.71 (for model 2) 
and 0.81 (for model 1). Hence, Latin Americans 
Figure 6.3: Life Evaluation in Latin America. Estimated errors  
from Regression Exercises
Note: Estimated errors from OLS regression analyses using all observations in the GWP 2006 to 2016 surveys.  
Life evaluation as dependent variable, measured in a 0 to 10 scale. Independent variables in Model 1: logarithm  
of household per capita income, having someone to count on, donated money, freedom in your life, corruption  
within businesses, and corruption in Government. Independent variables in Model 2: logarithm of household per 
capita income.
Source: Gallup World Polls, all waves 2006 to 2016.
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have life-evaluation levels that are above what 
would correspond to their situation on the basis 
of commonly used explanatory variables of life 
evaluation. This finding suggests that there are 
some factors which are relevant in explaining life 
evaluation in Latin America and which are not 
yet fully incorporated in the available data.
Affective State in Latin America
Latin Americans report outstandingly high levels 
of positive affect. A simple average on the basis 
of five questions19 in the Gallup World Poll and 
which are associated to positive affect shows the 
situation: eight of the top ten countries in the 
world are from Latin America, as well as ten out 
of the top fifteen countries. The non-Latin 
American countries in the top ten are Canada 
and Philippines (See Table 6.1).
It is important to remark that the outstanding 
performance of Latin American countries in 
positive affect does not correspond to the 
situation in negative affect.20 In other words, 
Latin Americans’ positive affect is very high, but 
negative affect in the region is not low –neither 
in comparison to other countries nor to what 
would be expected on the basis of the socio- 
economic situation in the region.
On the basis of information from Gallup World 
Polls 2006 to 2016 it is evident that Latin  
Americans enjoy very high positive affect (See 
Figure 6.4). On average, the simple regional 
mean for Latin Americans is similar to that for 
the Anglo-Saxon countries and slightly higher 
than that for the Western European countries. 
Some countries like Paraguay, Panama and Costa 
Rica enjoy very high positive affect.
Table 6.1: Top 15 Countries in the World in Positive Affect. Positive and Negative 
Affect. Mean Values by Country. 2006–2016
Rank Country
Number 
 of observations Positive affect Negative affect
1 Paraguay 10995 0.842 0.222
2 Panama 11025 0.833 0.215
3 Costa Rica 11006 0.829 0.279
4 Venezuela 10994 0.824 0.243
5 El Salvador 11008 0.818 0.319
6 Guatemala 11045 0.812 0.297
7 Colombia 10999 0.810 0.308
8 Ecuador 11135 0.809 0.323
9 Canada 11325 0.804 0.257
10 Philippines 12198 0.800 0.364
11 Iceland 3131 0.799 0.217
12 Denmark 10777 0.798 0.193
13 Honduras 10991 0.797 0.273
14 Norway 6010 0.797 0.208
15 Nicaragua 11015 0.796 0.312
All countries in the world 0.697 0.270
Note: Positive affect measured as simple average of the following five ‘day-before’ dichotomous variables: Smile  
or laugh yesterday, Learn something, Treated with respect, Experienced enjoyment, and Feel well-rested. Negative 
affect measured as simple average of the following five ‘day-before’ dichotomous variables: Experienced worry, 
Sadness, Anger, Stress, and Depression. Positive and negative affect are measured in a 0 to 1 scale.
Source: Gallup World Poll waves 2006 to 2016.
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While positive affect is more favorable in Latin 
America, the reverse is true for negative affect, 
with Bolivians and Peruvians reporting especially 
high negative affect.
The information presented in Figure 6.4  
corresponds to mean values across all years in 
the surveys (2006 to 2016). However, some 
countries show clear time trends and of particular 
interest is the situation in Venezuela, where 
positive affect have declined from a top value of 
0.87 in 2010 to 0.74 in 2016 while negative affect 
have risen from a value of 0.13 in 2010 to 0.42 in 
2016 (See Figure 6.5). No doubt the complexities 
of economic crisis, political polarization, high 
violence, and migration and separation of families 
are affecting the well-being of Venezuelans.
Positive affect is very high in Latin America  
and negative affect is also high, but the main 
question is whether they do correspond to the 
levels of commonly used variables in the expla-
nation of happiness. Two regression exercises21 
are implemented on the basis of all observations 
in the Gallup World Polls surveys from 2006 to 
2016 in order to study this correspondence 
between affect in Latin America and some 
relevant variables which are often used to explain 
happiness. The first regression exercise (model 1) 
uses the logarithm of household per capita 
income as the unique explanatory variable of 
affect. The second regression exercise (model 2) 
adds other explanatory variables such as: count 
on the help, donated money, freedom in your life, 
corruption within businesses, and corruption in 
government. Figure 6.6 presents the estimated 
errors from these regressions for the case of 
positive affect, while Figure 6.7 provides the 
same information for the case of negative affect.
Figure 6.4: Positive and Negative Affect. Latin America, 2006–2016
Note: Country means in positive and negative affect. Regional averages refer to simple country means in the region. 
Positive and negative affect are measured in a 0 to 1 scale.
Source: Gallup World Poll waves 2006-2016.
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Figure 6.5: Venezuela.  
Trends in Positive and  
Negative Affect. 2006–2016
Source: Gallup World Poll, waves 2006-2016.
Table 6.2: Explanatory Power of Some Relevant Variables.1 R-Squares from 
Person-Level Regressions.2 By Region, 2006–2016
 Dependent Variable
Region Life Evaluation Positive Affect Negative Affect
Latin America 0.064 0.034 0.031
Anglo-Saxon 0.107 0.064 0.078
Western Europe 0.215 0.094 0.119
All countries in world 0.181 0.072 0.032
1  List of explanatory variables in regressions: Count on help, Donated money, Freedom in your life, Corruption within 
businesses, Corruption within government, and Logarithm of household per capita income.
2 Linear regressions, Ordinary least squares technique.
Source: Gallup World Poll waves 2006 to 2016.
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It is observed in Figure 6.6 that positive affect is 
very high with respect to corresponding income 
levels as well as to the situation as described by 
a group of variables which are often used to 
explain people’s happiness. All Latin American 
countries show, on average, positive affect levels 
which are much above what would be predicted. 
In addition, the regional average in Latin America 
is much above that in the Anglo-Saxon and 
Western European regions and, of course, much 
above the world average (which is 0). Hence, it is 
concluded that a strong tendency to experience 
above-expected positive emotions is observed in 
most Latin American countries. These findings 
clearly indicate that the set of explanatory 
variables which are commonly used in explaining 
happiness is missing some relevant factors which 
are relatively abundant in Latin America. 
Estimated errors for negative affect in Latin 
America do show a pattern which is closer to the 
expected one: Some countries show negative 
mean errors while others show positive mean 
errors, and the regional average is small –but still 
significantly different from zero. Hence, it is 
concluded that a slight tendency to experience 
above-expected negative emotions is observed 
in most Latin American countries.
In addition, the explanatory variables of happiness 
which are commonly used have less explanatory 
power in Latin America. Table 6.2 presents the 
goodness of fit (R-square coefficients) for 
regional regression exercises with life evaluation, 
positive affect, and negative affect as dependent 
variables, and with the following variables  
as explanatory ones: count on help, donated 
Figure 6.6: Positive Affect. Estimated Errors
Notes: Estimated errors from worldwide regression analyses. Positive affect as dependent variable. Independent 
variables in Model 1: logarithm of household per capita income, count on the help, donated money, freedom in your 
life, corruption within businesses, and corruption in Government. Independent variables in Model 2: logarithm of 
household per capita income. Positive affect is measured in a 0 to 1 scale.
Source: Gallup World Poll, all waves 2006 to 2016.
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money, freedom in your life, corruption within 
businesses, corruption within government, and 
logarithm of household per capita income. All 
observations from the Gallup World Poll surveys 
from 2006 to 2016 are used and regressions are 
run by region. It is observed in Table 6.2 that  
the group of independent variables has good 
explanatory power in Western Europe, but very 
little explanatory power in Latin America. For 
example, while this group of independent  
variables explains about 22 percent of the 
variability of Western European’s life evaluation 
they do only explain about 6 percent of the 
variability of Latin Americans’ life evaluation. 
Similarly, while the group of variables explains  
9 percent of the variability of Western European’s 
positive affect  – and 12 percent of their negative 
affect –, they do only explain 3 percent of the 
variability of Latin American’s positive affect –
and 3 percent of their negative affect.
It is evident that Latin Americans are outliers  
in what respect to their experience of positive 
affect. Latin Americans’ positive affect is high in 
comparison to most countries in the world and 
also high with respect to what some commonly 
Figure 6.7: Negative Affect. Estimated Errors
Notes: Estimated errors from worldwide regression analyses. Negative affect as dependent variable. Independent 
variables in Model 1: logarithm of household per capita income, count on the help, donated money, freedom in your 
life, corruption within businesses, and corruption in Government. Independent variables in Model 2: logarithm of 
household per capita income. Negative affect is measured in a 0 to 1 scale.
Source: Gallup World Poll, all waves 2006 to 2016.
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used explanatory variables would predict. A 
slightly similar result is found for negative affect. 
Hence, the explanation of happiness on the basis 
of variables such as Income, count on help, 
donated money, freedom in your life, corruption 
within businesses, and corruption within govern-
ment, seems to be missing some very important 
drivers, at least for the Latin American case. 
Furthermore, the correlation between evaluative 
and affective states is smaller in Latin America 
than in other regions in the world. Figure 6.8 
shows the simple country means by region for 
the intra-country correlations22 between affects 
(positive and negative) and life evaluation. It is 
observed that the regional mean for the intra- 
country correlations between positive affect and 
life evaluation is much smaller in Latin America 
(0.19) than in a group of Anglo-Saxon countries23 
(0.32) as well as than in a group of western 
European countries (0.28). In a similar way, the 
regional mean for the intra-country correlations 
between negative affect and life evaluation is 
much smaller – in absolute terms – in Latin  
America (-0.19) than in a group of Anglo-Saxon 
countries (-.34) as well as than in a group of 
western European countries (-.28).24
It is also important to state that the regional 
mean values for intra-country correlations 
between positive and negative affect are very 
similar across the regions under study. The 
regional mean values are -0.37 in Latin America, 
-0.37 in Western Europe, and -0.42 in Anglo- 
Saxon countries. In other words, the pattern of 
personal correlations between positive and 
negative affects does not seem to vary  
substantially across regions in the world.  
However, the pattern of personal correlations 
between positive affect and life evaluation as 
well as between negative affect and life  
evaluation does substantially differ across 
regions.
Figure 6.8: Life Evaluations and Affective States. Intra-Country Correlations, 
Means by Region
Note: Simple means of intra-country correlations between positive affect (Pos Aff), negative affect (Neg Aff), and life 
evaluation (LE). Simple means by region.
Source: Gallup World Poll wave 2006 to 2016.
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Affective experiences are an important substrate 
in overall assessments of life, and they play a 
central role in people’s aspirations and behavior. 
The outstandingly high positive affect levels in 
Latin America, their lack of correspondence to 
life-evaluation measures, and the relatively low 
correlation between life evaluation and affective 
states call for further study of the affective 
situation in the region. Furthermore, it is clear 
that the set of commonly used explanatory 
variables for life evaluation provide an incomplete 
explanation for both evaluative and emotional 
happiness in Latin America. An expanded study 
of affective regimes, emotional communities, and 
emotional regimes25 could contribute to a better 
understanding of how the relevance of affective 
states in a region is associated to its cultural 
attributes. The results from this study could help 
to understand the emergence of communities 
and societies that value, promote, and have 
particular attitudes to the experience of positive 
affect.26 In addition, it is also important to further 
study the drivers of affective states because the 
nature and dynamics of these drivers could 
explain the behavior of affect in a society.27 For 
example, the abundance of close and intimate 
interpersonal relations could be a driver for  
the experience of high positive affect but also, 
when relations are not going well, of high  
negative affect. 
Some scholars have pointed to the apparent 
contradiction that emerges when contrasting the 
socio-economic situation in many Latin American 
countries with the high happiness levels reported 
by Latin Americans. The following two sections 
address this issue and show that there is no 
contradiction. The next section shows that the 
socio-economic and political problems in the 
region do depress people’s happiness; however, 
these problems do not suffice to generate low 
happiness in the region because Latin America’s 
Figure 6.9: Corruption, Victimization and Economic Difficulties in Latin America
Notes: Corruption: percentage of people in the country stating that almost everyone or most officials in the municipal 
government are corrupt. Economic difficulties: percentage stating that income is not sufficient so that they have 
either problems or big problems to cover their needs. Victimization: percentage of people reporting that they have 
been victims of crime during the past 12 months.
Source: Information processed on the basis of Latinobarometer 2013.Source: Gallup World Poll wave 2006 to 2016.
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social organization promotes and nurtures some 
drivers of happiness which are not fully captured 
by commonly-used explanatory variables. The 
following section elaborates an explanation of 
Latin Americans’ happiness in terms of the 
importance human relations have in the region, 
not only as a source of material support but, 
fundamentally, as a source of positive affect and 
of non-materialistic purpose in life. In particular, 
the abundance and the quality of family relations 
play a crucial role in understanding happiness in 
Latin America.
Social, Economic and Political  
Problems in Latin America and  
Their Impact on Happiness
Latin America is no paradise; there are many 
social and economic problems in the region. 
Some of the problems are structural and emerge 
from historical processes, such as: weak political 
institutions, high corruption levels, and high 
income inequality that magnifies poverty rates in 
what would mostly be considered as mid-income 
countries. Other problems have been triggered 
by recent processes; for example: the closeness 
to the largest drug market in the world combined 
with a wrong strategy that looks to represses 
production rather than to reduce consumption 
has exacerbated drug-related violence and has 
led to alarming crime rates in some areas of Latin 
America. This process of rising violence is also 
fostered by weak civic interpersonal relations, 
high corruption rates, and greater penetration  
of materialistic values during the last decades. 
Figure 6.9 shows some figures on corruption, 
victimization and economic difficulties which 
suffice to portray the situation of social problems 
in the region. The belief that there is some level 
of corruption at the local and national govern-
mental levels is widespread in Latin America. 
Country level figures for municipal-level  
corruption go as high as 82 percent in Mexico; 
with relatively low figures -beneath 40 percent- 
in Chile and Uruguay.28
Living within some degree of economic difficulty 
is also common in most countries of Latin  
America. For example, about 36 percent of 
Brazilians and 53 percent of Mexicans declare 






Almost everyone is corrupt -0.106 0.000
Most officials are corrupt -0.093 0.000
Not many officials are involved -0.050 0.045
There is hardly anyone involved Reference
Economic  
difficulties. 
Problems or  
big problems to 
cover their needs
It is not sufficient, has big problems -0.409 0.000
It is not sufficient, has problems -0.242 0.000
It is just sufficient, does not have major problems -0.036 0.066
It is sufficient, can save Reference
Victimization  
during the past  
12 months





Note. Control variables: marital state, gender, age, age squared, education level, language, country dummies.
Source: Latinobarometer 2013.
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that their earnings are insufficient to cover  
their needs. This figure reaches levels above  
60 percent in Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua 
and Dominican Republic, and it is not beneath  
30 percent in any country in the region.
Many people report being victims of crime 
during the past year; for example, this figure 
reaches levels of 20 percent in Mexico and it is 
above 15 percent in Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela 
and Brazil. The fear of victimization is high in 
some areas of Latin America, where people have 
directly been a victim of crime or know of a 
relative who has been.
Latin Americans are not immune to the many 
social and economic problems they do live with. 
Table 6.3 shows the results from an econometric 
exercise that studies the impact of corruption, 
violence and economic difficulties on life  
satisfaction. It is clear that life satisfaction 
declines with the presence of perceptions of 
corruption, with economic difficulties, and with 
exposure to crime.29
The existence of social problems and of economic 
difficulties does reduce happiness in Latin America, 
but it does not necessarily imply low happiness. 
How can Latin Americans experience high 
happiness levels within this context? There are 
many positive factors in the region, in particular 
the nature and abundance of close and warm 
interpersonal relations. This specific structure of 
Latin Americans’ interpersonal relations allows 
them to enjoy high levels of satisfaction in 
domains of life that are particularly important to 
Latin Americans: the social domain and, in 
especial, the family domain of life. 
The Importance of the Relational 
Realm in Latin America
Latin Americans spend much time and resources 
in the nurturing of interpersonal relations.30 Some 
Latin American social thinkers have made a 
distinction between the realm of relations and the 
realm of the material world; their research shows 
Figure 6.10: Percentage of People Who Report Living with Parents.  
Adult People in the World Value Survey
95% confidence interval
Source: World Value Survey, all waves.
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that Latin Americans give greater importance to 
the relational realm and, in consequence, to the 
creation and sustain of interpersonal relations.31 
The family – both the nuclear one and the extended 
one – is a central institution in Latin American 
culture and it is also an important source of 
positive affect and of purpose in life. 
This section shows that the nature of Latin 
American interpersonal relations substantially 
differ from those in other regions of the world 
–in particular from those in Western European 
and Anglo-Saxon countries. Latin Americans 
place great interest in nurturing their  
interpersonal relations, and this implies for the 
abundance of warm and close relationships  
that positively impact family satisfaction as well 
as overall happiness –both from an evaluative 
and from an affective perspective. Family  
satisfaction is very high in Latin America, and 
close and warm relations do also extend to 
friends, neighbors, and colleagues.
Living in the Family
Most people grow up in families. But in some 
cultures it is expected for them to leave their 
family as soon as they reach adulthood, while in 
Latin American people tend to live longer with 
their parents and do not necessarily leave their 
family when they become adults. By living longer 
in the family people extend their companionship 
with those they grew up with, and with whom a 
close, disinterested, and long-lasting relationship 
already exists. It is also common to find elder 
parents living in their adult-children households.
Information from the World Value Surveys (all 
waves) shows that adult people in Latin American 
tend to live with their parents in a larger  
proportion than those from Western European 
countries and from Anglo-Saxon countries (See 
Figure 6.10). The simple country average for 
those Latin American countries in the survey is 
33 percent, which shows that one third of people 
Figure 6.11: Under School Age Kids: Provider of Childcare. Percentage Who Say 
Family Members 
Note: Other response options are: government agencies, non-profit organizations, private childcare providers,  
and employers. 
Source: International Social Survey Program’s module on Family and Changing Gender Roles IV (2012)
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Figure 6.12: Provider of Domestic Help to Elderly People. Percentage Who Say  
it is for Family Members to Take Care of Domestic Help for Elderly People
Note: Other response options are: government agencies, non-profit organizations, private childcare providers,  
and employers. 
Source: International Social Survey Program’s module on Family and Changing Gender Roles IV (2012)
Figure 6.13: Taking Care of Family Before Helping Others. Country Means 
Note: You should take care of yourself and your family first, before helping other people. Response scale: 5 Agree 
strongly, 4 agree, 3 neither agree nor disagree, 2 disagree, 1 disagree strongly.
Source: International Social Survey Program, Social Networks II, 2001.
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who were surveyed reported living with their 
parents. This figure is only 12 percent for those 
western European countries and only 9 percent 
for those Anglo-Saxon countries included in 
Figure 6.10.
The extension of children’s stay at home as well 
as the incorporation of the elders in their grown-
up children’s households implies an abundance 
of close and normally supportive interpersonal 
relationships. When these relationships are 
gratifying they do contribute to both high live 
evaluation and the enjoyment of high positive 
affect; however, in those cases where the  
intimate relationships become unsatisfactory 
they may detonate the experience of strong 
negative affect.32
Taking Care of Children and Elderly  
in the Family
Family members do also play a central role in 
child rearing in Latin America, and many elder 
persons do live with their adult children and their 
grandchildren and/or do keep in close contact 
with them. 
The International Social Survey Program’s  
module on Family and Changing Gender Roles IV 
(2012) asked the following two questions to 
people from many countries: First, ‘People have 
different views on childcare for children under 
school age. Who do you think should primarily 
provide childcare?’, second, ‘Thinking about 
elderly people who need some help in their 
everyday lives, such as help with grocery  
shopping, cleaning the house, doing the laundry 
etc. Who do you think should primarily provide 
this help?’. The information from the survey 
shows that Latin Americans strongly believe that 
the family must play a central role in raising kids 
as well as in taking care of the elder. The simple 
Figure 6.14: One of Main Goals: Make My Parents Proud. Country Means
Note: Making parents proud as one of the main goals in life. Response scale: Strongly agree (4), Agree (3), Disagree 
(2), Strongly disagree (1)
Source: World Value Survey, all waves.
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country average for people responding that the 
family should take care of under-school age kids 
is 76 percent in the Latin American countries in 
the survey. The same figure is only 33 percent  
for Western European countries and 46 percent 
for Anglo-Saxon countries in the survey (See  
Figure 6.11).
Similarly, a larger proportion of Latin Americans 
do also believe that elderly people should be 
supported by their family members rather than 
by governmental and private institutions. The 
simple country average for those Latin American 
countries in the survey is 77 percent, while this 
figure is 36 percent in the Western European 
countries and 52 percent in the Anglo Saxon 
countries in Figure 6.12.
A larger proportion of under-school-age  
children in Latin America grow up within a  
family environment and enjoying the close 
interaction with people who love them and  
who are intrinsically motivated to take care of 
them. Elder people do also frequently enjoy the 
company of loved ones. Research has shown that 
there are positive emotional benefits of growing 
in family environments where parents are present 
in the raising of their kids.33
Preference for Taking Care of Family
The ISSP Social Networks II survey (2001) asked 
people about their degree of agreement with the 
following statement: “You should take care of 
yourself and your family first, before helping 
other people”. There were only two Latin American 
countries in this survey, but the data shows that 
people in Brazil – Latin America’s largest country 
– tend to strongly agree with this statement, 
while in Chile people do agree with the statement 
(Figure 6.13).
Figure 6.15: Watching Children Grow is Greatest Joy. Country Means 
Note: Watching children grow up is greatest joy. Response scale: 5 Strongly agree, 4 Agree, 3 Neither agree nor 
disagree, 2 Disagree, 1 Strongly disagree. 
Source: International Social Survey Program’s module on Family and Changing Gender Roles IV (2012)
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This information does not only show the concern 
people have for the well-being of family members 
in Latin America, but it also shows a relative 
disregard for the well-being of people who  
are neither relatives or friends. Hence, family 
relations are relatively strong, but civic relations 
are relatively weak in Latin America; and this 
takes place in countries with weak institutional 
arrangements.
Life Evaluation Incorporates Family  
Considerations
People’s evaluation of life, as well as their  
affective experiences, depends on the attainment 
of those goals that they consider important. 
Goals and values play a central role in the  
relationship between drivers of happiness and 
happiness itself. The importance of the realm  
of relations in Latin Americans’ way of life does 
also show up in the greater relevance of some 
relational goals, such as making parents proud 
and watching children grow up.34
The World Value Survey asks people on the 
degree of agreement with the following state-
ment: “One of my main goals in life has been to 
make my parents proud”. Figure 6.14 presents 
the simple averages for the degree of agreement 
with this statement in many Latin American 
countries as well as in some West European and 
Anglo-Saxon countries. It is observed that there 
is a huge difference in the degree of agreement 
with this statement between Latin Americans 
and people from the other two regions under 
consideration; as a matter of fact the simple 
country average in Latin America is 3.40, while 
this figure is 2.74 for the Western European 
countries and 2.87 for the Anglo-Saxon countries 
under consideration. 
The International Social Survey Programme’s 
Family and Changing Gender Roles IV module 
does also have a question on the relevance of 
watching children grow up. To be specific, the 
question asks for the degree of agreement with 
the following statement: “To what extent do you 
Figure 6.16: Uncles and Aunts. Visited More than Twice in the Last Four Weeks
Note: Percentage of people who visited at least one uncle or aunt ‘more than twice in the last four weeks’
Source: International Social Survey Programme’s block on Social Networks II (2001)
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Figure 6.17: Cousins. Visited More than Twice in the Last Four Weeks 
Note: Percentage of people who visited at least one cousin ‘more than twice in the last four weeks’
Source: International Social Survey Programme’s block on Social Networks II (2001)
Figure 6.18: Nieces and Nephews. Visited More than Twice in the Last Four Weeks 
Note Percentage of people who visited at least one niece or nephew ‘more than twice in the last four weeks’
Source: International Social Survey Programme’s block on Social Networks II (2001)
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agree or disagree?: Watching children grow up is 
life’s greatest joy”. The information presented in 
Figure 6.15 shows that the nurturing of children  
is a source of greatest joy in Latin American 
countries. The simple country average for the 
Latin American countries in the sample is 4.48, 
while this figure is 4.29 for the Western European 
countries and 4.18 for the Anglo-Saxon countries 
in the study.
Goals and values do intervene both in the  
evaluation of life as well as in the triggering of 
affective states. The more relational-oriented 
goals of Latin Americans implies for happiness  
to depend closely on the family situation and on 
the quality and quantity of family relations.35
The Presence of Extended Family
It is natural for most people to have an extended 
family: cousins, uncles and aunts, nieces and 
nephews, grandparents, grandchildren, god- 
parents and so on. However, the degree of 
involvement of extended-family members in a 
person’s life may vary across cultures. The 
International Social Survey Programme’s Social 
Networks II (2001) asked people about how 
often they have been in contact with the  
following kind of relatives in the last four weeks: 
Uncles and aunts, Cousins, and Nieces and 
nephews. Only two Latin American countries are 
present in the survey: Brazil and Chile, and it is 
important to note that Chile usually performs 
relatively low within the Latin American ranking 
of these kinds of interpersonal relations. Figures 
6.16 to 6.18 show the percentage of respondents 
who say that they visited their relative ‘More than 
twice in the last four weeks’. It is observed that 
the extended-family is quite involved in the daily 
life of Brazilians. The interaction with the extended 
family in Chile is also much above of that in the 
Western European countries in the survey. 
Hence, the involvement and interaction with 
members of the extended family is quite high  
in Latin America. Research on the relationship 
between quantity and quality of relationships 
with relatives and life satisfaction is scarce –
probably as a consequence of these relationships 
being relatively scarse in those countries where 
Figure 6.19: Visit Closest Friend Daily or at Least Several Times a Week
Note: Percentage responding daily or at least several times a week
Source: International Social Survey Programme’s block on Social Networks II (2001)
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major research is undertaken –; however, some 
findings suggest that this kind of relationship 
may contribute to people’s happiness.36
Close Relationships with Close Friends
The realm of close interpersonal relations in Latin 
America extends beyond the nuclear and extended 
family. Friends are also highly involved in the 
daily life of Latin Americans, and friends are 
expected to play an important role not only in 
bringing emotional and economic support but 
also in sharing daily life.
The International Social Survey Programme’s 
block on Social Networks II (2001) has a couple of 
questions regarding the involvement and support 
which is expected from friends in different coun-
tries of the world. Two Latin American countries 
are included in this survey: Brazil and Chile.
The first question asks how often people see  
or visit their closest friend. Figure 6.19 shows  
the percentage of people who report seeing or 
visiting their closest friend daily or at least 
several times a week. It is observed that this 
percentage is very high in Brazil and it is also 
high in Chile. 
The second question asks people about their 
degree of agreement with the following statement: 
“People who are better off should help friends who 
are less well off”. Figure 6.20 shows that in the two 
Latin American countries in the survey there is 
wide agreement about expecting friends who are 
better off to help those who are less well off.
Data from other sources, such as the BIARE- 
Mexico (National Statistical Office survey on 
self-reported well-being) and the United States’ 
General Social Survey show that people in 
Mexico gather more often and more frequently 
with relatives and with friends than people in the 
United States. For example, 77 percent of people 
in Mexico state that they gather with relatives at 
least several times per month, while this figure is 
of 53 percent in the United States. Regarding 
gathering with friends several times per month, 
the figure is 68 percent in Mexico and 45 percent 
in the United States.
Figure 6.20: People Better Off Should Help Friends
Note: Country averages; people who are better off should help their friends. Response scale: 5 Agree strongly,  
4 agree, 3 neither agree nor disagree, 2 disagree, 1 disagree strongly
Source: International Social Survey Programme’s block on Social Networks II (2001)
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High Family Satisfaction in Latin America and 
its Importance for Happiness
Given the nature of interpersonal relations in 
Latin America and the centrality of the family it 
should come as no surprise that family satisfaction 
is very high in the region. The International Social 
Survey Programme’s module on Family and 
Changing Gender Roles IV (2012) has a question 
on family satisfaction: ‘All things considered, how 
satisfied are you with your family life?’. The 
response scale is categorical and in this chapter 
it is treated as cardinal in a 1 to 7 scale for  
descriptive purposes, where 7 is associated to a 
‘completely satisfied’ response. Figure 6.21 shows 
country means for family satisfaction in Latin 
America, Western Europe and Anglo-Saxon 
countries. The simple country average for the 
four Latin American countries in the survey is 
5.87, which is much higher than the average for 
the Western European countries in the graph 
(5.58) and for the Anglo Saxon countries (5.60) 
High family satisfaction is of the greatest  
relevance in explaining high happiness in Latin 
America, both in terms of evaluation of life as 
well as of enjoyment of positive emotions. 
An Illustration from Mexico
Mexico’s National Statistical Office (INEGI) has 
recently started measuring subjective well-being 
indicators in order to have better assessments of 
people’s situation. A large representative survey 
(about 39,000 observations) implemented in 2014 
provides information about: life satisfaction, 
satisfaction with achievements in life, satisfaction 
with affective life, family satisfaction, standard  
of living satisfaction, health satisfaction, leisure 
satisfaction, occupation satisfaction, and social 
life satisfaction. all variables are measured in a  
0 to 10 scale. Figure 6.22 presents descriptive 
statistics for these variables; it is observed that 
Mexicans report very high levels of family satis-
faction and that their satisfaction with affective 
life is higher than that with achievements in life. 
Figure 6.21: Family Satisfaction
Note: Satisfaction with family, country means. ‘All things considered, how satisfied are you with your family life?’ 
Response scale: Completely satisfied (7), very satisfied (6), fairly satisfied (5), neither satisfied nor dissatisfied (4), 
fairly dissatisfied (3), very dissatisfied (2), completely dissatisfied (1). 
Source: International Social Survey Programme’s module on Family and Changing Gender Roles IV (2012)
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Figure 6.22: Subjective Well-Being Information. Mean Values, Mexico 2014   
Note: Satisfaction measured in a 0 to 10 scale.
Source: BIARE survey 2014, Mexico’s National Statistical Office (INEGI)
Table 6.4: Domains of Life Explanation of Satisfaction with Affective Life and 
with Achievements in Life. Mexico 2014. Ordinary Least Square Regression
Satisfaction with achievements in life Satisfaction with affective life
Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t
Family satisfaction 0.085 0.000 0.428 0.000
Standard of living satisfaction 0.273 0.000 0.192 0.000
Health satisfaction 0.132 0.000 0.052 0.000
Leisure satisfaction 0.098 0.000 0.039 0.000
Occupation satisfaction 0.137 0.000 0.055 0.000
Social life satisfaction 0.085 0.000 0.105 0.000
Intercept 1.520 0.000 1.107 0.000
R_squared 0.359 0.321
Source: BIARE survey 2014, Mexico’s National Statistical Office (INEGI)
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Relatively low levels of satisfaction are seen in 
the standard of living and leisure (free-time) 
domains of life.
Table 6.4 presents the main results from an 
econometric exercise that aims at explaining 
satisfaction with achievements in life and with 
affective life on the basis of satisfaction in 
domains of life.
It is observed that family satisfaction has, by  
far, the largest impact on the satisfaction with 
affective life of Mexicans. Family satisfaction  
is also statistically significant in explaining 
satisfaction with achievements in life; however,  
in this case the standard of living has a much 
larger coefficient. It seems that interpersonal 
relations matter for both affective and evaluative 
aspects of life, but they count more for the 
former than for the latter.37
Conclusions
Latin Americans report high happiness levels. 
Positive-affect scores are substantially high both 
in comparison to other countries in the world 
and to what income levels in the region would 
predict. Latin Americans’ evaluation of life is also 
above what income levels would predict.
Many social and economic indicators portray 
Latin America as a mid to low income-level 
region with high poverty rates, great income 
inequality, high violence and crime rates, and high 
levels of corruption. How can Latin Americans 
 be so happy within a context that may look 
somehow unfavorable? This chapter has shown 
that the happiness of Latin Americans is  
diminished by their many social and economic 
problems and that, in fact, happiness could 
increase if these problems were properly  
addressed. However, it would be a big mistake to 
assume that these problems overwhelm the daily 
lives of Latin Americans. In fact, it would be a 
focusing-illusion bias to assume that Latin 
Americans must be unhappy because there are 
some problems in their life. In fact, the daily life 
of Latin Americans is not constricted to the 
consequences of income poverty, institutional 
corruption, income inequality, crime and  
violence, and other problems. This chapter  
shows that there are many positive factors that 
contribute to the happiness of Latin Americans; 
in particular, the abundance and quality of close, 
warm, and genuine interpersonal relations. 
The specific structure of Latin Americans’  
interpersonal relations allows them to enjoy high 
levels of satisfaction in domains of life that are 
particularly important to Latin Americans: the 
social domain and, in especial, the family domain 
of life. It explains the outstandingly high positive 
affect in the region as well as the above-expected 
evaluative states.
The Latin American case shows that the  
abundance and nature of interpersonal relations 
is an important driver of happiness which  
deserves further attention, as was emphasized  
in Chapter 2 of World Happiness Report 2017. 
Happiness research that focuses on evaluative 
measures may risk underestimating the impor-
tance that close, warm and genuine interpersonal 
relations have in people’s happiness because 
their impact is larger on affective than on  
evaluative states. Happiness in relational- 
oriented societies may be better portrayed by 
overall assessments of life that incorporate 
information from both the evaluative and the 
affective substrates.
There are many lessons from the Latin American 
case to the development discourse. 
First, it shows the need of going beyond  
objective measures when aiming to assess 
people’s situation. Subjective well-being  
measures provide better assessments of the 
experience of being well people have and  
contribute to a better understanding of their 
actions. Subjective well-being measures better 
incorporate the values people have and which 
are relevant in assessing their lives; because 
values differ across cultures this subjectivity 
constitutes an advantage when making 
cross-cultural assessments of people’s  
well-being.
Second, the Latin American case does not ignore 
the importance of income, but it clearly shows 
that there is more to life than income. The 
development discourse should neither confuse 
persons with consumers nor well-being with 
purchasing power.
Third, the Latin American case shows that 
genuine, warm, and person-based interpersonal 
relations substantially contribute to happiness. 
The development discourse has neglected these 
relations in favor of instrumental ones, which 
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may have a larger impact on economic growth 
but not on people’s happiness. By objectifying 
other people, instrumental relations are not as 
gratifying as genuine ones. 
Fourth, it is not only acceptable for but also 
expected from public policy to focus on solving 
social problems; however, such policies will not 
succeed in raising happiness if they neglect the 
positive aspects of social life, and if they follow a 
partial rather than integral view. In fact, policies 
should not focus only on eradicating problems 
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(1971), de Imaz (1984). It is important to remark that the 
blending of values and worldviews does not necessarily 
imply the complete integration of Europeans and indigenous 
groups; many studies show that even today there is some 
discrimination on the basis of the skin color (Ortiz et al., 
2018)
10 Noguera and Pineda (2011), Ángel Maya (1995, 2002, 2006)
11 Acosta (2008), Gudynas and Acosta (2011)
12  Esteinou (2004), Arizpe (1973), Gonzalbo (1996, 1998), 
Gonzalbo and Rabell (1996)
13  Díaz-Guerrero (1979), Germany (1965), Díaz-Loving et al. 
(2008). 
14  Rojas & García-Vega (2017), Yamamoto (2016), Beytía (fc), 
Velásquez (2016), Martínez Cruz & Castillo Flores (2016), 
Mochón Morcillo & de Juan Díaz (2016), Ateca-Amestoy et 
al. (2014).
15  The specific countries which are included in the Western 
European and Anglo-Saxon lists may vary across analyses 
due to the availability of information. However, in general 
the Western European classification makes reference to the 
following countries: United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Greece, 
Denmark, Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg, 
Switzerland, Norway, Portugal, and Ireland. The Anglo- 
Saxon classification makes reference to the following 
countries: United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
16  Life evaluation is measured on the following question from 
the Gallup Polls: “Please imagine a ladder with steps 
numbered from zero at the bottom to ten at the top. 
Suppose we say that the top of the ladder represents the 
best possible life for you, and the bottom of the ladder 
represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of 
the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at 
this time, assuming that the higher the step the better you 
feel about your life, and the lower the step the worse you 
feel about it? Which step comes closest to the way you 
feel?” The response to the question is based on an 
imaginary 11-point scale whereby 0 designates one’s  
worst possible life and 10 denotes the best possible life 
respondents can imagine for themselves. 
17  Figures are computed using information from the Gallup 
World Poll waves 2006 to 2016. The survey includes 166 
countries and regions.
18  If you were in trouble, do you have relatives or friends you 
can count on to help you whenever you need them, or not? 
(1=yes, 0=no). Donated money to a charity (1=yes, 0=no). 
Whether the respondent is satisfied with the freedom to 
choose what do to with his or her life in this country (1=yes, 
0=no). Whether the respondent thinks there is corruption 
in businesses (1=yes, 0=no). Whether the respondent thinks 
there is corruption in government (1=yes, 0=no).
19  The five dichotomous variables are: Smile or laugh 
yesterday, learn something, treated with respect,  
experienced enjoyment, and feel well-rested. The questions 
in the survey ask whether this affect was experienced the 
day before.
20  Negative affect is assessed as the simple average of the 
following dichotomous variables in the Gallup World Poll: 
Experience worry, Sadness, Anger, Stress, and Depression. 
The Gallup survey asks whether the person experienced the 
emotion the day before, with a Yes or No answer. 
21  The regression exercises use an ordinary least square 
technique, which means that the independent variable is 
treated as a cardinal one.
22  By intra-country correlations we mean the correlations 
between affect and life evaluation based on differences 
across persons living in the same country.
23 Canada, United States, Australia and New Zealand.
24  It is also possible to estimate regional correlations based on 
country mean values of life evaluation, and positive and 
negative affect. It is found that these correlations do also 
differ across regions. For example, the correlation between 
country means of positive affect and life evaluation is 0.87 
in the Western European region and only 0.29 in the Latin 
American region. Similarly, the correlation between 
negative affect and life evaluation is -0.90 in the western 
European region and only -.36 in the Latin American region. 
This finding basically indicates that by knowing a Western 
European country’s life evaluation mean it is possible to 
predict with high confidence this country’s positive and 
negative-affect means; however, this would not be possible 
for Latin American countries, where a relatively high life 
evaluation is not necessarily associated to a relatively high 
positive affect or a relatively low negative affect in a 
country. 
25 Sterns and Sterns, 1985; Rosenweim, 2002; Reddy, 2001.
26  Holler, 2014; Villa-Flores and Lipsett-Rivera, 2014; Rivera, 
2000. It may also be interesting to note that a study of 
human language found that Latin American languages 
show the greatest positivity in comparison to other 
languages in the study. The authors state that “Mexican 
Spanish and Brazilian Portuguese exhibit relatively high 
medians” (Dodds et al., 2015; p. 2390) in perceived average 
word happiness for 10 languages under study.
27 Rojas, 2013; Rojas and Guardiola, 2017.
28  Some international data shows that corruption in Latin 
America is comparatively high. Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) goes from 0 (highest 
level of perceived corruption) to 100 (lowest level of 
perceived corruption). The mean value of the CPI for Latin 
American countries is 37.9, which is slightly lower than the 
mean value for the world (42.9) and much lower than the 
value for Western European countries (74.8) and for the 
Anglo-Saxon countries (81.2). This means that Latin 
America’s perceived corruption level is higher than the 
world average and much higher than those levels in 
Western Europe and the Anglo-Saxon countries, according 
to data from 2016 of Transparency International. Uruguay, 
Chile and Costa Rica present the lowest levels of perceived 
corruption in Latin America, while Guatemala, Nicaragua 
and Venezuela present the highest levels. 
29  Country-level studies suggest that negative events such as 
corruption and victimization trigger negative affect and 
reduce life evaluation (Leyva et al., 2016)
30  In some towns of Mexico people do also spend a lot of time 
and resources nourishing their relationship with the dead 
ones. The night before The Day of the Death (November 
2nd) the living ones gather in the cemeteries with their 
dead relatives in order to celebrate and eat together. 
Relatives are always present, even after they have died.
31 Díaz Guerrero (1997)
32  See Leyva et al., 2016. It may be stated that in terms of the 
experience of affective states close, warm, and disinterest-
ed interpersonal relations provide greater mean returns but 
also greater risk.
33  For the importance of parent-child relationships see Noble 
and McGrath (2012) and O’Brien and Mosco (2012) For a 
review of many studies on the emotional benefits of family 
relationships see Kasser (2002) For an in-depth study of 
the importance of parent-child relationships for life 
satisfaction over the life course see Layard et al. (2013) and 
Clark et al. (2018)
34 Germani (1965); Díaz-Guerrero (1979); Yamamoto (2016)
35  Domains-of-life studies in Latin America show that the 
family domain is crucial in explaining life satisfaction as well 
as its evaluative and affective substrates (Rojas, 2006, 
2012c)
36  On the basis of information from the United Kingdom 
Powdthavee (2008) finds that frequency of contact with 
relatives –as well as with friends- does make a significant 
impact on people’s happiness. Powdthavee concludes that 
“the estimated figure is even larger than that of getting 
married . . . It can compensate for nearly two-third in the 
loss of the happiness from going through a separation or 
unemployment”. Nguyen at al. (2016) also find that the 
frequency of contact with family members has a positive 
impact on life satisfaction, happiness and self-esteem; 
however, the delimitation of family members is not clear in 
the study. There is also some research finding out that 
inter-generational family relations are very relevant for the 
well-being of elder people (Katz, 2009) Of course, there is 
also an ample literature on relational goods which empha-
sizes the importance of interpersonal relations without 
providing an in-depth study of specific kinds of family 
relations (Gui, 2005; Gui and Stanca, 2010; Becchetti et al., 
2008) Relatedness is also considered a basic psychological 
need by Deci and Ryan (1985), while Grinde (2009) 
elaborates an evolutionary argument about the importance 
of community relations for people’s well-being.
37  Life satisfaction is highly correlated with both satisfaction 
with affective life (0.42) and satisfaction with achievements 
in life (0.46). 
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The most striking fact about happiness in 
America is the Easterlin Paradox: income per 
capita has more than doubled since 1972 while 
happiness (or subjective well-being, SWB) has 
remained roughly unchanged or has even  
declined (Figure 7.1). Many explanations for the 
Easterlin Paradox have been put forward, the 
most prominent being the decline of America’s 
social capital. I wrote approvingly of that  
explanation in my short essay “Restoring America’s 
Happiness” in the World Happiness Report 2017. 
In this article, I explore a complementary  
explanation: that America’s subjective well-being 
is being systematically undermined by three 
interrelated epidemic diseases, notably obesity, 
substance abuse (especially opioid addiction), 
and depression.
When Richard Easterlin first presented his 
famous paradox, he hypothesized that  
subjective well-being is affected mainly by 
relative income (one’s relative position in the 
social pecking order) rather than by absolute 
income. If that is true, an overall rise in national 
income per person that leaves the distribution of 
income broadly unchanged will have little effect 
on well-being. Yet the view that only relative but 
not absolute income matters is hard to defend in 
the face of evidence that many countries are 
experiencing gains in well-being alongside their 
economic growth, including high-income  
countries. The evidence broadly suggests that 
absolute income, not just relative income,  
matters for subjective well-being, albeit with  
a clearly declining marginal utility of income  
(the Cantril ladder score of SWB is roughly linear 
in the logarithm of per capita income). 
The most likely explanation for the Easterlin 
Paradox, therefore, is that certain non-income 
determinants of U.S. happiness are worsening 
alongside the rise in U.S. per capita income, 
thereby offsetting the gains in SWB that would 
normally arise with economic growth. John 
Helliwell has identified five major variables other 
than per capita income that help to account for 
cross-country happiness: population health 
(measured by health-adjusted life expectancy, 
HALE); the strength of social support networks; 
personal freedom (measured by the perceived 
freedom of individuals to make key life decisions); 
social trust (measured by the public’s perception 
of corruption in government and business); and 
generosity. To understand the Easterlin Paradox, 
we should look to the trends in these non-market 
causes of SWB.
Indeed, while America’s income per capita has 
increased markedly during the past half century, 
several of the determinants of well-being have 
been in decline. Social support networks in the 
Figure 7.1: Average Happiness and GDP Per Capita, 1972–2016
–––––––  Happiness
–––––––  GDP Per Capita
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U.S. have weakened over time; perceptions of 
corruption in government and business have risen 
over time; and confidence in public institutions 
has waned. Since these various dimensions of 
social capital have all been shown to be important 
determinants of subjective well-being, it seems 
likely that gains in U.S. well-being that would 
have resulted from rising incomes have been 
offset by declines in social capital, as I have 
previously emphasized. 
In addition to the loss of social capital, there is 
another possible culprit that has been less widely 
discussed in the context of the Easterlin Paradox. 
America’s public health, as measured for example 
by HALE, has improved much less than in most 
other high-income countries, and in recent  
years, is experiencing an outright decline. The 
U.S. life expectancy actually fell by 0.1 years  
from 2014 to 2015, and then by another 0.1 years 
from 2015 to 2016. 
Table 7.1 shows the Health-Adjusted Life Expectancy 
for the OECD countries for the years 2000 and 
2015. The U.S. fell from 26th in the OECD ranking 
in 2000 to 28th in 2015 and experienced the 
second smallest overall increase in HALE between 
2000 and 2015, just 1.9 years, whereas more than 
half of the OECD countries enjoyed an increase 
of more than 3 years. In 2015, America’s healthy 
life years were 4.3 years lower than the average of 
the top five countries (Japan, Korea, Switzerland, 
Italy, and Israel). We now know that the gap 
likely widened further in 2016 in view of the 
absolute decline in U.S. life expectancy. 
The U.S. is suffering from three serious epidemics: 
obesity, substance abuse, and depression. Each of 
these constitutes a significant burden of disease, 
and each is likely to be causing a significant 
decrement to U.S. subjective well-being. Each 
could be ameliorated through public policies that 
would contribute measurably to U.S. well-being. 
The Obesity Epidemic 
Obesity is now a global epidemic, and America’s 
obesity epidemic is extreme in comparison with 
other countries. As shown in Figure 7.2, America’s 
rate of adult obesity is by far the highest of the 
OECD countries, standing at an estimated 38.2 
percent in 2015. Of the next six countries, second- 
ranked Mexico (32 percent) is next door to the 
U.S., and four of the six are English-speaking 
countries with close business and advertising 
linkages with the U.S., including Canada, UK, 
Australia, and New Zealand.
America’s obesity epidemic rose gradually in the 
1960s and 1970s, and then soared in the 1980s 
onward, as shown in Figure 7.3. There is a vast 
literature trying to account for the epidemic.  
Table 7.1: Health-Adjusted Life 
Expectancy (HALE), 2000 and 
2015, OECD Countries
Country 2000 2015 Change
Japan 72.7 74.9 2.2
Iceland 70.3 72.7 2.4
Italy 70.0 72.8 2.8
Switzerland 69.9 73.1 3.2
Canada 69.8 72.3 2.5
Israel 69.7 72.8 3.1
France 69.7 72.6 2.9
Sweden 69.7 72.0 2.3
Greece 69.5 71.9 2.4
Norway 69.3 72.0 2.7
Australia 69.3 71.9 2.6
Spain 69.2 72.4 3.2
Netherlands 69.2 72.2 3.0
New Zealand 69.1 71.6 2.5
Austria 69.0 72.0 3.0
Germany 68.7 71.3 2.6
United Kingdom 68.6 71.4 2.8
Luxembourg 68.5 71.8 3.3
South Korea 68.1 73.2 5.1
Belgium 68.0 71.1 3.1
Denmark 67.9 71.2 3.3
Finland 67.9 71.0 3.1
Chile 67.7 70.5 2.8
Portugal 67.6 71.4 3.8
Ireland 67.4 71.5 4.1
United States 67.2 69.1 1.9
Slovenia 66.8 71.1 4.3
Czechia 65.8 69.4 3.6
Mexico 65.6 67.4 1.8
Poland 65.3 68.7 3.4
Slovakia 64.9 68.1 3.2
Hungary 63.7 67.4 3.7
Estonia 63.1 69.0 5.9
Latvia 63.0 67.1 4.1
Turkey 61.6 66.2 4.6
Source: World Health Organization
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The evidence points strongly to the change in 
the American diet after mid-century, with a 
massive shift toward sugar additives, processed 
foods, and snack foods. The intake of energy 
from snack foods soared between 1977 and 2012, 
according to recent data. Diets with high sugar 
intake and high glycemic loads are obesogenic 
(tending to cause obesity) and also raise the risk 
of metabolic diseases such as adult-onset 
diabetes. Cross-national data show that average 
per capita sugar consumption by country is 
correlated with national obesity prevalence.
Dietary sugar (sucrose, a disaccharide of glucose 
and fructose) was added both for taste and for 
increased shelf-life (such as for baked goods). 
The industrial process to produce High-Fructose 
Corn Syrup (HFCS, also roughly half glucose and 
half fructose) was improved in the 1960s, and the 
FDA approved HFCS as “generally recognized  
as safe” (GRAS) in 1976. Thereafter the use of 
HFCS as a low-cost sweetener soared, as did 
overall sugar consumption, until peaking around 
2000 and declining somewhat thereafter. Coffee 
consumption also gave way to sugary soda 
consumption (Figure 7.4). 
The results have been disastrous for obesity  
and closely related metabolic diseases such as 
adult-onset (type-II) diabetes. As explained by 
Lustig and colleagues, fructose metabolism l 
eads directly to fatty deposits in the liver (de  
novo lipogenesis), which in turn causes insulin 
resistance and other metabolic disorders. Highly 
processed foods are characterized by a high 
glycemic load, meaning that they lead to a spike 
in blood glucose that in turn provokes a spike in 
insulin. This, in turn, may lead to insulin resistance 
Figure 7.2: Obesity Among Adults, 2015 or Nearest Year 
Source: OECD Health Statistics
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Figure 7.3: Rate of Adult Obesity in the United States, Various Periods, 1960–2015 
Source: OECD Health Statistics
Figure 7.4: Coffee Availability in the United States Peaked in 1946
Source: USDA ERS 
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as well, and metabolic disease. Thus, both high 
sugar intake and highly processed foods are 
culprits of the obesity epidemic and the accom-
panying epidemic of metabolic disorders.
According to a recent estimate by Euromonitor 
International, the U.S. tops the world in the 
amount of sugar in purchases of packaged foods 
and beverages, with an average of 126 grams per 
person per day compared with a global average 
at 34 grams per person per day. Of the 126 
grams, a remarkable 50 grams comes from soft 
drinks alone. Some causes of America’s very high 
sugar consumption include: (1) the relatively low 
cost per calorie of sugar additives and high 
glycemic-load foods compared with foods with 
lower glycemic loads such as fruits and vegeta-
bles; (2) the U.S. federal government’s relentless 
promotion of corn production from the 1970s 
onward, which in turn lowered the cost of 
high-fructose corn syrup as a major food additive; 
(3) unregulated advertising by the U.S. fast-food 
industry to promote prepared, frozen, and 
take-out foods with higher sugar content; and 
(4) the addictive properties of sugar, leading to 
habituation and chronic over-consumption.
Many studies show that obese individuals have 
significantly poorer health and lower subjective 
well-being. The lower SWB may result both from 
the direct health consequences of obesity as well 
as the social stigma associated with obesity. The 
adverse health consequences are extensive. The 
U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) lists the 
following adverse disease burdens: all-causes of 
death (mortality); high blood pressure (hyperten-
sion); high LDL cholesterol, low HDL cholesterol, 
or high levels of triglycerides (dyslipidemia);  
type II diabetes; coronary heart disease; stroke; 
gallbladder disease; osteoarthritis (a breakdown 
of cartilage and bone within a joint); sleep  
apnea and breathing problems; some cancers 
(endometrial, breast, colon, kidney, gallbladder, 
and liver); low quality of life; mental illness such 
as clinical depression, anxiety, and other mental 
disorders; and body pain and difficulty with 
physical functioning. 
According to obesity expert Dr. Robert Lustig, 
excessive sugar consumption has direct adverse 
effects on mental well-being by disrupting the 
dopamine-EOP “reward” pathway, causing an 
addictive craving for sugar with the classic hall-
marks of addiction (including tolerance, withdrawal, 
craving, and continued use despite negative 
consequences). Sugar addiction also disrupts the 
serotonin pathway that is responsible for the 
psychological sense of contentment. In essence, 
according to Lustig, sugar is a toxic and addictive 
substance that has been dangerously foisted on 
an unsuspecting and poorly informed public by 
the U.S. government and the fast-food industry.
Studies have found that obesity is a significant 
predictive factor for subsequent depression, while 
depression is a predictive factor for subsequent 
obesity. A meta-analysis of longitudinal studies of 
depression and obesity in the U.S. and Europe 
reached the following conclusion: “Obesity was 
found to increase the risk of depression, most 
pronounced among Americans and for clinically 
diagnosed depression. In addition, depression 
was found to be predictive of developing obesi-
ty.” Lustig describes how interactions between the 
dopamine (“reward”) pathways and the serotonin 
(“happiness” or “mood”) pathways may account 
for this bi-directional linkage between obesity 
and depression.
The Opioid Epidemic
In December 2017, the U.S. Centers for Disease 
Control announced that U.S. life expectancy had 
declined for the second straight year, declining 
0.1 years between 2015 to 2016 following a 
decline of the same magnitude between 2014 
and 2015. This reversal in the upward trend of life 
expectancy is shocking and almost unprecedented 
for a rich country in recent decades. The CDC 
emphasized the role of rising substance abuse, 
and especially the modern opioid epidemic, in 
the reversal. The CDC counted 63,000 deaths 
from drug overdoses in 2016, marking an in-
crease in the age-specific mortality rate from 6.1 
per 100,000 in 1999 to 19.8 per 100,000 in 2016, 
as shown in Figure 7.5.
While many socioeconomic factors and substances 
are involved in this epidemic, one major culprit is 
the class of opioids. Causes of increased opioid 
deaths include the introduction in the 1990s of 
new prescription opioids such as OxyContin, the 
update of new powerful synthetic opioids such 
as Fentanyl, and the increased use of heroin, with 
trends shown in Figure 7.6.
Roughly 20 years after the onset of the opioid 
prescription-drug epidemic, it is becoming 
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Figure 7.5: Age-adjusted Drug Overdose Death Rates: U.S., 1999–2016
Source: CDC 
Figure 7.6: Overdose Deaths Involving Opioids, by Type of Opioid,  
United States, 2000–2015
Source: CDC
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increasingly clear that pharmaceutical companies, 
notably Purdue Pharma (the manufacturer of 
OxyContin), engaged in aggressive marketing  
of the opioid prescription drugs despite  
growing evidence that a dangerous epidemic 
was getting underway. 
No doubt because the U.S. is the epicenter of 
opioid drug manufacturing and prescription, it is 
also the epicenter of the global opioid epidemic. 
Estimates of the Disability-Adjusted Life years 
(DALYs) per 100,000 population for opioid use 
disorders is shown in the map in Figure 7.7. The 
U.S. shows appears bright red, the world’s most 
intense hotspot, with 764 DALYs per 100,000, 
followed by Russia (605), Iraq (578), and Iran (556).
The Depression Epidemic
There is significant evidence of a major, long-term, 
and continuing epidemic of clinical depression 
(including Major Depression Disorder, MDD, and 
Major Depressive Episodes, MDEs) and other 
psychopathologies including psychopathic 
deviation, paranoia, and hypomania. Twenge  
et al. report the following:
Two cross-temporal meta-analyses find large 
generational increases in psychopathology 
among American college students 
(N=63,706) between 1938 and 2007 on the 
MMPI [Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory] and MMPI-2 and high school 
students (N=13,870) between 1951 and 2002 
on the MMPI-A … The results best fit a model 
citing cultural shifts toward extrinsic goals, 
such as materialism and status and away 
from intrinsic goals, such as community, 
meaning in life, and affiliation.
New research supports this conclusion for more 
recent years. Mojtabai et al. examined national 
trends in the prevalence of major  




depressive episodes (MDEs) in adolescents and 
young adults between 2005 and 2014, with the 
following conclusions:
The 12-month prevalence of MDEs increased 
from 8.7% in 2005 to 11.3% in 2014 in adoles-
cents and from 8.8% to 9.6% in young adults 
(both P < .001). The increase was larger and 
statistically significant only in the age range of 
12 to 20 years. The trends remained significant 
after adjustment for substance use disorders 
and sociodemographic factors … In the 
context of little change in mental health 
treatments, trends in prevalence translate 
into a growing number of young people with 
untreated depression.
Another study this past year reaches a very 
similar conclusion:
The current study estimated trends in the 
prevalence of major depression in the U.S. 
population from 2005 to 2015 overall and by 
demographic subgroups. Data were drawn 
from the National Survey on Drug Use and 
Health (NSDUH), an annual cross-sectional 
study of U.S. persons ages 12 and over (total 
analytic sample N = 607,520). Depression 
prevalence increased significantly in the  
U.S. from 2005 to 2015, before and after 
controlling for demographics. Increases in 
depression were significant for the youngest 
and oldest age groups, men, and women, 
Non-Hispanic White persons, the lowest 
income group, and the highest education and 
income groups.
The causes of the MDD epidemic are not defini-
tively established. They may include sociological 
factors (decline in social support systems, more 
loneliness), economic factors (rising inequality of 
income, financial crisis, economic stress), shifting 
cultural norms (more materialism), biophysical 
factors (declining physical activity, sugar addiction 
and other dietary changes, obesity, less time spent 
in open sunlight), technological facts (time spent 
on social media and electronic devices such as 
smartphones), or other causes still to be identified.
As with obesity and opioid abuse, the U.S. stands 
out among the world’s nations as having one of 
the highest burdens of disease from major 
Figure 7.8: Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), DALYs per 100,000, 2016  
(both sexes, all ages) 
Source: IHME
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depressive disorder. The estimates of DALYs per 
capita for the world, estimated by the IHME, are 
shown in Figure 7.8. The highest burdens per 
capita are estimated to be in Morocco (956 
DALYs per 100,000). Among the OECD countries, 
the U.S. ranks third (679), behind Portugal (702) 
and Sweden (702).
As reported by Twenge and colleagues, the 
evidence suggests a significant rise in  
adolescent depressive symptoms and suicide 
rates between 2010 and 2015. There is evidence, 
moreover, that the rising rates of adolescent 
depression are correlated with the use of new 
screen technologies (smartphones, video games) 
and social media. Causation may run in both 
directions, from depressive syndromes toward 
screen time (as a kind of “self-medication”) and 
from screen time toward depressive symptoms, 
for example, through the development of  
addictive behaviors to the new technologies,  
and other depression-inducing conditions such 
as increased loneliness and feelings of alienation 
resulting from online rather than interpersonal 
interactions. Video games, for example, seem  
to have six attributes of addiction: salience, 
mood modification (“self-medication”),  
tolerance, withdrawal, conflict, and relapse.  
See also Shakya and Christakis for evidence  
that Facebook use is associated with lower 
self-reported mental health.
Without question, the burden of mental illness  
on SWB in the U.S. is enormous, and according 
to Layard and colleagues, depression is the 
single largest determinant of SWB in a cross-sec-
tion of individuals within the U.S. Indeed, Layard 
and colleagues find that mental illness is the 
single largest determinant of well-being across 
individuals in four countries studied: the U.S., 
Australia, Britain, and Indonesia. The importance 
of mental illness in the variation of SWB across 
individuals in the population is illustrated by 
Clark et al. in Figure 7.9.
Figure 7.9: Percentage Fall in Misery if Various Problems Could Be Eliminated




The U.S. is in the midst of a complex and  
worsening public-health crisis, involving  
epidemics of obesity, opioid addiction, and major 
depressive disorder that are all remarkable by 
global standards. The cumulative effect of these 
epidemics is the remarkable recent fall in overall 
life expectancy at birth (LEB), an event that is 
nearly unprecedented for a high-income country 
in peacetime. Even before the national LEB 
began to decline in 2015, age-specific all-cause 
mortality rates were already on the rise between 
1999 and 2013 for white, non-Hispanic, working- 
class, midlife adults (aged 45-54), notably those 
without a college degree, as documented by 
Case and Deaton. The major causes of the rising 
death rates noted by Case and Deaton were drug 
overdoses, suicides, and alcohol-related liver 
mortality, consistent with the rising prevalence  
of substance abuse (including opioids) and 
mental illness.
The quantitative implications of these epidemics 
for America’s overall SWB is hard to assess 
without more granular data linking individual 
SWB with individual conditions of obesity, opioid 
dependence, and depression. Yet we are justified 
to suspect that the implications are very large. 
America’s HALE is now around 4.3 years behind 
the five leading countries, and America’s obesity 
prevalence, opioid misuse, and MDD prevalence 
are among the very highest in the world. As 
Layard has recently reminded us:
Mental illness is one of the main causes of 
unhappiness in the world. It produces nearly 
as much of the misery that exists as poverty 
does, and more than is caused by physical 
illness. Treating it should be a top priority for 
every government, as should the promotion 
of good mental health … This would save 
billions because mental illness is a major 
block on the economy. It is the main illness 
among people of working age. It reduces 
national income per head by some 5 per 
cent—through non-employment, absenteeism, 
lowered productivity, and extra physical 
healthcare costs. Mental illness accounts for 
a third of disability worldwide.
Why has the United States performed more 
poorly than other high-income countries on 
public health generally, and on these three 
epidemics specifically? I would suggest the 
following four hypotheses.
First, the U.S. sociopolitical system produces 
higher levels of income inequality than in the 
other OECD high-income countries. High U.S. 
inequality, and especially the persistent  
absolute and relative poverty of a significant  
portion of the U.S. population, are risk factors  
for all three epidemics. The evidence is clear that 
low socioeconomic status is a major risk factor 
for poor mental and physical health. As Everson 
et al. concluded:
Many of the leading causes of death and 
disability in the United States and other 
countries are associated with socioeconomic 
position. The least well-off suffer a dispro-
portionate share of the burden of disease, 
including depression, obesity, and diabetes … 
Data from these studies demonstrate that 
the effects of economic disadvantage are 
cumulative, with the greatest risk of poor 
mental and physical health seen among 
those who experienced sustained hardship 
over time.
Second, the three epidemics are mostly likely 
mutually reinforcing. Obesity causes depression 
and depression can lead to obesity. Depression 
and substance abuse are also bi-causal.
Third, the U.S. healthcare system is woefully 
inadequate to face these epidemics. U.S. health-
care is the most expensive in the world by far. 
Coverage rates of the poor are the lowest among 
the high-income countries. The emphasis is on 
treatment rather than prevention. And healthcare 
for depression is notably deficient. According to 
Dr. Renee Goodwin, “A growing number of Amer-
icans, especially socioeconomically vulnerable indi-
viduals and young persons, are suffering from 
untreated depression.”
Fourth, America’s culture and politics of 
corporate deregulation is partly responsible. The 
obesity epidemic can be linked directly to the 
fast-food industry, especially the aggressive use 
and promotion of sugar additives and other 
obesogenic processed foods. The opioid epidemic 
can be traced in part to the lobbying and direct 
marketing of major pharmaceutical companies. 
The extraordinarily high cost, and therefore 
under-coverage, of the U.S. healthcare system, 
including for mental illnesses, is the result in part 
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of corporate lobbying for the freedom of private 
healthcare providers to set exorbitant prices 
despite the evidence of very limited and inade-
quate market competition  
over prices.
Fifth, the U.S. may be among the leading countries 
experiencing depressive syndromes associated 
with the new social media and with increasing 
screen times on the new ICTs. As indicated 
earlier, the correlation of depression and new 
media is likely to be bi-causal. Depressive  
tendencies may lead to excessive use of new 
technologies, while screen time may itself be 
addictive and/or linked to increased loneliness 
and alienation.
The disease epidemics, in short, most likely have 
a similar etiology to the decline in social capital 
that I addressed in my analysis in last year’s 
World Happiness Report. In both cases, inequali-
ty, corporate power, and disruptions of so-
cial-support networks, are major factors in 
America’s social crisis. The result is a decline in 
trust, a rise in perceptions of corruption, and a 
population that is suffering from pain, suffering, 
and premature mortality.
Practical policies exist to reverse all three of  
the epidemics. Obesity can be reduced through 
regulations limiting sugar additives in store-
bought products; corrective taxes on soda 
beverages; the elimination of subsidies on corn 
(and therefore on high-fructose corn syrup); 
limits on food advertising, especially to young 
children; and the promotion of public awareness 
regarding the causes of obesity and solution 
through more healthful diets. Mental health can 
be improved through preventative medicine, 
measures to strengthen social support systems 
for vulnerable groups, steps to combat addic-
tions to the new social media and technologies, 
and greatly improved access to mental health 
services. The opioid epidemic could be radically 
reduced by ending the direct marketing of addic-
tive drugs to patients as well as banning the 
implicit and explicit kickbacks to doctors who 
(over-)prescribe these dangerous products.
These are important “top-down” policy changes. 
At the same time, “bottom-up” programs of  
positive psychology and wellness at schools, 
workplaces, and in the community can help 
individuals to change their own behaviours, 
overcome addictions, and pursue life strategies 
(such as meditation) to bolster their personal 
well-being and the well-being of friends, family, 
and community. The evidence is large and 
growing that such life-change strategies can be 
highly effective. This year’s Global Happiness 
Policy Report contains detailed surveys on best 
practices in education, the workplace, and 
personal, family, and community well-being.
The main issue for the U.S. is not the lack of 
means to address the crises of public health and 
declining well-being. Rather, perhaps the major 
practical barrier is corporate lobbying that keeps 
dangerous corporate practices in place and 
imposes untold burdens on the poor and  
vulnerable parts of the U.S. population, coupled 
with the failure of the American political system 
to address and understand America’s growing 
social crisis. The challenge of well-being is a matter 
both of high politics and economics and the sum 
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Migrant Acceptance Index: 
Do Migrants Have Better 
Lives in Countries That  
Accept Them?
Neli Esipova, Julie Ray, John Fleming and Anita Pugliese
World Happiness Report 2018
In reaction to the migrant crisis that swept 
Europe in 2015 and the backlash against  
migrants that accompanied it, Gallup  
developed a Migrant Acceptance Index  
(MAI) designed to gauge people’s personal 
acceptance of migrants not just in Europe,  
but throughout the rest of the world.1 
Gallup’s Migrant Acceptance Index is based  
on three questions that ask respondents about 
migrants in increasing level of proximity to  
them. Respondents are asked whether the 
following situations are “good things” or  
“bad things”: immigrants living in their country, 
an immigrant becoming their neighbor and 
immigrants marrying into their families.
“A good thing” response is worth three points  
in the index calculation, a volunteered response 
of “it depends” or “don’t know” is worth one 
point, and “a bad thing” is worth zero points.  
We considered volunteered responses such as “it 
depends” because in some countries, who these 
migrants are may factor more heavily into whether 
they are accepted. The index is a sum of the 
points across the three questions, with a maximum 
possible score of 9.0 (all three are good things) 
and a minimum possible score of zero (all three 
are bad things). The higher the score, the more 
accepting the population is of migrants. 
Scores on Gallup’s first global deployment of this 
index ranged widely across the total 140 countries 
where these questions were asked in 2016 and 
2017,2 from a high of 8.26 in Iceland to a low of 
1.47 in Macedonia. The total sample included more 
than 147,000 adults aged 15 and older, and among 
them, more than 8,000 first-generation migrants.
In all, 29 countries’ index scores fall more than 
one standard deviation below the country-level 
mean score and 23 countries’ index scores fall 
more than one standard deviation above the 
country-level mean score. The bulk of the rest  
of the world falls in the middle. In the countries 
at the extreme ends of the distribution—the 
countries that are the least-accepting and the 
most-accepting of migrants – is where we see 
the biggest differences in how migrants  
themselves rate their lives, which we will discuss 
in more detail later.
Least-Accepting Countries Cluster 
Primarily in Eastern, Southeastern 
Europe
Many of the countries that are the least-accepting 
of migrants are located in Eastern or Southeastern 
Europe, and were on the front lines or touched 
somehow by the recent migrant crisis. For 
example, nine of the 10 countries that score a 
2.39 or lower on the index are former Soviet bloc 
countries—most located along the Balkan route 
that once channeled asylum seekers from Greece 
to Germany.
While the bulk of the least-accepting countries 
are in Eastern or Southeastern Europe, four are in 
the Middle East and North Africa. This includes 
Israel, Egypt, Iraq and Jordan. The others are in 
Table A1. Migrant Acceptance Index Items
Question Response options*
I would like to ask you some questions about foreign immigrants people 
who have come to live and work in this country from another country. 
Please tell me whether you, personally, think each of the following is a 
good thing or a bad thing? How about: 
 • Immigrants living in [country name]?   
 • An immigrant becoming your neighbor? 






*Responses in parentheses were volunteered by the respondent.  
Copyright © 2016–2017 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved.
Asia: Afghanistan and Pakistan in South Asia, 
Myanmar and Thailand in Southeast Asia, and 
Mongolia in East Asia. 
Most-Accepting Countries Span 
Globe, Income Levels
As opposed to the least-accepting countries, 
which are more geographically and culturally 
clustered, the most-accepting countries for 
migrants are located in disparate parts of the 
globe. The top two most-accepting countries 
could not be farther apart—Iceland with a score 
of 8.26, and New Zealand with a score of 8.25. 
The bulk of the most-accepting countries for 
migrants primarily come from Oceania, Western 
Europe, sub-Saharan Africa and Northern  
America. However, a common thread tying many 
of the most-accepting countries together is their 
long history as receiving countries for migrants. 
Although the recent U.S. election was marked by 
considerable anti-immigrant rhetoric, the U.S. 
ranks among the most-accepting countries with 
a score of 7.86. Canada also makes this list, but 
scores higher than its neighbor to the south, with 
a score of 8.14.
Migrant Acceptance Linked to  
Migrants’ Evaluations of Their  
Current, Future Lives
For the past decade, Gallup has asked adults 
worldwide to evaluate their lives on the Cantril 
Self-Anchoring Striving Scale, where “0”  
represents the worst possible life, and “10” 
represents the best possible life.3 In our earlier 
research, we were able to determine that where 
migrants come from, where they go, and how 
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Figure A1: Distribution of Migrant Acceptance Index Scores
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long they stay affects their life evaluations on  
this scale.4 Turning our focus to the potential 
relationship between life evaluations and migrant 
acceptance, we also see that people’s acceptance 
of migrants—or the lack thereof—is linked to how 
migrants themselves evaluate their lives. 
To explore the relationship between migrant life 
evaluations and the level of migrant acceptance 
in their new countries, we conducted an analysis 
of covariance on individuals’ current life  
evaluations on this scale, using age, gender and 
education level as covariates. We adjusted the 
data with regard to age, gender and education  
to allow for fairer comparisons between  
migrants’ life evaluations and the life ratings of 
other populations, such as the native-born in 
destination countries.5 
Migrants as well as the native-born living in 
countries that are the least-accepting of  
migrants evaluate their lives less positively than 
Table A2: Least-Accepting  
Countries for Migrants
29 countries with index scores that fall one standard 
deviation below the country-level mean score
Country
Migrant 
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those who live in countries that are the most 
accepting, regardless of whether they are  
newcomers (who have lived in the country for 
less than five years) or long-timers (who have 
lived in the country for more than five years).6 
In the least-accepting countries, newcomers—
who may be full of optimism and hope about life 
in their new countries—rate their current lives 
more positively than the native-born. But this 
positively fades the longer migrants stay in 
countries where the population is not receptive 
to them. Long-timers’ life evaluations are  
statistically much lower than the scores for 
newcomers, but their life evaluations also drop 
lower than the scores for the native-born.7 
The story is different for migrants in the  
most-accepting countries. Newcomer migrants 
and long-timer migrants both rate their lives 
higher than the native-born do. Notably, migrants 
do not lose their positive outlook the longer they 
stay: The life evaluations of newcomers and 
long-timers is statistically the same. 
Outlook for the Future
Migrants and the native-born in the least-accepting 
countries rate their lives in five years better than 
their present situations, but they still lag far 
behind their counterparts in the most-accepting 
countries. Newcomers in the least-accepting 
countries have a more positive outlook for their 
lives than the native-born do, but long-timers 
again are more pessimistic than either group. 
In the most-accepting countries, the native-born 
and newcomer migrants share the same level of 
optimism about their lives in five years, but 
long-timers give their future lives higher ratings 
than the native-born or newcomers do. It’s 
possible that since long-timers have had more 
time than newcomers to establish themselves in 
their lives and careers, they not only may be 
more hopeful, but also more confident about 
what the future may bring. 
Figure A2: Current Life Evaluations by Migrant Acceptance Index
   Least-accepting countries   Most-accepting countries
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Future Research
Although Gallup has data from 140 countries, the 
samples of migrants available in a single year of 
data collection permits us to analyze the links 
between migrant acceptance and migrants’ lives 
only in broad strokes. 
Earlier Gallup research on migrants indicates 
that where people come from and where they 
move to and how long they stay play a large role 
in whether they gain or lose from migration.8 
Future World Poll research on migrant acceptance 
may allow us not only to do more in-depth 
analysis at the country level, but also to discover 
whether migrants’ countries of origin also factor 
into their life evaluations when they move to 
countries that are more likely to accept or to not 
accept them. Further, with larger sample sizes, 
we would be able to investigate how migrant 
acceptance may affect potential migrants’ desire 
to migrate and their plans to move and where 
they would like to go. 
Figure A3: Future Life Evaluations by Migrant Acceptance Index
   Least-accepting countries   Most-accepting countries

















1  Esipova et al (2018). 
2   Based on World Poll surveys in 138 countries in 2016, and 
the U.S. and Canada in 2017. 
3   Gallup (2010).  
4   International Organization for Migration (2013). 
5   Results of the ANCOVA revealed statistically significant 
effects for two of the three covariates: Education level 
(F(1,32521) = 2126.5, p < .0001; Gender (F(1,32521) = 23.1, p 
< .001; and Age (F(1,32521) = 1.9, p < .168).
6   A significant main effect for migrant status emerged with 
newcomer migrants providing significantly higher life 
evaluations than either native-born or long-timer migrants, 
F(2,32521) = 9.0, p < .001. A significant main effect for 
migrant acceptance also emerged, with respondents from 
the most-accepting countries providing significantly higher 
life evaluations than those from the least-accepting 
countries, F(1,32521) = 60.2, p < .002. 
7   A significant Migrant Status x Migrant Acceptance 
interaction emerged, F(2,32521) = 21.0, p < .001. Simple 
effects analyses revealed that while newcomer migrants 
had higher life ratings than their native-born counterparts 
for both the most- and least-accepting countries, long-tim-
er migrants in the least-accepting countries had significant-
ly lower life ratings than either the native-born or newcom-
er migrants. Long-timer migrants in the most-accepting 
countries had life evaluations that were equal to those of 
newcomer migrants.
8   Esipova et al (2013). 
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